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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Dissertation 
At present a variety of cosmological schemes is presented in 
scientific circles for consideration. In the last forty years yet others 
have been developed. Each has explicit and implicit indications as to 
why it is considered to be preferable to its competitors and each has 
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a rather clear development over a fairly short period readily tied down 
in the pertinent literature. Each thus indicates its presumed opera-
tional and conceptual values and each reveals its peculiar difficulties 
and predilections. The degree to which this is the case is accentuated 
by the frequent open debate by partisans and critics where aims and 
biases are explored with candor and unusual clarity. 
At present also, a recent translation into English of Karl Popper's 
Logik der Forschung, and a number of other books and articles by the 
same author, have raised widespread interest in his rather unusual views 
as to the ways in which scientific theories should be developed and tested. 
Some of these views are of particular interest in cosmology. and indeed 
some of the cosmologists mentioned above claim to use his standards to 
judge their, and their competitors', work. It then must be seen whether, 
since 1917, we have seen in the field of scientific cosmology illustrations 
of the fruitfulness, actual or potential, of his criteria. 
So, it shall be the purpose of this dissertation to examine Popper's 
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ideas as to the formulation and acceptability of scientific theories when 
applied to the specific problem of constructing models of the universe 
of a general type, since these involve unique difficulties. It also intends 
to examine the cosmological models presented, since these reveal the 
working methods, aims, and assumptions of the more philosophical type 
of scientific mind. As a consequence, it may be possible to point up 
certain limitations in the working philosophies of contemporary cosmo-
logical theorists, as Popper might see them, while showing to what 
degree their unusual problems fit or imply revision in the schemes 
offered by Popper. 
This dissertation is interested, then, more in methodology and its 
structure than in the synthesis of cosmologies of a physical type in some 
broader world view of the author's own or of someone else. Of course, 
the weltanschauung of the person choosing a methodology, or specifically 
a cosmological model of the physical universe, will be pertinent insofar 
as it has influence and thus will be examined where possible. But, in the 
main, stress will be placed upon two questions, the first of which is 
whether Popper's views as to the most fruitful process of scientific 
speculation agree with the way in which models of the universe have, in 
fact, developed. The second is the question of whether the unique problems 
met by models of cosmological scope and with unusual boundary conditions 
suggest revision in Popper's scheme and, on the other hand, whether 
Popper presents fruitful criteria for choice among the postulated cosmo-
logical models. 
2. Definitions 
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There are a relatively few terms or ideas requiring definition here 
and not explicated later. The first of these is the meaning of 'theory 
formation.' Popper expressly excludes from the logical analysis of 
scientific method the psychological processes by which a theory is 
stimulated and formulated. He will include only questions of judgment 
as to the relative testability of theories and thus of their mathematical 
form with which he connects the prediction of ease of testing. The dis-
sertation will carefully enunciate Popper's criteria here for formulating 
such testable theories, which he equates with structuring them so they 
will be most readily falsifiable by observation should they actually be 
false in their claims regarding reality. Any correction or amplification 
of these criteria~ by us, will be strictly with the intent of pointing 
attention to other factors apparently playing a role in the formulation of 
cosmological theories so as to increase their potential testability 
(falsifiability). Other influences than the attempt to attain or avoid 
testability in the development and defence of theories will be ignored by 
us~ as they are with Popper. 
The second is the usage of the term 'cosmological model.' It may 
be taken to me:an the construct which is postulated to describe the major 
featuresof the physical universe in a coherent fashion. One can separate 
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it from the theory believed to explain what goes on within the model. 
Conjoining theory and model one achieves a hypothesis regarding the 
laws which govern astrophysical processes as a whole and the character 
of observations which should be possible if the laws are true. Since we 
desire to discuss such a conjunction we will treat the term 'model' in 
the broad sense of such a hypothesis. Where a distinction of theory and 
model is necessary for our purposes it will be made apparent at the 
appropriate juncture. 
The last term which perhaps needs some clarification is 'post-
relativistic.' It is intended to convey the idea that our emphasis will 
be on cosmological schemes in science since the advent of special 
relativity very early in this century, and the generalized relativistic 
theory a decade later. However. it appears necessary to outline clearly 
certain antecedent discussions both of method and of cosmological theory 
content, as well as to define the essentials of both theories of relativity, 
so that the genesis of many contemporary issues will become clearer. 
Hence a chapter has been allotted to this task. 
3. Limitations 
It is quite apparent that an adequate exploration of the issues noted 
in Section One is a task of taxing proportions. Yet it has seemed to the 
author impossible to ascertain the answers to these issues in any partial 
fashion, such as by analyzing only one class of models or by going into 
less subsidiary technical detail. The present science in cosmology is 
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one in which competing schemes strongly influence one another and often 
experience partial synthesis. The broad theoretical foundations and/ or 
basic methodological controls may be the same for schemes of fairly 
different character. Also, subsidiary theories may, in part, be embraced 
in quite different models. And the tests, by observation, of cosmologies 
may not be critical to any single class or type of model, particularly if 
adjustment of the models is made to permit the new empirical data, which 
raises the vexing question of what change is ad hoc and which is not. 
This requires a detached analysis of the technical test data itself. 
If it appears impossible to determine adequately how cosmologists 
work without seeing the interplay of their theories, and the complex 
sociological influences on both theory choice and evaluation of testing as 
manifested in the multiplicity of theories available for consideration, so 
it seems impossible to broaden the survey to cover more philosophical 
cosmologies and still remain close to our task of evaluating cosmologies 
by their testability under critical astrophysical observation. Of course 
the philosophical context in which a person, or a group of persons, make 
a judgment as to the possibility of a very general theory in astrophysics, 
and later as to its tenability after observational testing, may be of import 
(indeed the author believes it is greater than Popper suggests). But our 
task is one of assessing the fruitfulness of differing methodologies in 
scientific cosmology, so that broader epistemic and metaphysical issues 
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can be introduced only as they are necessary to such purposes as those 
just noted. No attempt is made to criticize these more embracing issues 
on any other basis. 
The author does claim to have rather exhaustively covered his 
allotted field of discussion, however. He has intensively surveyed the 
astronomical literature of the last half century, using his own library, 
the library of the Georgetown University Observatory, University of 
Toronto, and Boston University. He believes little of importance to his 
topic in English-, French-, or German-language journals or books in the 
field has escaped his attention, although some of it was not used because 
of duplication. The period before 1900 has been surveyed through the half 
dozen major journals in the history of science, the standard monographs, 
and, where feasible, the original sources. 
On the more philosophical side of the dissertation the author has 
read all the major works of Popper in print as well as talking briefly with 
him, he has intensively surveyed the major philosophical journals for 
material pertinent to all phases of his subject, as well as reading widely 
the more elaborate works in the field of theory formation and testing. He 
is thus aware of the many important questions given only brief mention in 
the following chapters and of the varied perspectives on many points which 
should be given comparative analysis elsewhere. But he has felt it neces-
sary to outline cosmology only from the direction of its methods and 
concepts as pertinent to the kind of issues Fbppe.rraises, having to do 
with choice among theories before and after testing just as he has felt 
it essential only to criticize Popper's work from the side of the limi-
tations revealed therein by actual cosmological work. He may then 
hope to bring the work into manageable proportions. 
The dissertation is written for the person only generally aware 
7 
of the nature of both Popper's work and contemporary physical cosmology. 
It claims to be philosophical, not only in many incidental senses which 
will be apparent, but in the tradition of the philosophy of science which 
explores the formulation of scientific theories, the unfolding of their 
consequences, and the evaluation of testing. But even more than this, the 
use of cosmology as a specific science in our study of Popper's analysis 
is particularly apt because of its problems of uniqueness and boundary 
values, and because of its close relationship to issues of religious and 
metaphysical concern. This relationship is influential in both model 
choice and in evaluating test procedures and may aid in clarifying any 
opaqueness in Popper's work on these. 
4. Previous Research in the Field 
It would be quite misleading to assume that either Popper's analysis 
of the logic of scientific work or the methods and concepts of cosmologists 
have not been evaluated elsewhere. There is, indeed, a sizeable literature 
in both areas. But it would be equally as incorrect to say that the 
analyses of Popper's work have been either sufficiently extensive in 
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their criticism or correct in the points usually made, as it would be 
incorrect to assume that the general methodology of the differing 
cosmological models and the modes of comparative testing have been 
given any thorough unified analysis. And certainly no one has attempted 
the mutual interplay of Popper and cosmological work attempted here. 
Such work on Popper's scientific philosophy as seems valuable 
we have noted at the appropriate time. Most of it is of a limited sort 
dealing with a few specific points. The occasional broader surveys, 
~ Passmore's and Wisdom's, have proven rather useless for the degree 
of insight we have found necessary. There is, of course, an extensive 
literature differing implicitly with Popper's work to a smaller or larger 
extent. Since we do not intend a comparison per se, we have utilized 
this only when it was considered useful to a point we might desire to 
make, and it is noted at such times. 
Physical cosmology has been fortunate in having such lucid reporters 
"' of its intricate facets as Einstein, Eddington, Milne, Lemaitre, Bondi and 
Hoyle. It is also blessed with a number of fine, highly mathematical 
treatments of many of the models to be discus sed. But none of these 
expressly unfold the methodological and conceptual framework of, and 
the procedures necessary for the testing of, the many models we must 
cover, certainly with the detail we need. We have thus tried for a survey 
which is sufficiently comprehensive, as well as sufficiently intensive and 
precise, to indicat e clearly the everyday problems of the cosmologist 
as well as the attitudes controlling his work. As an important part of 
this, we have attempted a careful assessment of the present status 
of testing in all areas of each model as well as a distillation of points 
of essential difference and similarity among the conceptual foundations 
of differing models. McVittie and Stoops offer the most extensive 
similar surveys but they are much more limited in most of the above 
areas. 
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The author thus feels sure that he has offered a uniquely thorough 
and careful explication of cosmological theory development historically 
in the past forty-five years, and the only extensive survey of the problems 
of testing on the contemporary scene, suitable for comparison adequately 
with the contentions of Popper both as to how scientists work and the 
goals their methodology should achieve. But the debt he owes to other 
less general work, or those differing in intent is large. Where it is con-
scious, it is carefully noted in the footnotes or appendices. 
5. The Methodology of the Dissertation 
The work which follows has been divided into five chapters and 
extensive appendices. The rationale behind such a two-fold distribution 
has been merely to keep the more technical explication separate from 
the main text and thus to keep the body of the thesis at least less 
difficult to read than would otherwise be the case. The reason for the 
specific classification of the five main chapters may not be so obvious. 
The second chapter is a rather detailed summary of Popper's 
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ideas as to the nature of scientific theories, the methods by which they 
are applied, and the means to attaining testability of a maximal sort for 
them. No attempt is made to be explicitly critical although there is some 
shaping of the content because of the organization of the collated material. 
However, a careful presentation of Popper's discussions seemed most 
necessary because of the amazing frequency with which he is misunder-
stood and because an ordered outline of his thought on our topic is not 
readily obtained by reading his works too narrowly or quickly. 
The third chapter, of the character of a history of cosmological 
ideas, may seem redundant both because of a number of histories avail-
able and because it is not within the period defined by our dissertation 
title. But the author believes it is neither. In the latter case, as Popper 
himself has agreed in conversation, there is need to enunciate carefully 
the many important strands leading to the warp and woof of contemporary 
cosmological theorizing. In the former case our defence must be that • 
.. 
though we have such major works as those of Koyre. Munitz, Jammer, 
Hesse, and Whittaker, and many more specific studies, there is no single 
source, or small group of sources, for the conceptual and methodological 
type of analysis we require. Indeed, much of the survey literature that 
is available seems to exhibit errors which can be quite serious for our 
purposes. Consequently, it has seemed wise to provide our own analysis 
utilizing the original sources and/ or the finest of contemporary scholar-
ship on matters of detail. 
ll 
The fourth chapter is intended to be a careful enunciation of the 
basic characteristics of the major types of cosmological schemes offered 
in the past half century. Care is taken to show clearly the method used 
to develop each, the judgments made as to ancillary concepts, and the 
kind of testing available or considered pertinent by advocate or critic. 
The philosophical attitudes incipient in, or embracing, these models 
along with the discussion of most of the empirical problems in the above 
points is, however, retained for later criticism. 
In the fifth chapter a careful attempt is made to discover whether 
cosmologists do in fact follow the various suggestions and claims of 
Popper in forming, developing the consequences of, testing, and defending 
their constructs. Popper's scheme for choice among models is also 
brought to bear in detail to discover whether it suggests which models 
ought to be preferred. Finally, an attempt is made to point up the various 
problems raised by such specific ideas as the principle of uniformity, 
and the question of creation. By so doing inherent limitations involved 
in certain schemes can be delineated and also revisions can be assayed 
with the intent of improving their testability. 
Finally, the sixth chapter attempts to criticize Popper's ideas in 
the light of the present situation in cosmology where limitations in test-
ing are present and where residual disagreement as to model choice is 
thus a question of preferred method or of other value judgments. 
Specific attention is paid to a critique of the concept of simplicity and 
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allied ideas in Popper as well as to the importance of esthetic and meta-
physical judgments in cosmology. which Popper treats imperfectly. 
Lastly. his falsifiability criterion is assessed as his major contribution 
in the philosophy of science and improvements are suggested in the light 
of the severe stress placed on Popper's fairly simple scheme by so 
difficult a study as that of cosmology. 
Thus1 the order of the chapters and their content is intended to 
alleviate the tendency for the dissertation to become a physics thesis 
on the one hand or a history of science thesis on the other. It should 
keep clearly before the reader the simple question. "How does one 
choose among cosmological models? 11 in the present complexity of 
astrophysical science. And just as by using Popper's analyses to cri-
ticize models presented, and arguments made in their defence, we can 
limit our critique therein so~ in turn. by using only arguments in fact 
raised by cosmology we can limit our critique of Popper to these 
specifics. The results~ we hope. will be most heuristic. 
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II. POPPER ON THE FACTORS ESTABUSHING THE MERIT OF A 
SCIENTIFIC THEORY. 
1. The Demarcation of Empirical Science. 
i. The Problem of a Criterion of Demarcation. 
Having discussed, in the brief introduction, the philosophical 
context in which Popper's work is to be placed, it is now time to turn 
to a closer examination of the work itself. Much of what Popper has 
written must be ignored in line with our specific interests, but all of 
it is valuable and immensely stimulating and repays richly any study 
given it. In what follows, attention will be focused on Popper's broader 
theses which are of great import to the subject matter of this disserta-
tion and on certain of the specific amplifications he offers which are 
pertinent to our task. 
It is hardly debatable that Popper's basic interest lies in specify-
ing the nature of empirical science as a distinctive area of human thought. 
Indeed he tells us that for over forty years he has grappled with the 
problem of deciding when one theory was scientific and when another was 
not, as quite distinct from their respective successes in unfolding reality 
to our ken. "I wished to distinguish between science and pseudo-science; 
knowing very well that science often errs, and that pseudo-science may 
happen to stumble upon the truth.',l It requires very little insight to see 
1. K. Popper, "Philosophy of Science: A Personal Report," 
British Philosophy in the Mid-Century, ed. C. A. Mace, pp. 154-191. 
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that few problems in a critical analysis of human thought are so fraught 
with dissention as is this one1 and the discussion aroused since he first 
perused the question bears witness to the dissonance rather sharply. 
Now why should such disagreement arise? One might surely 
suspect any simple answer to the delimitation of what is 'scientific' 
and Popper's many writings and the sizeable literature that has grown 
around and about these at least give indication on the face of it that his 
answer is reassuringly complex and thus beyond suspicion. Yet1 as we 
shall soon discover1 Popper sees the answer as suggestively simple 
in its basis. Beyond that1 only fortification and defence are necessary; 
a task to which Popper applies himself with considerable diligence1 
always challenging and often brilliant. 
Popper's examination begins with the presumption that all rational 
discussion involves the clear statement of a problem and the critical 
examination of solutions proposed to it. With this few would disagree, 
but the precise nature of what is involved in critically examining suggested 
solutions turns out to be all-important1 for he tells us that ''whenever we 
try to propose a solution to a problem, we ought to try as hard as we can 
to overthrow our solution, rather than defend it." 1 Even if we fail, others 
will provide the criticism! 
Of course1 such critical analysis will apply to mathematics, logic., 
1. K. Popper1 The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: 
Hutchinson & Co. 1959)1 p. 16. 
and philosophical inquiry as well as to empirical science. "I do not 
care what methods a philosopher (or anyone else) may use as long as 
he has an interesting problem, and so long as he is sincerely trying 
to solve it." 1 It is necessary to ascertain~ then~ what is distinctive 
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in scientific analysis of both experiential and theoretical types. Popper 
is very solicitous of the latter and concludes that theoretical statements 
must be retained within the domain of empirical science even if this 
obviates using experimental and observational verification as a criterion 
of distinctiveness. 2 Thus~ while assuming that a system is scientific 
"only if it is capable of being tested by experience,'~ the desire which 
we all should have to disprove rather than defend any theories therein~ and 
the necessity to retain the theoretical facets of science 1eave us with only 
falsification as the criterion by which we demarcate science from other 
areas of human thought. 
I shall not require of a scientific system that it shall be 
capable of being singled out, once and for all~ in a 
positive sense; but I shall require that its logical form 
shall be such that it can be singled out, by means of 
empirical tests~ in a negative sense: it must be possible 
for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by 
experience. 4 
Indeed, he tells us clearly that we must expose any system we desire 
to call empirical to possible falsification in every conceivable way. 5 
Thus the empirical method aims ''not to save the lives of untenable 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 16. 
2. Ibid., p. 40. 
3. Loc.cit. 
4. Ibid., pp. 40-41. 
5. K. Popper, LSD~ p. 42. 
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systems but, on the contrary, to select the one which is by comparison 
the fittest, by exposing them all to the fiercest struggle for survival. "1 
We will return to his elaboration upon, and defense of, this thesis in a 
moment, but it is of interest to note how Popper's thinking took on these 
directions. 
He tells us that during his student days and following the collapse 
of the Austrian empire, the Vienna air was full of new ideas such as 
Einstein's relativity theory, Marx's view of history, Freud's psycho-
analysis, and Alfred Adler's 'individual psychology.' The eclipse 
observations of 1919, which gave some confirmation to Einstein's views 
on gravity, greatly impressed him but the claims to scientific status 
of the other three just as greatly dissatisfied him. 
One might say that my problem first took the form, 
'What is wrong with Marxism, psycho-analysis, and 
individual psychology? Why are they so different from 
mathematical ~hysics and especially from the theory 
of relativity?;· 
Popper then reached the following conclusions. Foremost, it was 
apparent that the distinction was not one of truth versus falsity (for he 
never actually believed any were really true) nor was it that mathema-
tical physics was more exact or capable of better measurements than 
sociological or psychological types of theory. Rather, it seemed that 
the latter types manifested only apparent explanatory power - they 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 42. 
2. K. Popper i:rl"C: A. Mace (ed.), BPM, p. 156. 
appeared to be able to explain practically everything 
that happened, within the fields to which they referred 
.... Once your eyes were thus opened, you saw con-
firming instances everywhere: the world was full of 
verifications of the theory. Whatever happened 
always confirmed it.l 
But Einstein's theory was different in that it made specific predictions 
which greatly risked empirical refutation (~ in the eclipse observa-
tions ). " The theory is incompatible with certain possible results of 
b t . u2 o serva 10n •... 
Popper formulates these considerations as follows: 3 
1) It is easy to verify theories - if we want to look for confirma-
tions. 
2) Confirmations count only if they result from risky predictions 
(i.e. unlikely ones). 
3) The more a theory forbids the better it is. 
4) Theories that aren't refutable by some conceivable event 
aren't scientific. 11Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people 
often think) but a vice. 11 
5) Genuine tests of theories must be attempts to refute them. 
Some theories are more testable than others. They take greater risk 
of falsification. 
6) 11Confirming evidence does not count except when it is the 
result of a genuine test of the theory; and this means that it can be 
1. K. Popper in C. A. Mace (ed.), BPM, p. 157. 
2. Ibid., pp. 159-160. 
3. Loc. cit. 
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presented as an unsuccessful but serious attempt to falsify the theory." 
7) Some testable theories when found to be false are rescued by 
their admirers introducing either ad hoc auxiliary assumptions or 
ad hoc reinterpretations of the theory so that the theory escapes the 
refutation. But, while always possible, such a process rescues the 
theory only by lowering its scientific status. 
It was not until a dozen years later that Popper's views took on 
a new critical twist. Wittgenstein had by then become rather popular in 
Vienna and a sympathetic group, the Vienna Circle, had formed under 
Schlick. Simplified, Popper tells us their view was basically that 
'The statements which may possibly fall within the 
province of science are those which may possibly be 
verified by observation statements; and these state-
ments, again, coincide with the class of all genuine 
or meaningul statements.' For this approach, then, 
verifiability, meaningfulness, and scientific character, 
all coincide. I 
However, Popper says that he cared little for the problem of 
2 
meaning. His interest lay rather in finding a criterion for the character 
of scientific theories, i.e., in the problem of demarcation. Actually, 
however, ''Wittgenstein's verifiability criterion of meaning was intended 
to play the part of a criterion of demarcation as well . ~ •• "3 It is to 
Popper's critique of this that we will turn after noting briefly his 
detailed delineation of what is non-scientific. In certain later contexts 
I. K. Popper in C. A. Mace (ed.), BPM.. p. 164. 
2. Loc. cit. See also K. Popper LSD, pp. 35-36. 
3. K. Popper in C. A. Mace (ed.), B.P.M. p. 164. 
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we will see the practical importance, in both cosmology and philosophy 
of both of the discussions. 
ii. The Nature of Metaphysics, Mathematics and Logic 
Popper, in the Preface to his English edition in 1958, made quite 
clear the fact that he feels there is no method which is peculiar to 
philosophy. He expresses the other side of the coin by claiming that 
11the growth of knowledge can be studied best by studying the growth of 
scientific knowledge 11 and not by ''the study of linguistic usages, or of 
language systems •11 1 When we place this beside his claim that all 
rational study is critical study, that it should desire to find itself in 
error if it is in error, we get the pedestals upon which we must stand 
in viewing his two horizons - the scientific landscape and that which is 
non-scientific. 
Cul:'rent philosophy of science is deeply permeated, as is much 
contemporary philosophy, by the analysis of ordinary language and the 
construction of linguistic systems for specific purposes. The first of 
these Popper severely denounces. They 
seem to have lost this admirable optimism which once 
inspired the rationalist tradition. Their attitude, it seems, 
has become one of resignation, if not despair. They not 
only leave the advancement of knowledge to the scientists: 
they even define philosophy in such a way that it becomes, 
by definition, incapable of making any contribution to our 
knowledge of the world. The self-mutilation which this 
so surprisingly permissive definition requires does not 
appeal to me. There is no such thing as an essence of 
1. K. Popper, LSD, pp.l5-16. 
philosophy, to be distilled and condensed into a definition.1 
He continues by remarking that not only does such an approach fail in 
this manner but it presumes that philosophy, including purely meta-
physical ideas, has never contributed to scientific advance or growth 
2 
in our knowledge of the cosmos. 
But Popper is just as far from agreeing with all those in another 
group who believe philosophy advances only by analysis of scientific 
knowledge. One segment of these attempts to construct "artificial 
3 
models of the language of science" which Popper claims are grossly 
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deficient as compared with ordinary language, do little to advance science, 
but above all "yield only the most crude and the most misleading model of 
the growth of knowledge - the model of an accumulating heap of observer 
statements.'r4 He does, however, find himself kindred in spirit with those 
who study scientific knowledge as 
the result of the growth of common-sense knowledge 
... [for] . . . all of them discovered that scientific 
knowledge can be more easily studied than common-
sense knowledge ...• Its very problems are 
enlargements of the problems of common-sense 
knowledge." 5 
Thus, it is with the aid of analysis of reasons for rejecting or 
accepting scientific theories that we have Hume 's problem of 'reasonable 
belief' made capable of detailed study and we are provided with the key 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 19. 
2. Loc. cit. 
3. Ibid., p. 20. 
4. Ibid., p. 22. 
5. L.OC, cit. 
to delineating the non-scientific. But from the above quotation it is 
obvious that the line of demarcation is imprecise in the sense that 
though it may be sharply defined it is rather arbitrarily placed. The 
task of delineation is the task of proposing a suitable convention.1 
Popper doesn't desire to overthrow metaphysics, as we shall see 
he claims Wittgenstein and the inductivisits often did, 2 but 
to define the concepts 'empirical science' and 'meta-
physics' in such a way that we shall be able to say of a 
given system of statements whether or not its closer 
study is the concern of empirical science. 3 
The proposal of a criterion of demarcation he regards as a reasonable 
topic of discussion among those interested in it because of some com-
21 
mon purpose. ''The choice of that purpose must, of course, be ultimately 
a matter of decision going beyond rational argument." 4 
And what does Popper conceive as the grounds for his proposal? 
It is fertile in that it can "elucidate the problems of the theory of 
knowledge." 5 And what of the purposes, chosen by his own value 
judgments and predilections? To give to the enterprise of developing 
theories logical rigor, freedom from dogmatism, practical applica-
bility, and a desire to try new solutions to novel and unexpected questions.6 
1. K. Popper, LSD, pp. 35, 37. 
2. Inductivism assumes that the logic of scientific discovery is identical 
with the logical analyses of inductive methods. Wittgenstein assumed 
that meaningful propositions must be reducable to elementary state-
ments of experience. 
3. Op. cit., p. 3 7. 
4. Loc. cit. 
5. Op. cit., p. 38. 
6. Loc. cit. 
And what is the criterion itself? We have seen earlier that it is 
falsifiability. 
According to this criterion~ statements, or systems of 
statements, convey information about the empirical 
world only if they are capable of clashing with experience; 
or more precisely, only if they can be systematically 
tested, that is to say, if they can be subjected (in 
accordance with a 'methodological decision') to tests 
which might result in their refutation.1 
Popper claims his 
criterion of falsifiability distinguished with sufficient 
precision the theoretical systems of the empirical 
sciences from those of :rre taphysics (and from conven-
tionalist and tautological systems)~ without asserting 
the meaninglessness of metaphysics (which from a 
historical point of view can be seen to be the source from 
which the theories of the empirical sciences spring). 2 
One might summarize this in Popper's epigram: ''In so far as a 
scientific statement speaks about reality, it must be falsifiable; and 
in so far as it is not falsifiable, it does not speak about reality." 3 
Let us look, then, briefly at mathematics, logic~ and metaphysics 
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in the light of the above comments to discover Popper's precise attitude 
toward these. Mathematics and logic are not sharply distinguished by 
him (if indeed, in the light of the vast literature of current debate on the 
subject, they can be), but he does discuss them briefly in several ways. 
First, it is obvious that, for him, mathematical and logical systems 
cannot be refutable in experience. Of course one may make an additional 
1. K. Popper, Lsn: · pp. 313-314. 
2. Ibid.~ p. 314-.-
3. Loc. cit. 
claim that a given system (say Euclid's geometry as used by Kant) is 
alone true of the world we experience, but this is not essential to the 
system - of itself it is based on arbitrary postulates and rules for 
1 
deducing entailed consequences. He is at great pains to show that 
nothing is logically induced from experience (though experience may 
suggest, psychologically, some system to us 2 ) as we will see later. 3 
Thus, as long as we play by the rules, our conclusions in mathematics 
and logic will be analytic since they will be true by convention. 
An axiomatic system . . . . cannot therefore be regarded as 
a system of empirical or scientific hypothesis (in our 
sense) since it cannot be refuted by the falsification of its 
consequences; for these too must be analytic.4 
Secondly, both logic and mathematics are discussed, pursuant to 
the above, in the context of the aforementioned construction of model 
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languages. In his 1958 remarks he is severely critical of these as being 
too poor for any science,; indeed, poorer than ordinary language. He 
feels the state of the axiomatizing art at that time to be so primitive that 
it aids in solving problems in the growth of our scientific knowledge only 
of a very primitive kind (i.e., axiomatic systems are exact and 
5 
precise only in an extremely delimited sphere). In a similar vein, he 
remarks that scientific theories change perpetually and thus "only 
branches of science - and these only temporarily - ever acquire the form 
l. K. Popper, LSQ p. 71. 
2. Ibid., pp. 32, 72-75, 98. 
3. See pp. 40-49. 
4. Ibid., pp. 74, 266. 
5. Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
of an elaborate and logically well-constructed system of theories.'). 
But the form of a rigorous, axiomatized system is a fruitful goal to be 
aimed at since 
a tentative system can usually be well surveyed as a whole, 
with its important consequences. This is very necessary; 
for a severe test of a system presupposes that it is at the 
time sufficiently definite and final in form to make it im-
possible for new assumptions to be smuggled in. In other 
words, the system must be formulated sufficiently clearly 
and definitely to make every new assumption easily re-
cognizable for what it is: a modification and therefore a 
revision of the system. 2 
On the question of models and axiomatization we will have more 
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to say later, but we see here that Popper distinguishes sharply (however 
consistent he may or may not be) between mathematical and logical 
systems per se and their utilization in science as patterns for analysis 
and comparison. The import of such a distinction becomes an important 
part of his discussion on metaphysics to which we now turn. 
It is quite apparent from Popper's seven conclusions, listed 
earlier, 3 as to the value of falsifiability as a criterion of the scientific 
status of a theory, that metaphysical theories, as he defines them, fit 
these rather poorly.4 Some metaphysical theories interpret the evi-
dence of experience so it is impossible to use it for refutation -
1. K.' Popper, LSD, p. 71. 
2. Ibid., p. 71.--
3. See pp. 17-18· 
4. See his discussion in C. A. Mace (ed.), BPM, pp. 160-162. 
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everything becomes confirmatory. Others are simply non-testable, i.e. 
no evidence is available that might be used for refutation. Neither type 
takes much risk. But he, as we mentioned earlier, does not thereby 
deny metaphysics an important role in the history of science. No; it 
has frequently anticipated scientific theories even if "it cannot claim to 
be backed by empirical evidence in the scientific sense."1 However, he 
is most careful to point out that science does not rest upon an absolute 
base. 
The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above 
a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles 
are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down 
to any natural or 'given' base; and when we cease our 
attempts to drive our piles into a deeper layer, it is not be-
cause we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when 
we are satisfied that they are firm enough to carry the 
structure, at least for the time being. 2 
But much more remains to be said, since many of Popper's oppo-
nents feel capable of expressing the same attitudes and yet disagree 
fundamentally with him on two major points. These two issues rest on 
dissention with his falsifiability criterion of demarcation of scientific 
theories. Both demand a fundamental role be given, rather, to 
verifiability in science, the first as a criterion of meaning in science 
(which its proponents consider falsifiability to be in Popper's system, 
and which they consider to be a weakness) and the second as essential 
to the inductive method of science. At this point these serious 
1. K. Popper, in C. A. Mace (ed.), BPM, p. 162. See also K. Popper, 
LSD, pp. 38-39, 131, 276-278. 
2. K. Popper, LSD, p. 111. 
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criticisms will be discussed only from the point of view of their relation-
ship to the nature of metaphysical theories and other aspects must await 
later perusal. 
iii. Verifiability and Empirical Knowledge. 
Popper tells us that the problem of induction began to interest him 
in 1923, and to his amazement the conclusions he reached were met by 
widespread incredulity.1 First, he rejected inductive logic.2 
Secondly, he necessarily then rejected induction as the method of 
science. 3 We need not discuss his reasons at this time save to note 
why he conceives of inductive theories as part of metaphysics and not 
of science. 
Firstly, he claims that induction is based upon a "propensity to 
look out for regularities, and to impose laws upon nature." 4 Such think-
ing is dogmatic - it seeks regularity everywhere even where there is 
none. But is this not, he asks, typical of primitives and children? Does 
increasing experience and maturity not "create an attitude of caution 
and criticism rather than of dogmatism"? 5 The "dogmatic attitude . 
is indicative of strong belief; while a critical attitude is indicative of a 
weaker belief." 6 "This suggests that we may identify the critical atti-
tude with the scientific attitude, and the dogmatic attitude with the one 
1. K. Popper, in C. A. Mace (ed.), BPM, p. 166. 
2. K. Popper, LSD, pp. 35, 40 footnote ':<1. 
3. K. Popper, in C. A. Mace (ed.), BPM, pp. 184-185. 
4. Ibid., p. 175. 
5. K. Popper, in C. A. Mace, (ed.}, BPM .. p. 175. 
6. Loc. cit. 
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which we have described as pseudo-scientific." 1 Indeed, the "rule 
or craft of 'valid induction' is not even metaphysical: it simply does 
t • t 11 2 no ex1s • It is then quite clear that valid induction provides no 
criterion of demarcation. 
Secondly, induction is frequently argued as a logical problem. 
Observations and experiments are always finite in number so that to 
state laws such as 'B always depends on A' must be to claim what 
transcends experience. Yet science uses and proposes such laws all 
the time and only observation and experiment can be used in science to 
reject or accept them. Thus we have the dilemma of the status of 
scientific laws. Popper rejects Hume 's theory of repetition, based upon 
similarity, as involving an infinite regress; 3 he rejects any idea of 
in born expectations being valid :;1 priori since they are often mistaken; 4 
and he rejects Kant's a priori view of causality as imposed upon nature 
by the intellect since, while it is correct that we do proceed this way, 
the laws we impose need not be necessarily true nor need we be success-
ful in imposing them on nature.5 In line with his desire for a critical 
attitude in science he claims that "all laws and theories are conjectures, 
or tentative hypotheses .... and that we may reject a law or theory 
on the basis of new evidence."6 
I. K. Popper, in C. A. Mace, (ed. ), BPM, p. 177. 
2. Ibid., p. 181. Italics added. 
3. Ibid., pp. 169-171. See also K. Popper, LSD, pp. 27-28, 63. 
4. Ibid., p. 173. See also K. Popper, LSD, P.3o. 
5. K. Popper, in C. A. Mace (ed.), BPM, pp. 173-174. 
See also K. Popper, LSD, pp. 206, 212, 247-250, 437. 
6. Ibid., p. 182. -
As long as a theory stands up to the severest tests we 
can design, it is accepted; if it does not, it is rejected. 
But it is never inferred, in any sense, from the em-
pirical evidence. There is neither a psychological nor 
a logical induction. Only the falsity of a theory can be 
inferred from empirical evidence, and this inference is 
a purely deductive one. I 
Popper thus refuses to countenance any code of valid inductive rules, 
any faith in a metaphysical principle of induction. 2 
Finally, Popper makes his position on induction somewhat more 
precise through his discussion of the principle of the uniformity of 
nature - a near relative of the law of causality. He begins by arguing 
that theories are never verifiable - we only verify certain predictions 
3 based upon them. This raises the important methodological rule that 
"any new system of hypotheses should yield, or explain~ the old cor-
roborated, regularities."4 If the sun didn't rise tomorrow~ we'd have 
to try and explain it in terms of physical laws, but we'd also have 
to derive our older experiences from them. We are really, then, 
postulating the invariance of natural laws in space and Lime! Hence, 
it is part of our definition of natural laws if we postu-
late that they are to be invariant with respect to space 
and time; and also if we postulate that they are to have 
no exceptions. Thus from a methodological point of 
view, the possibility of falsifying a corroborated law is 
by no means without significance. It helps us to find out 
what we demand and expect from natural laws. And the 
1. K. Popper~ in C.A. Mace (ed.) BPM, pp. 173-174. See also 
K. Popper, LSD, p. 42. 
2. Ibid.~ IP· 180, 182, 185-186. 
3. Ibid., pp. 252, 315. 
4. K. Popper, LSD, p. 253 footnote *2. 
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'principle of the uniformity of nature' can .... be 
regarded as a metaprysical interpretation of a 
methodological rule. 
The non-verifiability of theories thus becomes of methodological 
import. 
The import of this shows up in the attempt to develop a metho-
dological principle of induction which is supposed to govern the 
verification of theories. For it turns out that the principle is really 
metaphysical! If it were empirical its justification would have to rest 
2 
on an infinite regress, so it must be introduced as an axiom. But in 
either case, the principle is a non-falsifiable statement. 
For if this principle - which is supposed to validate the 
inference of theories - were itself falsifiable, then it 
would be falsified with the first falsified theory, because 
this theory would then be a conclusion, derived with the 
help of the principle of induction; and this principle, as 
a premise, will of course be falsified by the modus 
tollens whenever a theory is falsified which was de-
rived from it. But this means that a falsifiable prin-
ciple of induction would be falsified anew with every 
advance made by science. It would be necessary, 
therefore, to introduce a principle of induction assumed 
not to be falsifiable. But this would amount to the mis-
conceived notion of a synthetic statement which is 
a priori valid, i.e. an irrefutable statement about 
reality .3 
A metaphysical faith in the uniformity of nature and in the verifiability 
of theories cannot be turned into a theory of knowledge based on indue-
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 253 footnote *2. 
2. Ibid., p. 30. 
3. K. Popper, LSD, p. 254. The modus tollens is the classical 
'If A is derivable from B, and if A is false, then B is false.' 
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tive logic! 1 
What then about metaphysical faith within science? Popper is 
quite clear that one can hardly conceive of practical action without a 
2 
faith in the existence of regularities in the world. Thus, while 
science is not a system of true or even probable statements, nor is 
it a system advancing toward some state of finality, 3 it is built upon 
a striving for knowledge and a search for truth which in turn depends 
on "guesses . • . guided by the unscientific, the metaphysical (though 
biologically explicable) faith in laws, in regularities which we can 
4 
uncover - discover. The statement 
'there exist laws of nature 1 might be appealed to if 
we wish to justify our search for laws of nature • , •. 
but ... 'justify1 (here) has a sense very different 
from the one it has in the context of the question 
whether we can justify induction. In the latter case, 
we wish to establish certain statements - the induced 
generalization. In the former case, we merely wish 
to justify an activity, the search for laws. Moreover, 
even though this activity may, in some sense, be 
justified by the knowledge that true laws exist - that 
there are structural regularities in the world - it 
could be justified even without that knowledge: the hope 
that there may be food somewhere certainly 'justifies' 
the search for it - especially if we are star5ing - even 
if this hope is far removed from knowledge. 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 254. See also p. 315. 
2. Ibid., p. 252. 
3. See G. Weiss in Physics Today, 12(November, 1959) 53-54. "[Popper 
says not to] expect an ultimate form of physical theory and, by im-
plication, that the technological and esthetic rewards of research are 
sufficient justification for its pursuit." 
4. K. Popper, LSD, p. 278. 
5. Ibid., p. 437. 
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Thus Popper's attitude toward metaphysics within science is that 
if we were to know that true laws exist it might provide some additional 
justification to the search for them but, even without such knowledge, our 
curiosity and the mere hope of success are quite sufficient a1one.1 He 
adds to this already stiff bow to metaphysics a caution against 'l.ssuing 
prohibitions that draw limits to the possibilities of research',2 by intro-
ducing metaphysical assumptions as to the indeterminacy of reality based 
on certain interpretations of Heisenberg's uncertainty relation in quantum 
mechanics.3 The idea that there are necessary laws of nature is "of 
great intuitive significance in connection with our attempts to understand 
the wor1d" 4 and we should not restrict ourselves unduly and in some 
a priori fashion by defining absolute barriers to human knowledge. 
We have now summarized the inductive method as being, in Popper's 
estimate, one of wrong-headedness as far as scientific method is con-
cerned 5 and thus of necessity, rather one of metaphysical predilection 
lying beyond the pale of scientific thought and having only such value as 
accrues to metaphysics apart from science. If indeed iJt is consistent 
enough for even that! We will discuss, in Section Two, a comparison of 
those widely-accepted facets of inductive processes in science which 
1. K. Popper, LSD, pp. 437, 438. See also p. 38. 
2. Ibid., p. 250. 
3. Ibid., pp. 246-250. See also K. Popper, ''The Propensity Interpre-
tation of the Calculus of Probability, and the Quantum Theory." 
Observation & Interpretation, ed. S. Korner, pp. 65-70. 
4. Ibid., p.438. 
5. Ibid., pp. 52-53. 
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Popper denies in favor of his hypothetico-deductive method, but it is 
sufficient here to have showed that induction as one aspect of the veri-
fication principle is, for Popper, a failure for scientific purposes since 
it is metaphysical. But there yet remains to be outlined the other aspect 
of verification theory, and this is the idea that there is a relation between 
the meaning ofa statement (or group of statements) and the empirical 
confirmation which it is (or they are) presumed to have. 
Popper tells us that when he developed his criterion of demarca-
ting science by falsifiability it seemed almost trivial and he was convinced 
his result must be common knowledge among philosophers and scientists.1 
He discovered much later how wrong his assumption here was because 
Wittgenstein had gained a large following in his view that metaphysical 
propositions were pseudo-propositions and therefore meaningless because 
they were not made up of elementary propositions all capable of being, 
~ 
at least in principle, ascertainable by observation. 
This means that the propositions which belong to science 
are those which are deducible from the true observation 
statement; they are those propositions which can be 
verified by the true observation statements. Could we 
know all the true observation statements, we should also 
know all that may be asserted by natural science.3 
Verifiability, rather than falsifiability, becomes a criterion of demar-
cation! 'Verifiable' becomes coincident with 'meaningful' and with 
'scientific' ! 
1. K. Popper, in C.A. Mace (ed.), BPM, p, 163 
2. Ibid., pp.l63-164. 
3. Ibid., p. 164. See also K. Popper, LSD, P. 313. 
I personally was never interested in the so-called 
problem of meaning, it appeared to me as a verbal 
problem, as a typical pseudo problem .•. [but I saw] 
•.• at once that Wittgenstein 's verifiability criterion 
of meaning was intended to play the part of a criter-
ion of demarcation as well .•.• [As such] it was 
totally inadequate, even if all our misgivings about 
the dubious concept of meaning were set aside .... 
[It] excludes from science practically everything 
that is, in fact, characteristic of it (while failing, in 
effect, to exclude astrology). No scientific theory 
can ever be deduced from observation statements, 
or be described as a truth -function of observation 
statements. 1 
It was in reply to this view that Popper spoke to the Vienna 
Circle and also presented some members with several documents 
(now part of the Logic of Scientific Discovery). 
But my contribution was classified by members of the 
Circle as a proposal to replace the verifiability criterion 
of meaning by a flasifiability criterion of meaning -
which effectually made nonsense of my views. My pro-
tests that I was trying to solve, not their pseudo-problem 
of meap.ing, but the problem of demarcation, were of no 
avail. 2 
He also claims that his attacks did, however, lead to modifications in 
the camp of the verificationists - all confusing - but his fate was to see 
criticism "of [his] alleged views .... widespread and highly success-
ful." 3 Nonetheless ''I have yet to meet a criticism of my views." 4 
1. K. Popper, in C.A. Mace (ed.), BPM, p. 164. 
2. Ibid., p. 165. 
3. Ibid., pp. 165-166. Italics added. 
4. Loc. cit. 
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There are three questions here. Why does Popper consider the 
problem of meaning a false one? Why does he consider verifiability as 
unsatisfactory for demarcation of science from other areas of thought? 
And why do his own views receive misunderstanding and criticism? We 
will reserve the last until we present our own analysis, but the first 
two can be treated at present. 
The words 'meaningless 1 or 'nonsensical' convey, and 
are meant to convey, a derogatory evaluation: and there 
is no doubt that what the positivists really want to achieve 
is not so much a successful demarcation as the final over-
throw and the annihilation of metaphysics. 1 
Popper later amplifies this and develops it further. 
The positivist dislikes the idea that there should be 
meaningful problems outside the field of 'positive' 
empirical science ..•. He wishes to see in the 
alleged philosophical problems mere 'pseudo-
problems 1 or 'puzzles'. Now this wish of his - which~ 
by the way, he does not express as a wis
2
h or a pro-
posal but rather as a statement of fact, can always 
be gratified. For nothing is easier than to unmask a 
problem as 'meaningless 1 or 'pseudo' . All you have to 
do is fix upon a conveniently narrow meaning for '·mean-
ing', and you will soon be bound to say of any incon-
venient question that you are unable to detect any meaning 
in it. 3 
There are implied in this two reasons for Popper's feeling 
4 that the above problem of meaning is really verbal. The first is that 
1. K. Popper, in C. A. Mace (ed.}, BPM p. 164. 
2. K. Popper, LSD, pp. 51, !:>3. With the exception (added by Popper in 
footnotes #2 and 6) of Carnap in the Logical Syntax of Language 
where he seems to adopt the view "that all such questions rest upon 
decisions ... " 
3. Ibid., p. 51. 
4. Ibid., p. 312. 
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it is a dogma, 1 solving the problem of demarcation, not on the basis 
of procedural difference as he claims to do, but by defining away what 
one dislikes. The second is that one cannot debate it since the language 
of debate is itself meaningless! Popper recalls here Wittgenstein 's 
famous and remarkable comment at the end of the Tractatus to the ef-
feet that "My propositions are elucidatory in this way; he who under-
stands me finally recognizes them as senseless." 2 "The dogma of 
meaning, once enthroned, is eleva t ed forever above the battle. It can 
3 
no longer be attacked." This is the ad hoc to end all gratuitous 
assumptions - it avoids all refutations, actual and potential! Thus it 
must have its status as a scientific theory lowered in proportion, i.e. 
4 to zero. 
Next, what of Popper's reasons for considering verifiability as an 
unusable demarcation criterion? There are two. The first is that it 
succeeds 
in annihilating ... not only metaphysics •.. but natural 
science as well. For the laws of nature are no more re-
ducible to observation statements than metaphysical 
utter.ai'l.ces. (Remember the problem of induction!) 5 
The line of demarcation then dissolves and all becomes meaningless! 
I. K. Popper, LSD, p. 313. Also p. 51. 
2. Ibid., p. 51, footnote *2. 
3. Loc. cit. 
4. Compare K. Popper in C.A. Mace (ed.), BPM, p. 160. 
5. K. Popper, LSD, p. 313. See also K. Popper, "The Nature of 
Philosophical Problems and their Roots in Science", B.J.P.S., 
3(1952), 124-156. 
Or let us see it expressed forcefully another way. 
Wittgenstein 's criterion of meaningfulness coincides with 
the inductivist's criterion of demarcation, provided we 
replace their words 'scientific' or 'legitimate' by 
'meaningful'. And it is precisely over the problem of 
induction that .•. (it) •.. comes to grief: positivists, 
in their anxiety to annihilate metaphysics, annihilate 
natural science along with it . . . . If consistently app-
lied, Wittgenstein 's criterion of meaningfulness rejects 
as meaningless those natural laws the search for which, 
as Einstein says, is 'the supreme task of the physicist': 
they can never be accepted as genuine or legitimate 
statements .•.. Thus instead of eradicating metaphy-
sics from the empirical sciences, positivism leads to 
the invasion of metaphysics into the scientific realm. 1 
On the other hand Popper thinks his criterion of demarcation provides 
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a practical division, undogmatic (though it is a proposal for agreement), 
and fertile in aiding the advance of science and the elucidation of pro-
blems in epistemology. 2 
Secondly, it denies ''that there should be meaningful problems 
outside the field of 'positive empirical science - problems to be dealt 
3 
with by a genuine philosophical theory". But Popper replies that, 
instead of being nonsense, 
the main problem of philosophy is the critical analysis of 
the appeal to the authority of 'experience' - precisely 
that 'experience' which every latest discoverer of positi-
vism is, as ever, artlessly taking for granted." 4 
1. K. Popper, LSD, pp. 36-37. See also K. Popper, "Adequacy and 
Consistency: A Second Reply to Dr. Bar-Hillel", B.J .P.S., 7(1956 ), 
249 footnote 1. 
~. Ibid., p. 38. 
3. Ibid., p. !:>1. See also K. Popper, ''Indeterminism in Quantum Physics 
and in Classical Physics," B.J .P.S., 1(1950), 122. 
4. Ibid., pp. 51-52. 
But they will likely continue to err, and since, in Popper's mind, "the 
growth of knowledge can be studied best by studying the growth of 
scientific knowledge", 1 his study in the methodology of science will 
be reduced by them to some branch of empirical science (since it 
isn't logic, the only alternative), say of the behavior of working 
scientists.2 This, Popper argues, is a mistake. He says his methodo-
logy should not 
be taken for an empirical science. I do not believe that 
it is possible to decide, by using the methods of an em-
pirical science, such controversial questions as whether 
science actually uses a principle of induction or not. 
And my doubts increase when I remember that what is to 
be called a 'science' and who is to be called a 'scientist' 
must always remain a matter of convention or decision. 3 
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Popper believes, instead, that to decide such questions we should 
compare methodologies (including those using induction) and see which 
give rise to inconsistencies, which have greatest utility, and which have 
redundancies. This is rather more critical than the view above and 
shows a greater appreciation of convention and its limitations rather 
than confusing the issue and tending to turn convention into dogma. 4 
We have now completed our outline of Popper's attitudes towards 
the use of verifiability as a criterion of demarcation or of meaning in 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 15. 
2. Ibid., p. 52. 
3. Loc. cit. 
4. Ibid., pp. 53, 262. 
science. With this outline we complete our survey of the delineation 
of the scientific and the non-scientific; a necessary foundation to our 
problem of analyzing Popper's views on the factors governing the de-
velopment of scientific theories and our choices among them. We have 
been introduced to the importance of distinguishing between what is and 
what isn 1t science as Popper sees it, and to the criterion for making 
such a distinction. But it is one thing to postulate a criterion and an-
other to use it, and we must turn next to the practical application of 
this criterion in the modern scientific scene. We must discover what 
Popper considers to be the precise failings of the major alternative to 
his criterion when applied to constructing and deciding among theories. 
And we must ascertain how Popper thinks one utilizes falsification and 
degrees of falsifiability in what he conceives to be the route of scientific 
advance - not the inductivist one but that of hypothesis, deduction, and 
attempted refutation. 
However, we may summarize Popper's conclusions, as to theory 
choice, up to this point in our analysis, as follows. 
1) The best scientific theory before testing is the theory which 
forbids the most. It must provide clearly more potential falsifying tests 
than its competitors. 'Falsifiability' means 'incompatible with possible 
observations'. 1 
1. Seep.17. 
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2) The best scientific theory after testing is the one which not 
only continues to take the greatest risk of being falsified but has sur-
1 
vived serious attempts at refutation during the testing. 
3) The more ancillary assumptions a scientific theory has which~ 
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~ intentionally or not, aid it in avoiding refutation the less scientific it is. 
4) Abstract scientific theories and universal laws are best esta-
3 blished if we use falsifiability as a test. 
5) Systems of theories should aim at rigorous axiomatization so 
new assumptions can be spotted if they are introduced and the system 
4 
tested to see if it is now less or more falsifiable. 
6) Metaphysics may give us the faith to seek regularities in nature 
(and often has so aided science) but it is not essential to the scientific 
quest. However~ it must not restrict science by claiming that reality 
places limits on its search. 5 
7) Theories and laws are tentative hypotheses and are not the 
product of psychological or logical induction. 
8) 'Scientific theories' and 'classes of meaningful statements • 
are not synonyms. 
Let us now move to the remaining sections of this chapter for 
elaboration and addition. 
1. See p. 17. 
2. Seep. 18. 
3. Seep. 15. 
4. See p. 24. 
5. See pp. 30-3l. 
2. The Conflicting Methods of Empirical Science. 
i. The Method of Induction. 
1 
Our previous examination of induction stressed the metaphy-
sica! nature which Popper conceives it to have. At present our study 
will stress1 rather, his critique of induction, as it is presumed by its 
advocates to function, in the development and choice of empirical 
theories. As we have seen, the two major strands tying together 
Popper's philosophy of science are his divergence from the widespread 
view that science builds its world view by induction and his advocacy of 
falsifiability as the characteristic of scientific theories. We shall see 
these entwining in our subsequent remarks. 
"I suggest that it is the task of the logic of scientific discovery or 
the logic of knowledge, to give a logic of this procedure; that is1 to 
2 
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analyze the method of the empirical science," says Popper. Now, since 
this method is widely conceived to be inductive, that is to pass ''from 
singular statements (sometimes also called 'particular' statements), 
such as accounts of the results of observations or experiments, to 
universal statements, such as hypotheses or theories, "3 it requires 
analysis to discover its logic. But Popper finds it lacking therein. 
1. See pp. 2'-3a. 
2. K. Popper, LSD, p. 27. 
3. Loc. cit. 
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First, a universal conclusion cannot logically be inferred from 
any number of singular statements without some additional principle 
justifying our assumption. Such an assumption "must be a synthetic 
statement; that is, a statement whose negation is not self-contradictory 
but logically possible." 1 But such a statement must be a universal 
statement in turn ! "Thus if we try to regard its truth as known from 
experience, then the very same problems which occasioned its introduc-
tion will arise all.over again ... it must lead to an infinite regress." 2 
Our only way out 3 is to take such a principle as a priori valid.4 
5 
This Popper refuses to do. His argument here is that the principle 
must either be falsifiable or non-falsifiable. If it is the former it would 
be falsified with the first falsification of any theory which is a conclusion 
derived by the use of the principle. Thus 
this principle, as a premise, will of course be falsified 
by the modus tollens whenever a theory is falsified 
which was derived from it. But this means that a falsi-
fiable principle of induction would be falsified anew 
with every advance made by. science. 6 
The alternative, a principle considered incapable of falsification, 
is then a synthetic a priori statement and this is by definition "an 
1. K. Popper, LSI). p. 28. 
2. Ibid., p. 29.-
3. Unless we assume we know every single event to which the law might 
apply and discover that they all do conform. Uusually this is impos-
sible. Ibid.,p.63. 
4. Loc. cit. 
5. Ibid., pp. 45 footnote 5, 254. 
6. Ibid., p. 254. 
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irrefutable statement about reality." 1 But ''that (this law is) necessarily 
true, or that we necessarily succeed in imposing (it] upon nature .•.. 
[is] wrong." 2 
Popper has apparently several reasons for such an attitude toward 
synthetic a priori statements. One is that a priorism is based on an 
'unfounded assumption'. 
the assumption that all genuine statements must be, in 
principle, completely decidable, i.e., verifiable and 
falsifiable; more precisely, that for all genuine state-
ments, an (ultimate) empirical verification, and an 
(ultimate) empirical falsification must both be logically 
possible. 3 
This criticism Popper conceives as avoided only by interpreting 
natural laws or theories as genuine statements which are 
partially decidable, i.e. which are, for logical reasons, not 
verifiable but, in an asymmetrical way, falsifiable only: 
they are statements which are tested by being submitted 
to systematic attempts to falsify them. 4 
And ''the best we can say of a hypothesis is that up to now it has been 
able to show its worth, and that it has been more successful than other 
hypotheses." 5 
Popper's second reason seems to be that though we can claim to 
possess knowledge and learn from experience, all we can claim justi-
fiably is that this argues against "a theory which entails the impossi-
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 254. Also p. 264. 
2. K. Popper in C.A. Mace (ed.), BPM, p. 174. 
3. K. Popper, LSD, p. 312. See also p. 42. 
4. Ibid., p. 3l~See also p. 47. 
5. Ibid., p. 315. 
bility of knowledge, or of learning from experience" and for the fact 
that "empirical knowledge in some sense of the word 'knowledge' 
exists." 1 But such a 'transcendental argument', which he calls it in 
allusion to Kant, cannot argue for certain knowledge or demonstrable 
knowledge and hence cannot argue for synthetic a priori knowledge. 
Thus the arguments here seem to eventuate in these theses. 
1) There is no logically air-tight reason for assuming a syn-
thetic a priori principle to be completely decidable as to truth. It 
would itself have to be the valid conclusion from empirically certain 
premises. But such indubitable grounds must rest on the slippery 
slopes of an infinite regress. 
2) We might claim it is imposed upon nature by our intellect. 
Popper agrees that this is the way we do proceed with laws in science, 
but our intellect need not develop on its own necessarily true laws 
about reality. AU empirical knowledge consists of guesses which have 
varied degrees of corroboration. 2 We postulate that laws are in-
variant in space and time and also that they have no exceptions. To 
falsify such a law is significant, as is even the possibility of doing so, 
hence we keep trying in an open-minded fashion. 3 Such a critical and 
fair approach obviates our intellect's imposing a psychological desire 
1. K. Popper, LSD., p. 368 footnote 3. 
2. Loc. cit. 
3. See p. 2 '· 
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to discover a principle of uniformity in nature upon nature dogma-
! 
tically and uncritically. This is primitive and childish. 
Returning now to the basic deficiences which Popper finds in the 
attempts to justify inference of universal statements from singular 
statements, we turn to an alternative often offered to finding a strictly 
valid basis for justification. With this alternative he is as little sa tis-
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fied. This second deficient doctrine is the idea that inductive inference 
"can attain some degree of 'reliability' or of 'probability'. According 
to this view, inductive inferences are 'probable inferences 1." 2 In 
reply to it, Popper says, 
[If] a certain degree of probability is to be assigned to 
statements based on inductive inference, then this will 
have to be justified by invoking a new principle of induc-
tion, appropriately modified. And this new principle in 
its turn will have to be justified, and soon. Nothing is 
gained, moreover, if the principle of induction, in its 
turn, is taken not as 'true 1 but only as 'probable' ...• 
[We are again lead] either t~ an infinite regress, or 
to the doctrine of a priorism. 
For Popper, however, this "whole problem of the probability of hypo-
thesis is misconceived" in addition. ''Instead of discussing the 'proba-
bility' of a hypothesis we should try to assess what tests, what trials, 
it has withstood." 4 
1. See pp. z~-~7. See also K. Popper in C.A. Mace (ed),BPM, pp. 173-176, 
186-187. 
2. K. Popper, LSD, p. 29. See alsop. 251. 
3. Ibid., p. 30. 
4. Ibid., p. 251. See also K. Popper in C .A. Mace (ed.) BPM, p. 187. 
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Popper has said that the decision as to whether induction is an 
appropriate methodology for science lies in seeing whether it gives 
rise to inconsistencies and whether it is a help and really needed in 
scientific work. He tells us it does the first and fails in the latter 
two. 1 We have seen his claims against its consistency.2 As to the 
other points we wilJ. await our discussion in the next section of what 
Popper conceives to be the way scientists normally do and always should 
work. 3 But there are several points to mention beforehand. 
The first of these is to recall the attempt to turn the problem of 
induction into "an empty pseudo problem." 4 This is done by claiming 
that universal statements about reality are not genuine since they 
usually cannot be "logically reduced to elementary statements of exper-
ience." 5 We may recall that this is maintained by many who espouse 
the verifiability criterion of meaning. And we saw that we are left with 
an invasion of metaphysics into science since our universal statements 
there become on a par with metaphysical propositions. Popper rejects 
1. K. Popper, LSD, pp. 52-53. 
2. Mainly, these claims show that the inductivist principle is inconsistent 
with a notion of validity which rejects infinite regresses and synthetic 
a priori principles. But such rejection is itself based on the fact that 
an inductivistiic empiricism of the above types must rest either on an 
infinite regress (and thus not on experience as empiricism should) or 
on the quite unempirical assumptions of a priorism. 
3. There are exceptions likely. Not everyone is critical and consistent. 
Loc. cit. 
4. Ibid., p. 36. See also K. Popper in C.A. Mace (ed.), BPM, p. 183. 
5. L<>"c. cit .• Also Ibid., p. 63. 
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this as a solution since it eradicates the demarcation of science from 
metaphysics. 1 
Another point is that an introduction of the idea of simplicity is 
of little help with the inductive problem. 2 If we observe a finite num-
her of events, a plot of these will fit an infinity of curves of varying 
complexity. Extrapolation (and even interpolation) uniquely determine 
no law. Now, some suggest we pick the simplest curve - the simplest 
law - relating the experienced events. But choice of any hierarchy of 
simplicities here can only be made on aesthetic or practical considera-
tions. It cannot be otherwise validated. Popper, however, does think 
the idea is of use in terms of falsifiability where it has logical and 
epistemic advantages not proven when applied to induction. 3 
As a final point we may refer to the attempts to reduce the 
4 
'probability of a hypothesis 1 to that of the 'probability of events'. 
The probability of a hypothesis is mostly regarded as 
merely a special case of the general problem of the pro-
bability of a statement; and this in turn is regarded as 
nothing but the problem of the probability of an event, 
expressed in a particular terminology. 5 
Popper conceives this identification to be the result of confusion. 6 If 
one attempts to reduce the idea of a probability of 
hypothesis to that of a truth-frequency which uses the 
concept of a sequence of statements, then one is at 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 37. 
2. Ibid., pp. 138-140. 
3. K. Popper in C.A. Mace (ed.), BPM, p. 189 appendix 6. 
4. K. Popper, LSD, p. 254. 
5. Ibid., p. 255. 
6. Ibid., p. 256. 
For, 
once confronted with the question: with reference to what 
sequence of statements can a probability value be assigned 
to a hypothesis ? 1 
1) such a sequence might be made up of the singular statements 
that can contradict or agree with the hypothesis, and the probability of 
the hypothesis being determined by the truth frequency of those singu-
lars agreeing with it, could be one-half, even if every second singular 
was a refutation; 
2) an attempt to avoid this by giving the hypothesis a probability 
based on an estimate of all tests it has passed to those not yet tried 
ends up in giving our hypothesis zero probability; 
3) and, finally, any try at basing our estimate on the ratio of 
tests with favorable results to those which gave no clear decision ends 
in making the probability hopelessly subjective since it depends on the 
experimenter's skill and training! 2 
Indeed, he goes further, and claims a hypothesis isn't a sequence 
of agreeing and contradicting statements at all! 3 "Basic statements 
(i.e. singular existential statements) are never derivable from univer-
sal statements alone. The latter cannot therefore be regarded as 
of basic statements." 4 This is because only if universal statements 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 257. 
2. Ibid., pp. 257, 258. 
3. Ibid., p. 258. 
4. Loc. cit. See alsop. 102. 
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had the form '(X) (it is the case that -such-and-such occurs at X)' 
could basic statements of agreement or contradiction be elements of 
a sequence making up the universal. But, instead, strictly universal 
statements are not limited to a restricted space and time, and thus we 
can't search the universe to verify them. This is due to their being 
equivalent to the negation of strictly existential statements ('all 
ravens are black' is equivalent to 'it is false that there exists a non-
black raven'). All we can do, if we find something existing, is to verify 
a strictly existential statement, or falsify some universal one.1 
One attempt remains to explain the probability of hypothesis in 
terms of sequences of statements - where a hypothesis is called 'pro-
bable 1 "if it is an element of a sequence of hypotheses with a definite 
truth-frequency." 2 Popper rejects this also for several reasons. 
First, the reference sequence cannot be determined uniquely. Secondly, 
We cannot speak of a truth-frequency within a sequence 
of hypotheses, simply because we can never know of a 
hypothesis whether it is true. If we could know this, 
then we should hardly need the concept of the probability 
of a hypothesis at all. 3 
Popper concludes: 
This seems to me to exhaust the possibilities of basing 
the concept of the probability of a hypothesis on that of 
1. K. Popper, LSD, pp. 68-70. 
2. Ibid., p. 259. 
3. Loc. cit. 
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the frequency of true statements (or the frequency of 
false ones), and thereby on the frequency theory of the 
probability of events. 1 
He has a rather sizeable literature to his credit which further shores 
up this argument in response to critical challenge. These writings we 
will mention in our critical analysis later, but the arguments in the 
few paragraphs of this section suffice to outline the failures of indue-
tive logic as Popper sees them. It is sufficient to show that he cannot 
conceive of induction as the methodoly of theory construction or of 
their corroboration. What he does consider to be the appropriate 
methodology is the subject of our next section. 
ii. The Hypothetico-Deductive Method. 
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In his contribution to a symposium on contemporary British philo-
sophy, 2 wherein he discusses the views that science explains by essences 
and that theories are instruments, Popper offers a third alternative that 
scientific theories are genuine conjectures - "highly informative guesses 
about the world which, although not verifiable (i.e., capable of being 
shown to be true) can be submitted to severe critical tests." 3 This 
idea is elaborated in the comment, ''In the field of empirical sciences 
the scientist, theorist or experimenter ... constructs hypotheses, or 
systems of theories, and tests them against experiences by observation 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 260. See also his summary in footnote '~5 and 
pp. 389-395; also K. Popper, 111Content 1 and 'Degree of Confirmation 1 : 
A Reply to Dr. Bar-Hillel", B.J.P.S., 6(1955), 163. 
2. K. Popper in H.D. Lewis (ed.), CBP, pp. 357-388. 
3. Ibid., p. 382. 
and experiment. 1 He adds that the task of the logic of scientific dis-
covery is to give an analysis of this method; thus it is the task of this 
section to outline Popper's view of the structure of science. 
Popper begins by claiming that the ''initial stage, the act of 
conceiving or inventing a theory~ seems to me neither to call for 
logical analysis nor to be susceptible of it." 2 The source of a new 
idea is a task for study by psychology which is interested in questions 
of fact, but the logical analysis of scientific knowledge cares rather 
for the justification or validity of these ideas. Hence~ the logic of 
knowledge "consists solely- in investigating the methods employed in 
those systematic tests to which every new idea must be subjected if 
it is to be seriously entertained." 3 
He then goes on to argue that science always moves from a 
hypothesis, a tentative new idea~ to the logical deduction of its con-
sequences which "are then compared with one another and with other 
relevant statements, so as to find what logical relations ..• exist 
between them." 4 From here~ after testing for consistency among 
our conclusions~ we proceed to see ifihe theory has the logical form 
of a scientific idea or whether it is tautological. If it is the former, 
1. K. Popper~ LSD~ p. 27. 
2. Ibid., p. 31. See also K. Popper~ NPP, 134-156, for a discussion of 
certain great theories of the past. 
3. Loc. cit. 
4 • Ibid., p. 3 2 . 
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we next compare it with other theories to see if it is novel and then 
finally proceed to test it by empirical examination of implication de-
rived from it. This final step best unfolds by choosing easily testable 
predictions, in particular those not derivable from whatever theory 
has been accepted until this time and, even more particularly, those 
which contradict deductions from the currently-held theory. Should 
our experimental or observational tests prove to verify the conclusions 
implied in our theory we will retain, for the present, the theory as 
possibly true. On the other hand, if the tests turn out negative, the 
falsified conclusions must logically falsify the theory from which they 
are valid deductions. Science thus verifies deduced conclusions from 
theories but never the theories themselves.1 Positive results only 
give temporary support to a theory - any future negative result obvi-
ates it. But as 
long as a theory withstands detailed and severe tests, 
and is not superseded by another theory in the course 
of scientific progress, we may say that it has 'proved 
its mettle' or that it is 'corroborated. 1 " 2 
By this means we can, in the light of earlier remarks in this 
chapter, delineate the theoretical system of science as it exists at 
any time. It is that system which represents a possible (i.e., non-
contradictory) world, a world which satisfies the demarcation cri-
1. K. Popper, LSD, pp. 33, 251. 
2. Ibid., p. 3 3. 
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terion (i.e., is not metaphysical but instead is a world of possible ex-
perience ), and a world which we feel as certain as we can corresponds 
to the world of our actual experience. The latter we achieve by having 
our system survive testing1 - and this survival Popper conceives as 
survival of attempts at falsification. We saw earlier that not only does 
he deny induction as the method of science, but that in testing theories 
it is the falsifiability and not the verifiability that is important!2 
Indeed, Popper claims that the system described above gives the 
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most positive information about the world we live in since it is a system 
most likely to clash with experience. "Not for nothing do we call laws 
of nature 'laws': the mo;e they prohibit the more they say." 3 This is 
because, fundamentally, the logical form of universal statements is such 
that, while they can never be derived from singular statements, they can 
be contradicted by singular statements! The modus tollens of classical 
logic allows us to proceed from the truth of a singular statement to the 
falsity of a universal one.4 This is one reason why induction as a scien-
tific method fails! 5 
Popper does feel constrained, however, to point out that it is 
always possible to introduce ad hoc arguments in order to evade falsi-
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 3 9. 
2. Ibid., p. 40 
3. Ibid., p. 41 
4. Loc. cit. 
5. Op. cit. pp. 42, 76-77. 
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fication. Any negative experimental or observational result can be ex-
plained away if we but try! For this reason he strengthens the demands 
of falsifiability noted above. He demands we accept, at any time, only 
theories which have survived until that time the "fiercest struggle for 
survival," 1 and this he envisages in this manner. If in a test we get a 
negative result and we then add auxiliary hypotheses to our premises 
in order to neutralize the negation, the additional theses must fit certain 
requirements. They must serve to strengthen the theory - not merely 
to save it! They must make the new system (original theory plus aux-
iliary hypotheses) prohibit more than the original, which means make 
it more subject to being falsified in future tests. 2 There are, of course, 
some exceptions to these standards, such as singular statements that 
really, while added, do not make a new system (e.g., "the assumption 
that a certain observation or measurement which cannot be repeated 
may have been due to error" 3) but these need not detract from the 
general value of the need to increase falsifiability in any addition we 
make to our original theories. 
The next question which concerns Popper is whether his criterion 
of demarcation, i.e., falsifiability, simply shifts the problem of whether 
theories are scientific to whether singular stat~ments are scientific. 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 42. 
2. Ibid., p. 83. Examples are ·given here. 
3. Loc. cit. 
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Here he comments that the criterion, in the actual course of scientific 
research serves to settle the immediate problem of whether a theory or 
system of theories is empirical or metaphysical while one seldom has 
a problem with whether a singular statement is empirical or not.l In 
the case of theories this is largely a problem of the practice of re-
search, while with singular statements questions of their empirical 
character and testing lie almost entirely in the area of theory of know-
ledge. One major obscurity in this epistemic area is the relation of 
basic statements (statements of singular fact which are capable of be-
ing premises in the empirical falsification of universal statements) to 
t . 2 percep 10n. 
The problem here is that statements of any kind can be justified 
logically only by other statements and not by perceptual experiences. 
Popper suggests resolution lies in separating our experiences (convic-
tions) which are psychological, from "objective logical relations sub-
sisting among the various systems of scientific statements, and within 
each of them." 3 He denies, as we saw in connection with induction, that 
4 
"the empirical sciences are reducible to sense perceptions." We 
can utter no scientific statement that does not go far 
beyond what can be known with certainty 'on the basis 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 43. 
2. Loc. cit. 
3. Ibid., p. 44. 
4. Ibid., p. 93. 
of immediate experience' ••.. Every description uses 
universal names . . • every statement has the charac-
ter of a theory, of a hypothesis. 1 
Thus, Popper claims we must sharply distinguish objective science 
from our knowledge. 2 
This knowledge is the concern of psychology and is linked with 
convictions (i.e., perceptual assurances) and feelings of belief (i.e. 
of compulsion to think in a certain way). But true epistemology cares 
only for such problems as the logic connecting scientific statements. 3 
And the only way to test validity, in the latter case is by putting it "in 
the form in which it is most easily testable." 4 Scientific statements 
must be presented so those trained in the appropriate methods can test 
them. If they reject our statements they must "formulate an assertion 
55 
which contradicts our own, and give us ... instructions for testing it."5 
We care little for their feelings of doubt or conviction as to their per-
ceptions! Any statement not testable in this way (~ reports of a 
single unexplained discordant observation) can at best stimulate 
science by suggesting problems. 
Having seen that 
from the epistemological point of view1 it is quite irrevelant 
whether ... [the) ... feeling of conviction was strong or 
weak .•. [since] ... none of this has any bearing on the ques-
tion of how scientific statements can be justified. 0 
1. K. Popper, LSD, pp. 94-95. See alsop. 59 footnote *l. 
2. Ibid., p. 98. 
3. Ibid., pp. 45-46, 99. 
4. Ibid., p. 99. 
5. Loc. cit. 
6. Ibid., p. 46. Compare K. Popper, "A Third Note on Degree of Cor-
roboration or Confirmation," B.J .P.S., 8(1958 ), 295. 
and, consonant with this, that the truth of scientific statements cannot 
be reduced to our experiences, we find Popper is therefore concluding 
that no favor can be granted to statements describing our perceptions 
(sometimes called 'protocol sentences 1). 1 Objective standards for 
scientific statements instead require what he calls inter-subjective 
testing 2 andsuch testing involves the deduction of testable statements 
from any statement we desire to test. But if such basic statements 
in their turn are to be inter-subjectively testable, 
there can be no ultimate statements in science .•. 
(which] ... cannot be tested, and therefore none 
which cannot in principle be refuted, by falsifying some 
of the conclusions which can be deduced from them. 3 
The foregoing, then, distills to this. We test systems of theories 
by deducing statements of a narrower scope from them. These in turn 
are similarly tested and so on, ad infinitum. This is not a difficulty 
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for the hypothetico-deductive method, as it was for the indte tive method, 
since we aren't trying to "establish nor justify the statement to be 
tested." 4 Of course we cannot test by such a chain forever in estab-
lishing a theory, so we may stop at some point with scientific state-
ments not yet tested. But they must be capable of being tested and we 
should leave them in such a form as to invite attempts at falsification! 5 
1. K. Popper, LSD, pp. 46-47. 
2. Ibid., p. 44.--
3. Ibid., p. 47. 
4. Loc. cit. 
5. Ibid., pp. 48, 99, 104. See also K. Popper, IQP, p. 195. 
Thus, as Popper sees the methodological convention on which science 
operates, science involves no end - there are always statements to be 
tested and thus premises for these which are potentially falsifiable. 
A hypothesis once 
proposed and tested, and having proved its mettle ..• may 
not be allowed to drop out without 'good reason' .•• [such 
as] ... replacement of the hypothesis by another which is 
better testable; or the falsification of one of the consequences 
of the hypothesis. 1 
There are a number of aspects of the above account on which 
Popper elaborates and that are of some technical import. The first 
is the formal relation between universal statements, "hypotheses of 
the character of natural laws", and singular statements "which apply 
to the specific event in question and which I shall call 'initial 
conditions'." 2 From these together we deduce a ~ecific prediction, 
which is also a singular statement. Popper further classifies state-
ments in which only universal names (and no individual names) appear 
as 'strict' or 'pure'. There are strictly universal statements and 
strictly existential statements. 3 As is common in modern logic, the 
1. K. Popper, LSD, pp. 54-55. 
2. Ibid., p. 60. 
3. Ibid., pp. 66-68. An example of a 'universal name' is 'planet' and 
of an 'individual name' is 'Mars'. Individual names require defini-
tion in terms of a proper name (or equivalent signs) while universal 
names require no use of proper names. A strict (or pure) universal 
statement would then be something like 'all planets are almost 
spherical' and an example of a 'strict existential statement would 
be 'there exists at least one planet.' 
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negation of a strictly universal statement is made equivalent to a strictly 
1 
existential statement and vice versa. The theories of science are of the 
'strictly universal form' so that they are really assertions that some-
thing or some state of affairs does not exist. It is for this reason they 
are falsifiable by the acceptance as true of a singular statement which 
infringes the proscription. 2 "Strictly existential statements, by con-
trast, cannot be falsified"3 since no statement of an observed event (i.e., 
no basic statement) can contradict it. ''Only a universal statement would 
do this."4 Thus he says strictly existential statements are non-empirical 
(i.e., metaphysical)! 5 
This introduces an asymmetry. When we find something exists at 
some place and time we may verify only a strictly existential statement 
which predicted it and may falsify only some universal statement that 
6 
prohibited it! Of course, the problem is to determine exactly what part 
of a theory (since they have a complex structure usually) is falsified by a 
particular observation. This is why we try to axiomatize our scientific 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 68. Compare p. 48. 'Not all ravens are black 1 is 
equivalent to 'there exists a non-black raven. 1 
2. Ibid., p. 69. •All ravens are black' is equivalent to 'no non-black 
raven exists. 1 To find a non-black raven is thus to falsify the strict 
universal. 
3. Loc. cit. 
4. Loc. cit. 'There exists at best one white raven 1 is falsifiable only by 
'ali ravens are non -white 1 and this can never be stated with certainty. 
Hence the strict existential statement is not falsifiable in practice. 
5. Loc. cit. 
6. Ibid., p. 70. 
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theories since this enables us to see what parts of a theory are derived 
from which specific axioms. For if we falsify some specific element 
we may only falsify some of the axioms and the others remain untouched.! 
Thus a theoretical system, such as cosmology, is really a hierarchy of 
levels of universality, with the higher ones being hypotheses relative to 
the lower level statements derivable from them, and thus falsifiable by 
the falsification of the lower levels. 2 As we mentioned earlier, even 
singular statements may be falsified in this manner for we can deduce 
consequences even from these. 3 
This introduces a second technical point. Are the axioms conven-
tions or hypotheses? If they are the former, they implicitly define the 
fundamental ideas telling us what they can or cannot mean. 4 They are 
decisions to define what concepts are admissible and what are not. 
"Every system of concepts which satisfies a system of axioms can be 
called a model of that system of axioms," 5 and thus here the models 
will be a system of analytic statements true by convention. Such a con-
ventional system "cannot be refuted by the falsification of its consequences; 
for these too must be analytic." 6 On the other hand, if the system is to be 
1. K. Popper, LSD, pp. 71-77. 
2. Ibid., p. 75. 
3. See p. 5'+. 
4. Ibid., p. 72. See also K. Popper, ''Self-Reference and Meaning in 
Ordinary Language," Mind, 63 N.S.(l954), 162-170. 
5. Ibid., p. 73. 
6. Ibid., p. 74. 
one of hypothesis we wonder what character the primitive terms may 
have, for "it is by no means clear what would be an empirical way of 
defining a concept." 
1 
For ostensive definitions which give a definite 
empirical meaning to a concept by saying it is a symbol for some real 
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object leave us with the fact that only individual names can be so defined. 
But we want universal names in our axiomatic system, and these we can 
define explicitly only by other universal names or we can simply leave 
them undefined - and some must always be in the latter class! "Yet this 
use must inevitably destroy the empirical character of the system" if 
we treat these undefined concepts as if they were implicitly defined. 2 
There are two ways out of this dilemma. One is to define the 
fundamental concepts of (say) a system of relativistic physics with 
the aid of some concepts used in an older system being superceded as 
science advances (say, Newtonian physics). 3 The other is not to treat 
undefined concepts as implicitly defined. 
Popper conceives this to be a solution because by analyzing the 
logical form of a theoretical system one cannot determine if the system 
is conventional (and therefore irrefutable, assuming it is internally con-
sistent of course) or if it is empirical (and therefore potentially falsifi-
4 
able). The distinction shows up only by making a methodological 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 74. 
2. Ibid., pp. 74-75. 
3. Ibid., p. 75. 
4. Ibid., p. 82. 
decision not to argue as if theories in science were, as in Duhem and 
, 
Poincare, attempts to create freely laws which we impose upon nature, 
thereby making a world in the image of our arbitrary model. 1 To treat 
scientific method in this conventionalistic fashion is to leave open the 
possibility of making almost any hypothesis fit experience, and this 
'conventionalist strategem' becomes a great ad hoc argument and more 
characteristic of metaphysics than of science. 2 Thus, to escape this we 
avoid implicitly defined, or non-empirical, concepts in favor of explicit 
definitions or no definition at all. The former alternative gives a term 
a meaning in terms of some system of 'lesser 1 universality. The latter 
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alternative leaves us with undefined universal names which we may treat 
in one of two ways. If they appear in statements of the highest level of 
universality, their use "is established by the fact that we know in what 
logical relation other concepts stand to them. They can be eliminated 
in the course of deduction." 3 If they occur in statements of lower levels 
of universality we establish their meaning by usage and must be careful 
4 
not to alter this surreptitiously in the course of argument. 
A third technical point is the distinction between 'falsifiability' 
I. K. Popper, LSD; pp. 78-80, 82. See also K. Popper, in H.D. Lewis (ed.), 
CBP, pp. 372-381. 
2. Ibid., pp. 82-83. See also K. Popper in H.D. ~ewis (ed.), CBP, p. 381. 
3. Ibid., pp. 83-84. Popper takes 'energy' as an example. 
4. Ibid., p. 84. Popper takes 'position' as an example. 
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and 'falsification'. The former is a "criterion for the empirical charac-
ter of a system of statement.;:" 1 The latter is applied to the actual con-
tradiction, by certain basic statements, of a theory. These basic state-
ments must describe a reproducible effect and not just be stray contra-
dictions involving errors in experiement and such things. 2 Falsification 
occurs only "if a low-level empirical hypothesis which describes such an 
3 
effect is proposed and corroborated" and this falsifying hypothesis must 
be empirical to be falsifiable. 
Popper amplifies the idea of falsifying events by stating that a 
falsifiable theory must prohibit not just one occurrence but at least one 
4 
event. An 'event' he considers to denote whatever is universal or 
typical in an 'occurrence'· Since theories do not refer to individual things, 
they are falsified (if at all) by forbidding an unlimited class of basic 
statements describing each and every prohibited event, any one of which 
events is found to obtain. 5 Implicit in this is the idea that "basic state-
ments have the form of singular existential statements," 6 i.e., they 
each refer to an occurrence of an event in some region of space and time. 7 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 86. 
2. Loc. cit. See also footnote *l. 
3. Loc. cit. 
4. Ibid., p. 90. 
5. I::Oc." cit. See also pp. 100-103. Statements describing each occurrence 
of an event he calls 'homotypic' in analogy to 'equivalent' statements 
describing one occurrence. 
6. Ibid., p. 102. 
7. Ibid., p. 103. 
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Finally, we may mention before concluding this section that Popper 
concludes his main text with an outline of the 'path of science' as he sees 
it. This path is from theories of low-level universality to higher-level 
theories - at least in physical science. The map is of interest to us here 
since it seems to obviate his hypothetico-deductive description in favor 
of inductive methods. But this he denies to be the case. 
For a theory which has been well corroborated can only 
be superseded by one of a higher level of universality; 
that is, by a theory which is better testable and which, 
in addition, contains the old, well-corroborated theory -
or at least a good approximation to it. It may be better 
therefore, to describe ... [the trend above] - the advance 
toward theories of an ever higher level of universality -
as 'quasi-inductive.' 1 
Just how this is done is the subject of our next, and final, section in 
2 
this chapter. But, as we did in an earlier section, let us summarize the 
factors regarding theory development which we have learned Popper 
espouses through the discussion of the section we now conclude. 
1) Theories are only partially decidable. They can only be falsi-
fied. 3 The best scientific theory is the one which has survived serious 
attempts at falsification most successfully. 4 
2) Theories are not sequences of basic statements. They are strictly 
universal and not limited to particular space-time-regions. Thus they are 
not verifiable. 5 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 276. 
2. See pp. 39-4-0. 
3. See pp.41-4-Z, 58, 
4. See p."t3. 
5. See p.+7. 
3) Theories are not probable or improbable in the truth-
1 frequency sense. 
4) Theories are highly informative guesses about the world 
which can be submitted to detailed and severe testing.2 
5) The inventing of a theory is not a task for the logic of sci-
3 
entific methodology to study; only the theory's justification is. 
6) Auxiliary hypotheses added to a theory to neutralize a falsi-
fying experimental result serve to weaken its scientific status.4 
7) Our conviction about a theory is irrelevant to its scientific 
worth, Objective standards of inter-subjective testing are necessary. 5 
8) No theory in science is beyond testing and thus potential refu-
tation. 6 
9) Axiomatizing theories aids in determining what parts are 
obviated by some falsifying test. 7 
10) The methodology of science must exclude conventionalism. 8 
11) Theories are not falsified by single occurrences but only by 
reproducible tests .9 
1. See p. +e. See also K. Popper, AC, p. 249. 
2. See pp. 1-8- so. 
3. Seep. 49. 
4. See pp.5.J1 61, See also K. Popper, ''Testability and 'ad-hocness' 
of the Contraction Hypothesis", B.J.P.S., 10(1959), 50. 
5. See p. S"6, 
6. See p. 57. 
7. See pp.SB-60, 
8. See pp.~o-,1, 
9. See pp. 62-~3. 
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12) Science moves from low - level theories to more embracing 
theories, and those which are more testable.1 
3. The Developing and Choosing of Scientific Theories. 
i. The Nature of Suitable Theories. 
In his fascinating essay, ''Three Views Concerning Human Know-
ledge" Popper compares what he calls essentialism, instrumentalism, 
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and the conjectural view of scientific theories. We may use the analysis 
as an introduction to the study of this section. Essentialism he finds to 
consist of three doctrines. 2 It points out that the scientist's goal is to 
find a true description of nature and its laws which also explains the 
facts of observation. 3 It proclaims that scientists can succeed in esta-
blishing the truth of these theories beyond reasonable doubt, and it states 
that the best theories describe the reality lying behind appearances. 
Popper accepts the first belief but concludes that the second fails to see 
that tests (or even a new theoretical discussion) can lead to discarding a 
theory. Theories all remain conjectural. The third idea, that science 
aims at ultimate explanation, he also rejects .. saying "[Whether] essences 
exist or not, the belief in them does not help us in any way, and indeed is 
likely to hamper us; so that there is no reason why the scientist should 
1. See p. '3· 
2. K. Popper in H.D. Lewis (ed.), CBP, p. 366. 
3. Compare K. Popper, NPP, p. 148. 
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assume their existence." 1 The belief in essences, whether true or false, 
may create obstacles to our posing new and fruitful questions; it isn't 
part of science since we could never be certain of even a theory which 
might fortuitously succeed in describing the essence of something, and 
it isn't "one of those extra-scientific beliefs (such as a faith in power of 
critical discussion) which a scientist need accept." 2 
Instrumentalism holds that theories are merely instruments help-
ing us explain why one symbolic representation of reality leads to another 
symbolic representation. 3 Theories are sets of instruction for deriving 
. 4 
one smgular statement from another. Popper claims, however, that 
5 
theories are not computation rules. In summary, his view is that 
logical relations which may hold between theories and 
computation rules are not symmetrical; and they are 
different from those which may hold between various 
theories, and also from those which may hold between 
various computation rules. The way in which compu-
tation rules are tried out is different from the way in 
which theories are tested; and the skill which the app-
lication of computation rules demands is quite different 
1. K. Popper in H.D. Lewis (ed.), CBP, pp. 368-369. These ideas reveal 
two facets of Popper's use of the term 'essence'· The second argues 
that we can never be sure that whiteness is always characteristic of 
being a swan while the third implies that an a priori belief in anything 
as being necessary uniquely to swan-ness entails the belief in ulti-
mate explanations and the premature cessation of questioning. Com-
pare his LSD, pp. 430-431. 
2. Ibid., p. 372. See also K. Popper, LSD, p. 252. 
3. K. Popper, LSD, pp.'l44-145. -
4. Ibid., p. 373. See also K. Popper, "A Note on Berkeley as a Precursor 
of Mach," B.J .P.S., 4(1953 ), 26-36 for a discussion of this in practice. 
5. Ibid., p. 377. • 
from that needed for their (theoretical) discussion~ and 
for the (theoretical) determination of the limits of their 
applicability. 1 
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Thus instrumentalism leaves us unable to account for the actual progress 
of science which involves attempted refutation and not just the establish-
2 
ing of theories as having different ranges of applicability. 
[By] neglecting falsification, and stressing application, 
instrumentalism proves to be as obscurantist a philosophy 
as essentialism ..•• It is only in considering how 
(in science] various theories stand up to tests that it 
can distinguish between better and worse theories and so 
find a criterion of progress. 3 
If theories are merely predictive instruments they cannot be falsi-
fied; indeed they may, as ad hoc hypotheses, rescue a scientific theory 
threatened by falsification. 
In contrast to the highly critical attitude requisite in the 
pure scientist, the attitude of instrumentalism (like that 
of applied science) is one of complacency at the success 
of applications. Thus it may well be res4onsible for the 
recent stagnation in theoretical physics. 
Popper, as a consequence~ rejects it as an alternative to essentialism. 
Finally~ Popper describes how own attitude regarding scientific 
theories. They are 
genuine conjectures - highly informative guesses about the 
1. K. Popper, LSD~ pp. 377~ 378. 
2. K. Popper in H.D. Lewis (ed.), CBP~ p. 3 80. 
3. Loc. cit. 
4. Ibid., p. 381. 
world which, although not verifiable ..• can be submitted 
to severe critical tests. They are serious attempts to dis-
cover the truth .•. event hough we do not know, and may, 
perhaps, never know, whether [they are] true or not. 1 
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As a result, this view is unlike essentialism in that it does not claim to 
describe, even partially, some real world behind mere appearance but 
rather postulates a world for each theory, described in their turn by 
further theories more universal and testable. "The doctrine of an essen-
tial or ultimate reality collapses together with that of ultimate explana-
tion." 2 New theories, like older ones, "are genuine attempts to describe 
these further worlds ... as equally real aspects, or sides, or layers, 
3 
of the real world. A piano is no more real than its molecules or atoms. 
The theories delineating all three are equal in ''their claims to describe 
reality, although some of them are more conjectural than others."4 
The view is also unlike instrumentalism in that while Popper calls 
a state of affairs " 'real' if, and only if, the statements describing it are 
true", 
5 
this doesn't diminish the claim of such a conjectured state of 
affairs to describe something real. Conjectures "may be true and thus 
describe a real state of affairs" and if a conjecture is falsified ''then it 
1. K. Popper in H.D. Lewis (ed.), CBP, p. 380. 
2. Ibid., p. 383. 
3. Loc. cit. 
4. Loc. cit. 
5. Ibid., p. 384. 
contradicts some real state of affairs." 1 Testable theories assert 
something cannot happen and thus they assert something about the 
real world. Hence the more conjectural a theory is, "the higher 
should be its degree of testability." 2 There is undoubtedly much 
which we don't know at all that is real! Therefore, " with the be-
lief that science can make real discoveries I take my stand •.•. 
• t • t t 1· II 3 againS Ins rumen a ISm. In sum, true science can predict events 
of a type already experienced (~, eclipses) and also new kinds of 
events (~, the birth of a galaxy). Instrumentalism cannot handle the 
second of these. Discoveries are guided by theories which do not offer 
only predictions from the known but which aim at creating novel situa-
tions for new tests.4 
We are now ready to explore some facets of what Popper's views 
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says of suitable theories in science having seen their general character. 
In modern cosmology, with which we will later compare his ideas, this 
question of suitability is of the greatest import for the contemporary 
intensive, and increasingly incisive, debate centers around it. The issues 
1. K. Popper in H.D. Lewis (ed.), CBP, p. 384. Popper thus believes in 
a world independent of theories about it, but claims that we can be 
certain only about some characteristics it does not have and only 
reasonably confident in the correctness of descriptions arising from 
theories that have withstood severe testing. Where such theories 
overlap in their 'realm of discourse 1 we presume that we are likely 
describing different facets or layers of complexity in reality. 
2. Loc. cit. 
3. Loc. cit. 
4 • Op. cit.~ p. 3 8 6 . 
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in this field are among the most critical in modern science and any 
aid as to their resolution or clarification which Popper may offer 
must be of great utility in the task of this dissertation. 
A few pages back it was noted that, for Popper, theoretical sys-
terns are composed of statements of varied levels of universality 
ranging from those on the highest level (axioms) to singular statements .1 
Thus falsification of any lower level will falsify the level above, which 
has the character of hypothesis relative to those below deduced from 
it. Indeed, we had occasion to mention even earlier thatt he singular 
statements themselves are often hypothetical, being falsifiable. 2 Thus 
the formal relationship existing here is a hierarchy of theories, each 
with its class of basic statements. The latter are all the self-consistent 
singular statements we can imagine and thus they will contain many 
which are mutually incompatible. Now an empirical theory is special 
type of theory which has two non-empty sub-classes: the sub-class of 
basic statements with which it is inconsistent and thus which it prohibits 
and the second sub-class which it doesn't contradict. Consequently, the 
former are potential falsifiers of the theory but about the latter we can 
say only that they are permitted. A ''theory makes assertions only 
1. See pp.S'fand ~7-~11. 
2. See pp.S"+andst. and K. Popper, LSD, pp. 75, 84. 
about its potential falsifiers. (It asserts their falsity)." 1 
Later we added a restriction on this, namely, that the non-empty 
class of potential falsifiers must contain a non-empty class of homo-
typic basic statements 2 (i.e., the infinite non-empty class of singular 
existential potentially-falsifying statements must contain at least one 
homotypic statement referring to a specific event). Now it is appar-
ent that there may be varying numbers of homotypic basic statements 
for different theories and therefore that their degree of falsifiability 
would differ. 3 As a consequence, we see that the theory ruling out 
the most basic statements actually 
says more about the world of experience ... for although 
the class of permitted statements will thereby become 
smaller ... we have seen that the theory does not assert 
anything about this class. 4 
Science aims at theories of this type "since it allows the empirical 
world only a narrow range of possibilities." 5 
But a problem arises here since the class of potential falsifiers 
is infinite for each theory. How then can we talk of one theory ruling 
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1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 86. But the falsification of a potentially inconsis-
tent basic statement means the verification of its negation. Since the 
second sub-class includes the negation of all members of the first 
sub-class, the assertion a theory makes as to the falsity of the latter 
requires the assertion of the truth of an equally large portion of the 
former. Popper is thus incorrect here (although he is more careful 
elsewhere on the same point), but perhaps he means merely to argue 
that, before testing, one sub-class will be permitted by a theory and 
the other will not. 
2. See pp. ~.z -63. 
3. K. Popper, LSD, pp. ll2 -ll3. 
4. Ibid., p. ll3. But see above. 
5. Loc. cit. 
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out more events than another? 1 Popper approaches its solution with 
the aid of an idea of sets of higher dimension having more points than 
lower dimensional sets, so that we may talk of classes of 'higher' and 
'lower' dimension, and also with the aid of class extension, of classes 
in which one is a sub-class of the other. 2 Let us note how he uses 
these concepts. 
Looking first at the sub-class relation, we see that one statement 
is falsifiable to a higher degree than another if the potential falsifiers 
of the first contain the class of potential falsifiers of the second, but not 
conversely. Thus, if the classes of potential falsifiers of both are iden-
tical, the statements have the same degree of falsifiability. Finally, if 
the class of potential falsifiers of one statement does not have those of 
the other as a proper sub-class, or if the classes are not identical, we 
cannot compare the two statements 1 degrees of falsifiability at an.3 We 
may note in passing that since there are no potential falsifiers for 
tautologies nor for metaphysical statements, the second restriction above 
makes the loss of their potential falsifiers identical and leaves them 
with' both zero falsifiability. On the other hand, self -contradictory 
statements can be potentially falsified by all logically possible basic 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 114. 
2. Ibid., pp. 114-115. It should be noted that Popper's discussion of 
dimensions is not the same as the commonly used topological defi-
nition of the dimension of a set of points. See d.bid., p. 285. 
3. Ibid., pp. 115-116 
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statements so that we may arbitrarily assign them a falsifiability de-
gree of unity. This leaves empirical statements with falsifiability 
0 (empirical falsifiability< 1, and for comparison we must seek varied 
fractions for empirical theories depending on how close they lie to con-
tradiction or to tautology. 1 
Popper uses this comparison of fractions to introduce the idea of 
logical probability since whenever ''we can compare the degree of falsi-
fiability of two statements, we can say that the one which is the less 
falsifiable is also the more probable, by virtue of its logical form." 2 
Thus logical probability one equals zero degree of falsifiability (and 
vice versa) and the less testable statement is the logically more pro-
bable one. 3 This applies both to universal and singular statements, 
though in the latter case the class of potential falsifiers is not a class 
of events but a class of occurrences. 4 
He further elaborates upon this idea in the context of logical as 
compared to empirical content. The empirical content of a statement 
is the class of its potential falsifiers while the logicalcontent is the 
class of all non-tautological statements logically derivable from the 
statement in question. This means, broadly, two things. First: if one 
I. K. Popper, LSD, p. 118. 
2. Ibid., pp. 118-119. 
3. Ibid., p. 119. Compare K. Popper, CDC, p. 157 passim. 
4. Loc. cit. 
statement entials another the logical content of the former is ~ that 
of the latter and if there is mutual entailment they have equal logical 
content. Secondly: two statements of equal logical co:rtent have equal 
empirical content, a statement whose logical content is greater than 
that of another must also have empirical content~ that of the other, 1 
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and, finally, if the empirical content of one statement is greater than that 
of another its logical content must also be greater or else noncomparable. 2 
We may continue our outline of Popper's views as to developing 
theories so that they will be empirically suitable by stating several 
other methodological rules which are variants of that implied above (i.e., 
that the most preferable theory is that which can be most severely tested 
and thus which has the highest empirical content.) 3 The first of these is 
that we should aim at the most universal theory. Another way of saying 
this is that our methodological decision is to leave nothing unexplained 
since this is always the same as seeking to deduce statements from 
others of higher universality. The second of these is to aim at the most 
precise theory. 4 
1. The equality arises from the possibility that one statement is the conjunc-
tion of the other with a metaphysical or purely existential statement, 
so that the first statement may have more logical content than the 
second but no increase in empirical content. 
2. K. Popper, LSD, p. 120. Where we can compare the logical content 
it is always greater in such a case. But comparison is not always 
possible due to the presence of metaphysical statements and the dif-
ficulty of ascertaining their precise logical content. 
3. Compare pp. 181 ~9, 6 ],~ 71. 
4. Ibid., p. 122. 
Now, Popper tells us that what 
I call higher universality in a statement corresponds 
roughly to what classical logic might call the greater 
'extension of the subject'; and what I call greater pre-
cision corresponds to the smaller extension, or the 
'restriction of the predicate'." 1 
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Hence, a proposition such as "all orbits of heavenly bodies are circular" 
as compared with "all orbits of planets are ellipses" is both more univ-
ersal and more precise. This is because the orbits of planets are sub-
class of the orbits of heavenly bodies and because circles are a subclass 
of ellipses. We should therefore aim at the former type of proposition 
since it has greater empirical content and thus greater testability. 
Thus far we have compared degrees of testability in theories only 
insofar as the subclass-relation can be used. We can also often compare 
testability by means of the 'dimensions' of theories as mentioned earlier, 
where we may or may not be able to use the relation of class to sub··class. 
To do this we start by realizing that basic statements are of varied 
degrees of compositeness, i.e., they are compounds of varied numbers 
2 
of simpler basic statements. But there is a difficulty in finding a natural 
end to this dissection of such statements ! To get around it we must 
select 
arbitrarily a class of relatively atomic statements, which 
we take as a basis for comparison ... rand define] by 
l. K. Popper, LSD, p. 123. 
2. Ibid., p. 127 .Recall that 'basic' statements are statements of singu-
lar observable facts. See pp.S"!S7, also Popper's, LSD, pp. 35, 43, 
100-103. They are thus singular existential statements which deal 
with observable, and thus testable, events. 
means of a generating schema or matrix (for example, 
'There is a measuring apparatus ... at the place ..• 1 
the pointer of which lies between the gradation mark 
• . . and ... ')." 1 
Now each statement obtained from this ma:trix by substituting in 
it definite values~ plus the conjunction of all such statements, forms 
what Popper calls a field. 2 "A conjunction of !:!. different relatively 
atomic statements of a field may be called an '!!_-tuple of the field'; 
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and we can say that the degree of its composition is equal to the number 
n." 3 
Popper then introduces the dimensional aspect. 
A theory t is called 'd-dimensional with respect to the field 
of application E:' if a:;d only if the following relation holds 
between!_ and E:: there is a number~ such that (a) the 
theory does not clash with any ~-tuple of the field and (b) any 
given ~-tuple in conjunction with the theory divides all the 
remaining relatively atomic statements uniquely into two 
infinite sub-classes A and B, such that the following conditions 
are satisfied: (ex) every statement of the class A forms 1 when 
conjoined with the given ~-tuple, a 'falsifying~ + 1 -tuple' 
i.e., a potential falsifier of the theory ; (13 ), the class B on 
the other hand is the sum of one or more, but always a finite 
number of infinite sub-classes [BiJ such that the conjunction 
of any number of statements belonging to any one of these 
sub-classes [ Bi] is compatible with the conjunction of the 
given ~-tuple and the theory." 4 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 128. 
2. Loc. cit. 
3. Ibid., pp. 128-129. 
4. Ibid., pp. 285-286. A theory that the earth travels in a circUlar 
orbit will be 3 -dimensional, on this definition~ because observation 
statements of one, two, or three positions of the earth will not clash 
with the theory. On theother hand, the conjunction of a fourth obser-
vation statement with the three already conjoined can potentially 
falsify the theory if it does not agree with the specific circle already 
defined as necessary from combining the theory and the three earlier 
observations. If it does falsify it the statement falls in class A· if 
' not it falls in class B. 
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Thus run-on sentence and its complex thesis we will see applied 
in a moment, but we may notice in passing how Popper seeks to relate 
this dimensional method of comparing degrees of testability to the sub-
class method. He notes that the concept of field includes singular 
statements of all kinds. But since we can compare their dimensions 
with the aid of the field, we can estimate the degree of composition of 
the basic statements included in the singular statements. As a result 
we may assume 
that to a theory of higher dimension, there corresponds a 
class of basic statements of higher dimensions, such that 
all statements of this class are permitted by the theory, 
irrespective of what they assert. 1 
Thereby, we see how the two methods of comparing degrees of testability 
are related. 
He concludes the discussion by noting: 
There will be cases in which neither, or only one, of the 
two methods is applicable .•.. But if in a particular 
case both methods are applicable, then it may conceiv-
ably happen that two theories of equal dimensions may 
yet have different degrees of falsifiability if assessed 
by the method based upon the subclass relation. In such 
cases, the verdict of the latter method should be accepted, 
since it would prove to be the more sensitive method. In 
all other cases in which both methods are applicable, they 
must lead to the same result; for it can be shown, with the 
help of a simple theorem of the theory of dimension, that 
the dimension of a class must be greater than, or equal 
to, that of its subclasses." 2 
1. K. Popper, LSD, pp. 129, 13 0. 
2. Ibid., p. 13 0. 
ii. Testing Theories. 
The last few pages have stressed the following aspects of scien-
tific theories as Popper sees them: 
1) they are extra-scientific beliefs which a scientist must have 
in doing his work, and thus in developing theories; 
2) we must be critical of every theory and never complacent in 
the success they have had; 
3) we must not assume we ever know if a theory is true or not, 
although all theories must claim to describe reality; 
4) only by falsifying a theory can we know it is not like the real 
world; 
5) the more a theory is conjectural the more it should be made 
capable of possible falsification and the more diligent we should be in 
testing it; 
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6) theories which rule out more basic statements allow the world 
a narrower range of possibilities, and thus science should aim at such 
theories; 
7) and, finally, the 'dimension' of a theory as well as 'subclass 1 
relationships may aid in choosing the most falsifiable theory among 
possible alternatives. In this regard we should aim at the most univer-
sal and most precise theories. Let us notice just how Popper applied 
some of these in his discussion on setting up theories and experimenting 
with them. 
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We may first notice the problem of graphical analysis of theories, 
We may consider the surface of a sheet of graph paper as made up of 
points, each corresponding to one relatively atomic statement. "The 
dimensions of the theory with respect to this field ..• is then identical 
with the dimension of the set of curves corresponding to the theory." 1 
Suppose we have theories describing the motion of the planets as circu-
lar, parabolic and elliptical. The first is three-dimensional since to 
falsify it we need "at least four singular statements of the field ... cor-
responding to four points of its graphic representation." 2 The parabolic 
hypothesis is four-dimensional and the elliptical theory is five-
dimensional for similar reasons. Now the sub-class relation places 
circles in the class of ellipses so that a hypothesis of circular motion 
is more falsifiable than one providing an elliptical motion. 
With the help of the dimensional comparison we can also include 
the parabolic theory, however. 
In algebraic representation, the dimension of the set of 
curves depends upon the number of parameters whose 
values we may freely choose. We can therefore say that 
the number of freely determinable paramters of a set 
of curves by which a theory is represented is character-
istic for the degree of falsifiability (or testability) of 
that theory. 3 
Utilizing this, in the light of our remarks on dimensions several pages 
back, we can conclude that we should have preferred initially the circular 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 130. 
2. Loc. cit. 
3. Ibid., p. 131. 
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to the parabolic view and the latter to the elliptical had we been Kepler. 
This is because crudity of experiement may allow us to falsify easily 
only the simplest of competing theories. 1 
But we should also note that 
quite different sets of curves may have the same dimen-
sion. The set of all circles, for example, is three-
dimensional; but the set of all circles passing through 
a given point is a two-dimensional set (like the set of 
straight lines). If we demand that the circles should all 
pass through two given points, then we get a one-
dimensional set, and soon. Each additional demand that 
all curves of a set should pass through one mor2 given 
point reduces the dimensions of the set by one. 
The number of dimensions can also be reduced, however, by other 
methods such as specifying eccentricities. For this reason we differen-
tiate material reduction of dimensions which introduces the need to fit 
the curves to one or more points, without change in shape, from formal 
reduction of dimensions which makes more narrowly specific the form 
of a curve (as in passing from ellipse to circle to straight line). 
Now "material reduction introduces an indivual name, formal re-
duction a universal name, into the definition of the relevant set of curves. "3 
For instance, if we have the set of all ellipses in a given plane they are 
defined by the general equation of an ellipse and this doesn't depend on 
the origin or orientation of any coordinate system we specify in the 
plane. Specific coordinates are determined only by defining an origin 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 131. 
2. Ibid., p. 132. 
3. Ibid., p. 133. 
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and orientation - that is by introducing individual names. On the other 
hand, formal reduction of ellipses to circles in the plane just introduces 
a new universal name. As a consequence, if 
we compare the degree of falsifiability of two theories, 
by considering their dimensions, we shall clearly have 
to take into account their generality, i.e., their invar-
iance with respect to co-ordinate transformations, 
along with their dimensions. 1 
Popper believes the above analysis aids greatly in handling the 
problems of the simplicity and the corroboration of hypotheses to which 
we now turn. 
The relative simplicity of theories is surely of great importance 
in science. As a consequence, Popper spends considerable time in its 
study. First, however, he eliminates preferences based on aesthetic 
or pragmatic grounds as extra-logical uses. Questions, in dealing with 
theories, of elegance in mathematics, of ease in handling, or of know-
ledge needed to understand them are of little interest to the task of a 
theory of knowledge. 2 What is of interest here is the 'degree of 
falsifiability' of theories and this Popper equates with simplicity. 3 
First, Popper, we saw earlier, claimed that "theories of a 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 134. This latter restriction we may ignore, how-
ever, if we aren't making geometrical statements describing the world 
but just representing some variables (~ pressure and volume in a 
gas at constant temperature) on a graph. 
2. Ibid., p. 137. 
3. I:Oc. cit. See also pp. 378-386. 
lower dimension are more easily falsifiable than those of a higher di-
mension." 1 This makes the former simpler by definition. Secondly~ 
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the degree of falsifiability and the universality and precision of a theory 
increase together. 2 Thus more universal and precise theories are 
simpler! " A more universal statement can take the place of many less 
universal ones, and for that reason has often been called 'simpler'." 3 
"I found that testability~ and thus prior improbability, can be equated 
with paucity of parameters ... and ... I equated high testability with 
high simplicity." 4 
Popper concludes that 
above all~ our theory explains why simplicity is so highly 
desirable. To understand this there is no need for us to 
assume a 'principle of economy of thought' or anything 
of the kind. Simple statements, if knowledge is our object~ 
are to be prized more highly than less simple ones because 
they tell us more; because their empirical content is 
greater; and because they are better testable. 5 
Let us next look at the corroboration of theories. After some fifty 
pages of close analysis, Popper concludes that 
probability hypotheses do not rule out anything observable; 
probability estimates cannot contradict~ or be contradicted 
by, a basic statement; nor can they be contradicted by a 
conjunction of any finite number of basic statements; and 
accordingly not by an finite number of observations either. 6 
1. K. Popper~ LSD~ p. 141. 
2. Ibid.~ pp. 141-142. 
3. Ibid., p. 142. 
4. Loc. cit.~ footnote *2. 
5. Loc. Cit. 
6. Op. cit., p. 190. See also pp. 387-419~ and K. Popper in C.A. Mace (ed.), 
BPM, p. 187, footnote >:<2. 
And again: "Probability estimates are not falsifiable. Neither, of 
course, are they verifiable 
2 
can be corroborated. 
II 1 But he does claim that theories 
Corroboration is based upon an appraisal made as to whether a 
theory has or has not stood up to testing. The degree of corroboration 
depends, however, more on the severity of the testing than on the num-
ber of corroborating instances. 3 
But the severity of the tests, in its turn, depends upon the 
degree of testability, and thus upon the simplicity of the 
hypothesis: the hypothesis which is falsifiable in a higher 
degree, or the simpler hypothesis, is also the one which 
is corroborable in a higher degree. 4 
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Of course, to be 'corroborable' is not the same as to be 'corroborated'. 
Highly falsifiable theories may only have slight empirical corroboration 
- indeed they may be falsified! So, too, we may give up one theory for 
a more falsifiable, and thus corroborable, theory without every falsify-
ing the first. 
Now in appraising a theory's corroboration we note that the degree 
increases with the number of corroborating tests. This is true even 
though the first such tests are usually considered to corroborate the 
theory sufficiently, so that later instances raise its degree of corrobor-
ation very little. But it is even more the case if the new corroborating 
l. K. Popper, LSD, p. 191. See also pp. 204-205, 254-262. 
2. Ibid., p. 251. See also pp. 363-377. 
3. See the case of 'Crows vs. Millikan', ibid., p. 267. 
4. Loc. cit. 
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instances corroborate the theory "in a new field of application." 1 They 
may then greatly increase the degree of corroboration. For this reason, 
the more universal the theory's potential applicability the more falsifi-
able it is and therefore the higher its degree of corroborability. 2 And 
thus the more it is shown to be really applicable the greater its corrob-
oration! Thus the degree of corroboration of one theory can be greater 
than the degree of a less universal theory. ''In a similar way, theories 
of a higher degree of precision can be better corroborated than less pre-
cise ones." 3 
Putting all this together, we note that 
the corroborability of a theory - and also the degree of 
corroboration of a theory which has in fact passed severe 
tests, stand both, as it were, in inverse ratio to its 
[absolute] logical probability; for they both increase with 
its degree of testability and simplicity. But the view im-
plied by probability logic is the precise opposite of this. 
its upholders let the probability of a hypothesis incrPase 
in direct proportion to its logical probability .... " 4 
[The] better testable and better corroborated hypothesis 
can never obtain a higher probability, on the given evid-
dence, than the less testable one. But this entails that 
degree of corroboration cannot be the same as probability. 
This is a crucial result ..• if you value high probability, 
you must say very little ... tautologies will always re-
tain the highest probability. 5 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 269. 
2. Compare with No. 5, p. 78. 
3. K. Popper, LSD, loc. cit. 
4. Ibid., p. 270-:--Note carefully footnote *2. See also K. Popper, AC, 
p. 249. 
5. Ibid., p. 270, footnote >:<3. See also K. Popper in C.A. Mace (ed.), 
BPM, p. 166 footnote 1. 
As to ad hoc hypotheses, Popper adds, 
I believe that it is the simple theories, and those which 
make little use of auxiliary hypotheses ... which can 
be well corroborated, just because of their logical im-
probability ... 1 [I] ascribe a high probability to such 
theories because they are severely testable, or logically 
improbable; that is to say because they have, a priori 
as it were, many opportunities of clashing with basic 
statements. 2 
Finally, we may look at the relation of 'truth' and 'corroboration 1 
as Popper sees it. The ideas of truth and falsity, as applied to state-
ments in science, are appraisals at a given time. We may appraise a 
statement as false today which we appraised as true yesterday because 
it no longer satisfies. 3 So it is with corroboration. It is also a logical 
appraisal ''for it asserts that a certain logical relation holds between a 
theoretical system and some system of accepted basic statements. 4 
But we can claim only that a theoretical statement is corroborated with 
respect to a system of basic statements accepted at a given point in 
time. 
Thus we must attach a subscript, as it were, to every 
appraisal of corroboration - a subscript characterizing 
the system of basic statements to which the corrobora-
tion relates (for example, by the date of its acceptance). 5 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 273. See also K. Popper in H.D. Lewis (ed.)., 
CBP, p. 362. 
2. Loc. cit. 
3. Ibid., p. 275. See also the footnote *1 on Tarski, ibid., p. G74. 
4. Loc. cit. 
5. Loc. cit. See also K. Popper in C.A. Mace (ed.), BPM, p. 178, 
and K. Popper, IQF, pp. 117, 195. 
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With this we close our presentation of Popper's views on the 
nature of the development and acceptance of scientific theories. All 
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of it is relevant to our analysis of the debate between competing cos-
mological theories to which we now turn. But we will first see the 
actual arguments used in the growth of these varied physical cosmo-
logies and in their defense. Only then can we see how closely Popper's 
account corresponds to the past and present history of methodologies 
for unfolding the nature of the physical universe. We may also remark 
that Popper does have specific illustrations of his ideas which are 
applicable to cosmology and which we have not mentioned. These we 
will raise as appropriate. 
III. THE FOUNDATIONS OF TWENTIETH CENTURY SCIENTIFIC 
COSMOLOGY 
1. The Conceptual Background. 
i. The Pre-Newtonian Physical Universe. 
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It is our intention in these three sections to deal with certain of 
the fundamental attitudes governing the choice of cosmological theories 
up to the early twentieth century. No attempt will be made either to be 
comprehensive or to analyze the social and philosophical context giving 
direction to these views of the physical world. Rather we shall treat 
Newton as a mountain peak casting his shadow over the attitudes of the 
following three centuries of astronomical theory and in turn illuminated 
by the tendencies inherent in figures before him. We shall seek, then, 
only for examples illustrative of this pattern. 
There are two reasons for such an approach, which is obviously 
somewhat arbitrary to anyone who realizes that not all the lucid insights 
of earlier physical world-views impinged upon Newton's concepts, and 
who also understands that not every mind from Newton's to Einstein's 
found the shadow of the former's influence comforting. The first is that 
the new colors presented hy relativity, and certain recent reactions to 
it, are best seen in contrast with the relatively subdued scene in cosmo-
logy following Newton's great synthesis. The second is that it is an 
interesting task to compare certain definite patterns of thought found in 
contemporary debate with similar patterns stretching across many cen-
turies, thus isolating a few questions from the many one might ask. 
Such patterns as the use of ideas of simplicity and elegance, the guid-
ance provided by mathematical structure and analogical model, and 
the utilization of essentialistic, formalistic or conjectural theoretical 
frameworks will be stressed. About these, Popper, as we saw, has 
much to say and also on such points much technical astronomical de-
bate pivots. 
It is the author's desire that we may thus avoid Holton's indict-
ment in our later analysis of contemporary cosmology by seeing things 
therein in perspective. Says he, "Among the signs of scientism is the 
habit of dividing all thought into two categories, up-to-date scientific 
1 knowledge and nonsense." Rather, we may use the history of science 
as Hanson challenges us to - to learn, that is, what reasons have, in 
fact, been given for preferring one hypothesis to another. Thereby we 
give "insight and solidity to our logical analysis of theory structure 
which might otherwise appear to be insubstantial." 2 At least, we may 
hope so! 
To begin our study, let us turn then to the world views of Coper-
nicus, Galileo and Kepler, which provide the immediate foundation of 
Newton's great edifice. In each case let us stress the following for ease 
1. Gerald Holton, "Modern Science and the Intellectual Tradition", 
Science, 131(1960), ll91. 
2. Norwood Hanson, "More on 'The Logic of Discovery' ", Jour. of 
Philosophy, 57 (1960), 187. 
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of comparison: 
1) the use of arguments of aesthetics and economy of thought; 
2) the use of models for guidance and illustration; and 
3) the conception of the nature of theories operative (in Appen-
dix B). 
Copernicus (1473 -1543 ), called by Koestler the Timid Canon, pub-
lished one of the major documents in the history of ideas only in the 
last year of his life. This was the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, 
which set forth ideas slowly developed over a thirty-year period. One 
might say that it represents primarily an attack upon the Ftolemaic 
system as unsystematic and as an affront to the Aristotelian uniformity 
of the universe. 1 It claims, instead, to offer the motion of the solar 
system as a systematic and consistently-related composition of circular 
motions obedient to the principles of physics. ~ 
The overt assumptions required are simple 3 the celestial 
circles have no center in common, the earth is only the center of the 
lunar circle and of the 'weight' of the solar system, the sun is central 
1. Compare Stephen Toulmin and J. Goodfield, The Fabric of the Heavens 
(London: Hutchinson & Ct)., 1961), p. 170 and Thomas W. Africa, 
"Copernicus' Relation to Aristarchus and Pythagoras", Isis, 52 (Sep-
tember, 1961), 403-409. 
2. Edgar Zilsel, "Copernicus and Mechanics" in Philip Wiener and A. 
Noland (eds.), Roots of Scientific Thought (New York: Basic Books, 
1960) pp. 276, 280. 
, . 
3. See excerpts from the Revolutwns and from Of Learned Ignorance 
in Milton K. Munitz, Theories of the Universe (Glencoe, Ill.: The 
Free Press, 1957), pp. 146-173. 
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to the major cycles, and the apparent motion of the fixed stars is due 
to a complex rotation about our axis since they lie at such a distance 
any real motion they might have is imperceptible. There were, of 
course, difficulties in this picture, such as the brightness of Venus 
(resolved only by Galileo) and the motion of terrestrial objects whereby 
they were the resultant of both rectilinear and perfect circular motion 
(resolved by claiming this occurred only when they were removed from 
their natural place). A much more fundamental problem arose from his 
placing the imperfect and changeable earth off center and replacing it 
by the sun on the largely neo-Platonic and Pythagorean grounds of the 
mystical majesty of the latter; a problem which eventuated in trouble 
with the church. 1 
But enough of this essential background; let us look now at our 
conceptual questions. First, is Copernicus' system intended to be sim-
pler than its predecessors and is it generally accepted as such? There 
is no doubt that Copernicus purposed to simplify the calculations of 
ptolemy's Almagest but in this he was rather unsuccessful - he ended 
up with around fifty spheres, eccentrics and epicycles, a sun not really 
central geometrically, and little improvement in the accuracy with 
which all this fitted observation. However, simplicity may involve more 
1. See here Arthur Koe-.stler, 'The t)leepwalkers (London: Hutchinson & Co., 
1959), pp. 119-~21 and Angus Armitage, The World of Copernicus 
(New York: Henry Schuman, 1947 ). 
a 
than a mathematicl simplification. 
A 
James Haden claims that the new view is somewhat more econ-
omical conceptually, it limits problems of prediction to the planets 
since it truly 'fixes 1 the distant stars, and it places the planets under 
the operation of a uniform mechanism without their motions being af-
fected causally by any factor like numerical ratios. 1 Ravetz claims 
that "Sun and circle worship, and mathematical elegance, play their 
part, but a belief in the rationality and intelligibility of God's heavens 
may have been crucial." 2 Hall, in his study, says, 
Copernicus' original contribution to science •.. lies in 
his being the avowed opponent of an idea, that the earth 
is the motionless core of the universe .•.. the opposi-
tion sprang from a demonstrable truth, that celestial 
observations could be equally well accounted for if the 
earch and planets were assumed to move about a fixed 
sun, allied to various wholly non-demonstrable consi-
derations - value judgments - seeming to show that the 
astronomical system constructed upon this assumption 3 
was simpler than the older system and preferable to it. 
We may state the above points on simplicity, elegance, and 
utility as follows, in a somewhat different fashion: 
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1) Copernicus did make the mathematics somewhat more economical 
but he removed the advantages of a geo-centric description so useful when 
1. James Haden, ''Copernicus - and the History of Science", Review 
of Metaphysics, 13(1959), 79-108. 
~. J. R. Ravetz, "Origins of the Copernican Revolution", Nature, 
189(1961), 860. 
3. A.R. Hall, The Scientific Revolution, 1500-1800 (Boston: The Beacon 
Press, 1956), pp. 36, 64-65. 
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we observe, as we must at present, from the earth. 
2) The discussion of the planetary system is neatly isolated from 
the 'fixed' stars and the mechanism of its motion is thereby easier to 
find. 
3) He did advance the art by giving the relative sizes of the 
planets, explaining the motion of the planets nearer the sun than ours; 
the uneven motions and imperfect circles of the Almagest were re-
moved, and other obscure points were clarified somewhat. 
4) To follow Copernicus was to reject a much larger philosophico-
theological world view of the period. 1 This he did not entirely realize 
and felt integration was easier than it proved to be. 
5) The introduction of Aristotelian physics into the nearby uni-
verse was intended to simplify understanding but instead it conflicted 
with the introduction simultaneously of a Platonic mathematization of 
the solar system (see below) and with most contemporary interpreta-
tions of Aristotle's physics. 
It is necessary to conclude then that Copernicus failed to simplify 
to any great degree his two goals of prediction and of the emplacement 
of physics more broadly into the universe. He did, however, introduce 
an interest in these followed up by others more satisfactorily. It be-
comes clear that his attempts to understand and explain with economy 
1. Compare Edwin A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern 
Physical Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), pp. 40-44. 
of thought involve the rejection of a broad philosophical cosmology 
(however unconsciously) in order to defend a personal psychological 
satisfaction in solving a more restricted problem. Simplicity in 
Copernicus is not then a utilitarian achievement in any great degree, 
it is not the attaining of greater elegance to any large extent, but it is 
rather an aesthetic goal. He did not 'explain' in the sense of logical 
economy. He did achieve 'understanding' at great cost but with psy-
chological satisfaction to himself and others to follow .1 
Turning now to Copernicus' use of analogy and models we may 
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make several points. From what we have seen, his construction of the 
universe certainly followed a new model (prefigured of course in such 
a person as Aristarchus ); but it was a model restricted in scope to a 
detailed picture of the nearby sun, moon, and planets and a much 
vaguer realm of fixed stars at great distance. It was also a model far-
from-mechanically derived; it was instead descriptive and included 
qualitative factors as well as quantitative. Ideas of 'fitness' and 'nat-
ural motion' are prevalent. 2 Sphericity is the result of natural appetite 
to unity bestowed on heavenly bodies by their creator; a theory of 
sympathy cognate with the idea of an emanating soul. 3 The sun is 
central, not by virtue of its mass and consequent greater influence, but 
1. J. Haden, CHS, p. 38. 
2. A.R. Hall, SR, pp. 66-67. 
3. Ibid., p. 66. See also Mary B. Hesse, Forces and Fields (London: 
Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1961), pp. 1~6-~17; and Max Jammer, Con-
cepts of Force (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 
pp. 69, 7~. 
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as a result of purpose to shed equally its glory. 
The model fails, really, in that it attempts to reconcile a helio-
centric cosmology with the physics of tradition which better fitted a 
geocentric model (implied in addition# it was believed, by Scripture 
and the Fathers). Copernicus ended up with the problem of explaining 
how the earth might move# how the tendency to cohere by natural ap-
petite might apply to all spherical bodies, and how one can give motion 
to a supposedly weightless heavens. What was required was a new 
physics! But Copernicus could not offer it and his contemporary peers 
had some justification in questioning a model which was not readily ex-
plained by concepts widely accepted. What his model did offer was the 
ability to start on an original basis and derive results previously der-
ivable only on another set of assumptions. 
1 
This penchant for thinking 
in new ways, of hard work, and of providing a novel and neat new concept 
could hardly fail to demand that others reason out what Copernicus saw 
but faintly. 
One point may be mentioned in passing. Copernicus seems to have 
considered the assumed circular motion of the planets to be natural and 
2 
requiring no further explanation. Only with Kepler is any real move 
1. A. R. Hall, SR, p. 68. 
~. M. B. Hesse, FF, p. 129. Also M. Jammer, CF, p. 72 and Max 
Jammer# Concepts of Space (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1957), pp. 70-72. 
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made to give a mechanical relation to the sun and its planets and only 
in Newton is a relation developed which explains, by the same factor, 
the spherical shape of bodies. 1 
Let us now move on. Perhaps in a general sense one might say 
that Copernicus left two major issues unresolved. The first was whether 
his description of the known would become a basic tool for exploring the 
unknown. The second was how, in removing the motion of the 'fixed' 
stars and thus the usual doctrine of an 'unmoved mover 1, one might 
find novel celestial forces to explain movement in the planets without 
begging the question in defining it as 'natural'. 
·with Galilee (1564-1642) we see both answered. The model he 
provided as an unfolding of Copernicanism is relatively simple but it 
implies much. First, with the aid of the new telescope, he argues for 
imperfect heavenly bodies. Secondly, he explains how the distant stars 
(so far off they exhibited no measurable parallax) could have such large 
apparent size by using a primitive idea of diffraction. Thirdly, by show-
ing that Jupiter had moons he removed the earth from any peculiar 
nature in this regard. Motion in the solar system might well have varied 
centers! Finally, he argued for the rotation of the sun itself. 2 
1. See now Appendix A, Note 1. 
~. See Galilee Gililei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, 
trans. Stillman Drake (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1954). Also G. de Santillana, The Crime of Galileo (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1955) and Arthur Koestler, TS, pp. 352-495. 
Here we may see evidence of point and counterpoint with several 
contemporary theories of his day. One of these is that of Tycho Brahe 
(1546-1601), the great founder of modern observational astronomy. He 
is also remembered for his inability to conceive ofthe immense dis-
tances to the fixed stars required if one accepted Copernicanism. 1 
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Consequently, we have Tycho's attempt to resolve the problem in an un-
usual model for the universe; one wherein the five major planets went 
around the sun, and the whole of these went around the earth together with 
the starry sphere of fixed stars (which was placed relatively nearby and 
which rotated at a slightly faster rate than the sun and its satellites). 
There is no doubt that this was not the conceptual advance from Caper-
nicus which Galileo provided, though it may well have been a better 
mathematical description of observation. It is, rather, a formalistic 
compromise of Copernican aspects with the theology and philosophy 
dominant in the time. Of Galileo this could hardly be said. 
But Tycho contributed several items to the destruction of the very 
world-view he desired to preserve. These were his observations of a 
nova and of a comet. The former revealed that the sphere of fixed stars 
was not immutable; the latter demanded that one revise the tradition of 
1. It remained for Galileo to provide the first step to a resolution of 
this, with his idea that stars might appear far larger optically than 
they should geometrically. See Alexandre Koyre, From the Closed 
World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1957 ), pp. 90-92. 
97 
solid planetary spheres. 1 All this fitted Galileo 1s similar conclusions 
as to the imperfection of the heavens well. Another contribution came 
from Giordano Bruno who was burned for heresy in 1600. ~ He postulated 
an infinite universe, thereby logically destroying the uniqueness of helio-
centrism. In addition he added the idea of infinite worlds much like ours. 
Both ideas were pure conjecture in the light of the empirical evidence of 
his time, but have a highly contemporary flavor. However# they are 
symptomatic of the new movement toward uniformitarianism and away 
from the pseudo-Dionysian distinction in quality of heavens and earth. 3 
Returning to our scheme used in discussing Co pernicus let us 
look at the function of the ideas of simplicity and elegance in Galileo. 
There is, first# sample evidence that he conceived Copernicus' system 
to be kinematically simpler than its rivals. 4 There is also ample 
evidence that he used the principle of simplicity in arguing for the move-
ment of the earth when no empirical proof could be found that this was 
l. Paul H. Kocher, Science and Religion in Elizabethan England (San 
Marino: The Huntington Library# 1953), pp, 37, 175. 
2. D. Singer, "The Cosmology of Giordano Bruno# 1548-1600", Isis, 
33(1941), 189 ff. Also G. Bruno# "On the Infinite Universe and Worlds", 
in M.K. Munitz (ed.)# TU, pp. 174-183 and Francis C. Haber, 
The Age of the World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1959), pp. 60-64. 
3. Milton K. Munitz, "One Universe or Many", Journal of the History of 
Ideas, 12(1951), 244, The idea of an infinite, but heliocentric# universe 
with stars distributed through space is found also in Thomas Digges 
who considered this permissible in Copernicanism. See Francis R. 
Johnson, Astronomical Thought in Renaissance England (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1937), pp. 161-169. Also Paul-
Henri Michel, ''Renaissance Cosmologies", Diogenes, 18(Summer, 
1957), 93-107. 
4. See Galileo Galilei, DCWS, pp. 328, 339, 341-3. 
certain. This implies that a true theory, for Galileo, reflects an 
assumed basic simplicity in nature.1 The Copernican view of nature, 
requiring fewer ad hoc complications, therefore must be nearer the 
truth than the Ftolemaic. 2 Indeed his writings are really a polemic 
against such excesses! Thus he uses simplicity in a utilitarian sense: 
the Copernican system in future should prove more practical because 
its predictions should lead to more accuracy than those of alternative 
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views, without involving the theory in a vast array of corrections for 
error necessary in the latter. 3 Galileo then teaches us to follow theory 
even beyond available data so as to see that nature obeys law; and the 
law must be mathematically describable. 4 
This brings up a second point. Nature for Galileo is regular and 
orderly since it is written in the language of mathematics - especially 
geometry. Only the the simple elegance of mathematics can we unfold 
this order. 5 Thus a few experiements can be used to deduce conse-
quences far beyond experience, thereby allowing economy of effort. 
This was basically Platonism. We see partially, too, the logical rigor 
1. Galileo Galilei, DCWS, pp. 60, 123, 396, 448. 
2. Mary B. Hesse, FF, pp. 99. 
3. Ibid., pp. 57,322,341. 
4. Compare Cornelius Lanczos, "Albert Einstein and the Role of Theory 
in Contemporary Physics," American Scientist, 47(1959), 42. 
5. E.A. Burtt, MFS, p. 64. See also Alexandre Koyre, "Galileo and 
Plato" in P. Wiener and A. Noland (eds.), RST, pp. 147-175. 
of God's knowledge. Indeed this is why science must aid in unfolding 
to hermeneutics the messages God gives us in Scripture.l 
Implicit in this is thus a third point in conceptual economy. We 
should use quantitative changes, rather than a complex inter-relation 
of these with qualitative distinctions, to explain nature. 2 Here, how-
ever, Galilee was cautious. He refused to build a system such as that 
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of Descartes, refusing to speculate about the more complex and handling 
only the relatively restricted problems of physical nature. But it was 
just this method which gave his "iconoclasm ..• a massive, threatening 
character.n3 Though he did not speculate, as did Bruno, about the 
extent of the universe, preferring largely to remain with the solar sys-
tern, 4 he invaded it sufficiently explicitly and by inference to disturb 
the dominant weltanschauung of his time. Indeed his system proved 
less simple to believe when placed in the perspective of a total world 
view provided by Aristotelian philosophy and traditional religion than 
did that of Copernicus ! It was not only a novel geometry but also a 
novel physics. 
Let us now turn, briefly, to his use of the mathematical model in 
/ 
cosmology. Koyre tells us 
... the Galilean conception of a correct scientific 
procedure implies a predominance of reason over 
1. E.A. Burtt, MFS, pp. 72-73. 
2. See Mary B. Hesse, FF, p. 101. Also A.R. Hall, SR, p. 177. 
3. A.R. Hall, SR, p. 74. 
4. Alexandre Koyre, FCW, pp. 95-99. 
mere experience, the substitution of ideal models 
(mathematical) for empirically given reality, the 
prevalence of theory over facts ... a method in 
which mathematical theory determines the very 
structure of experimental research. 1 
It is this mathematical metaphysic which led him to a doctrine 
of primary and secondary qualities - the former the realm of human 
and divine knowledge and the latter the realm of opinion. 2 The real 
world then is a world of the number, shape, position, magnitude and 
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motion of bodies. All else is the subjective product of our experience.3 
In this Galileo is Platonic: but there is more - 'We have the first 
stage in the reading of man quite out of the real and primary realm. 114 
The Copernican revolution~ of which Copernicus partook but little, is 
now well under way. 
Of course~ this view that a correct mathematical model and the 
ultimate nature of the world would be identical remains with Galileo 
more a description than an explanation.5 For example he never asks 
why the planets move as they do save to say that the sun 'infuses' by 
its rotation, both light and motion to the planets - hardly an explanatory 
1. Alexandre Koyre~ note in Diogenes, 16(Winter~ 1956), 19. 
2. E.A. Burtt, MFS, p. 73, and A.R. Hall, SR~ p. 169. 
3. A.R. Hall, SR, p. 171. "The v.orld of Galileo's imagination in 
mechanics was in fact Euclid's geometrical space with the addi-
tion of mass ... motion and gravity." 
4. E.A. Burtt, MFS, p. 79. 
5. A.R. Hall, SR, p. 171. 
idea.! Nor does he attempt to develop an idea of gravity based on ex-
ternal attraction at a distance but rather he considers the cause as 
being in some undefined way internal, manifesting itself as impetus.2 
Very likely Galilee was gifted with sufficient insight to see that the 
time was not ripe for the resolution of these descriptions in explana-
tion. 3 
As our last major pre-Newtonian, let us turn to Johann Kepler 
(1571-1630) 4 whose life-span was embraced by Galilee's. Here we 
meet a rather different perspective, at times more rash and at times 
less advanced than that of his contemporary. Kepler's point of view 
begins with an unusual question for his time - the mathematical rea-
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son for the number and distances from the sun of the planets, discussed 
in his Mysterium Cosmographicum, published when he was 25 years of 
age. The solution he finds in solid geometry. The shell of Mercury's 
orbit fits inside an octahedron whose points touch the shell of Venus 1 
orbit. This in turn fits in an icosahedron touching the shell of the orbit 
of the earth. Then between our shell and that of Mars is a dodecahedron; 
1. S. Toulmin et al, FH, p. 198. Connected with this is the idea tm 
Creator establishes harmony. See Mary B. Hesse, FF, 129 and 
E.A. Burtt, MFS, pp. 89-94. -
2. Mary B. Hesse, FF, p. 128 and E.A. Burtt, MFS, pp. 93-94. On 
Galilee's kinematics see A.R. Hall, SR, pp. 79-92. Also Ren~ Dugas, 
La science m~canique au XVIIieme Si]cle (Paris: Dunod, 1954 ); 
M. Jammer, CF, pp. 80, 94-102; and Edward H. Madden, The Structure 
of Scientific Thought (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), pp. 45-
47. 
3. See now Appendix A, Note 2. 
4. See Arthur Koestler, TS, 225-424. Also Carola Baumgardt, Johannes 
Kepler: Life and Letters (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951). 
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betwen Mars and Jupiter fits a tetrahedro:Q.; and between Jupiter and 
Saturn a cube. 
In the subsequent examintion of Tycho's records of the planetary 
motion, to which this geometry led him, he developed his great three 
laws. Along with these came the idea that the sun exerted a continuous 
physical force upon the planets and they upon it, in a manner which 
varied with distance in some way; though this force he conceived as 
acting in part along the path of each planet. Also in the course of this 
work he revised his ideas of the planetary solids, claiming that God may 
use other principles in laying out the paths than this one. 
What. then, were Kepler's views of the elegance and simplicity of 
his theory? Obviously the most important is that the best theory is that 
which is most inclusive, binding together previously distinct facts.1 Ex-
perience shows this is mathematical in nature and thus that the world of 
the planets is itself a mathematical order. The solar system is more 
harmonious and aesthetically satisfying on this rather Pythagorean 
basis than any other. From this, Kepler's first and second laws re-
2 
vealed the paths of the planets to be elliptical. 
It is notable though that all of this required a mathematical analysis 
of a most difficult type. Ultimate elegance and even mathematical simpli-
1. Edwin A. Burtt, MFS, pp. 54-55, 
2. A.R. Hall, SR, pp. 124-126. 
city thus was lost to his contemporaries in a context of difficulty and 
rediscovered only much later. The 'platonic' solids, indeed, were lost 
permanently in science with the possible exception of Bode's work in 
1772. But elegance does not here have the same status as beauty. The 
universe for Kepler is a beautiful order in its essence - it is not to be 
described by a theory accepted only because of its elegance.1 The per-
fection of the universe itself is the heuristic guiding principle in 
Kepler's work. 2 
Finally, Kepler initially conceived of his system as differing with 
that of Copernicus in that, while the latter argued a posteriori, he 
argued from a priori metaphysical and physical ground. 3 This he 
later altered in his Epitome Astronomiae Copernicanae (1618) to the 
idea that the a priori can give only probable grounds for his system 
and might even be altered somewhat in the light of astronomical re-
sults. While many today argue in the spirit of this, few find Kepler's 
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specific guiding principles any longer acceptable. His underlying theses 
are no longer simple to believe! But one point may be noted here. 
Kepler's metaphysics led him to an ordered world impossible in the in-
finite universe of Bruno. In it our solar system is unique. Existing 
1. See Michael Polanyi, ''Beauty, Elegance, and Reality in Science", in 
S. Korner (ed.), Observation and Interpretation (London: Butterworths 
Scientific Publications, 195 7 ), pp. 102-106. 
2. K. Popper, LSD, p. 131. Compare Derek Price, "Contra-Copernicus" 
in Marshall Clagett (ed. ), Critical Problems in the History of Science 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959). 
3. See Ralph Blake et al, TSM, p. 38. 
alone within a realm of fixed stars, the effort needed in studying such 
a model was considerably decreased over Bruno's. To assume we 
must deal with a boundless universe of complex structure is gratui-
tous and unnecessary in the light of experience.1 But this implies that 
Kepler's view of simplicity here is based on an Aristotelain type of 
epistemology (precluding assumption beyond experience) and is incon-
sistent with other Platonic elements in his thought (which could imply 
orders of structure different from that of our solar system). 2 
What then of Kepler's use of cosmological model? First, the 
mathematical nature which he believed it had is adumbrated by aes-
thetic and religious analogy. 
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[In] his Harmonice Mundi, published in 1619, we find the 
third of his immortal laws buried like a jewel in a mountain 
of 'metaphysical, poetical, religious and even historical 
speculations,' including the attribution of the different 
ranges of voice, bass, tenor, etc., to the various planets! 3 
The sun •.• is God the Father, the sphere of the fixed 
stars is God the Son, the intervening ethereal medium, 
through which the power of the sun is communicated to 
impel the planets around their orbits, is the Holy Ghost.4 
One may, of course, deny that this is more than allegorical illustration, 
or the flush of youth, but there is little denying that astrological, or at 
best, religious reasons for the constant motion of the planets are of 
1. For a detailed account of this question see Alexandre Koyre, FCW, 
pp. 58-87. 
2. Compare ibid., p. 72. 
3. G.J. Whitrow, review of Baumgardt, Johannes Kepler: Life and 
Letters, B.J .P.S., 2 (Novermber, 1952), 273. 
4. Edwin A. Burtt, MFS, p. 48. Also see A.R. Hall, SR, pp. 125-126. 
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profound importance in the psychological drive behind Kepler's work. 
Secondly, as with Galileo, the real world is a world of quantita-
tive character. Since God so created it, only by mathematical analy-
sis do its harmonies unfold.1 But it is a world far more complex, and 
of more continuous dynamic flux, than the dynamically constant Gali-
lean model. 2 Kepler was always a stern disciple of observational 
data, itself most complex, and his mathematical inventiveness, while 
driving him on in his staggering task of collation. is subordinate to 
this. 
Thirdly, any a priori metaphysical or physical ideas must be 
true to astronomy and also true in its a posteriori character. What 
the latter obviates the former cannot include. 3 The model from logic 
and the model from sensation, to be true, must and will agree. But, 
since the latter is limited to experience the former he conceives as 
limited, in that only such a priori grounds can obtain as result in a 
finitistic model of the universe.4 
Finally, his model gives the first rather detailed analysis of 
gravitational forces. He is the first to claim that the attraction of 
bodies is mutual. He is the first to argue for its all-pervading status. 
1. Edwin A. Burtt, MFS, p. 58. 
2. See A.R. Hall, SR. pp. 127-128. 
3. See Ralph M. Blake et al, TSM, pp. 38-39. 
4. See Alexandre Koyre. FCW, pp. 71-72, 78, 85-87. 
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This motive force resides in the sun, is emitted continually as an im-
material image of the sun (much like sunlight is an 'immaterial image • 
of the sun), which image rotates and carries bodies along with it (hence 
a component normal to the line between the sun and the planet).! The 
'logical' model explains that of observation well - they are therefore 
at one in general character. 2 
We must now move to the great synthesis provided for the dyna-
mics of Galileo and the three laws of Kepler in the thought of Isaac 
Newton.3 
ii. The Newtonian Cosmology 
When Isaac Newton (1642-1727) appears like a coment on the cos-
mological scene the times are not entirely out of joint for his great 
contribution of physical synthesis. For, as we have seen, prepared 
for him were essential elements necessary to his task. There is no 
need to repeat in detail the mechanical and mathematical elements and 
the methodological and philosophical elements we have outlined in Sec-
tion One and Appendices A and B. But we may mention that along with 
the former categories are other major ideas on which Newton could 
build: the consistent definition of the idea of acceleration (by the de-
1. A.R. Hall, SR, p. 263. For detail see Max Jammer, CF, pp. 81-93. 
2. See now Appendix A, Note 3. -
3. See Appendix B for a brief outline of three additional important ideas 
provided by these and other figures in the. history of physical cosmo-
logy, some of which impinge upon Newton and some of which are 
renewed only in contemporary thought. 
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veloping ideas of the scholars at Merton College in the mid -fourteenth 
century, by Oresme, and later by Galileo), insight into the geometry 
of free fall, and the first steps toward the calculus.1 On these kinema-
tical and mathematical foundations Newton builds in conjunction with 
another aspect of mathematico-mechanical thought -dynamics. 
Dynamics, dealing with forces and the causes of motion, had a 
long and tortuous history going back to Aristotle and even beyond. 2 
One recalls here Buridan's work in Paris around 1330 on the idea that 
bodies continued to move after impulse because of the activity of an 
inner energy called 'impetus'· Later it was debated whether 'impetus 1 
decayed with time or remained constant if the body was not influenced 
externally. This discussion was particularly important in explaining 
the movement of the planets in their endless circular orbits. With 
Benedetti, in the late 1500's, the question of motion in a straight line 
is systematically presented so that, when Galileo extraplated his terres-
trial physics to the entire solar system, the question of why planets 
should move in circles and not in straight lines is raised. His resolu-
tion we briefly mentioned earlier. 3 We may add that he conceived of 
1. See Marshall Clagett (ed.), The Science of Mechanics in the Middle 
Ages (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959); Rene Dugas, 
La science mecanique au XVIIieme siecle (Paris: Dunod, 1954); and 
David E. Smith, History of Mathematics (New York: Dover Pubns., 
195 8 ). 
2. See Max Jammer, CF, for detailed outline. 
3. See p.too. 
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normal terrestrial motion as circular,1 thus solving the problem by 
eliminating the linear alternative! 
With Bruno and Digges, and later Descartes, the ideal of linear 
motion is renewed. Immediately the question of why, then, the plan-
ets should not so move arises. In the 17th Century Huygens introduced 
the idea of centripetal force by analogy to a slingshot and Borelli soon 
applied this to the planets. Some force like the tension in a sling must 
act between the sun and the planets restraining them from flying off 
tangentially to their orbits. Indeed Huygens (and later Hooke) shows 
a circular orbit can be caused by some mysterious force inversely 
proportional to the square of the distance between planet and sun, act-
ing in conjunction with the velocity of the former. It was now clear that 
Kepler's gravitational force in the direction of the planet's motion 
might be unnecessary! But why then the elliptical paths he described? 
In Newton's great work, the Principia of 1687, the solution is 
supplied. 2 Kepler's three laws of planetary motion and the inverse 
square law of attraction are related in one systematic account! Of 
course, with Newton's rejection of Descartes' vortex theory 3 (that 
1. See his DCWS, pp. 21, 2 3, 33 and M. Hesse, FF, pp. 104, 127 -12!=::. 
2. See Sir Isaac Newton's Mathematical PrinciPles of Natural Phil-
osophy and His System of the \Vorld, trans. Florian Cajori (Berkeley: 
The University of California Press, 1934, and H.S. Thayer (ed.), 
Newton's Philosophy of Nature (New York: Hafner, 1953 ). 
3. See Stephen Toulmin et al, FH, p. 242. Also Max Jammer, CF, 
pp. 103-10'3 and Alexandre Koyre, FCW, pp. 110-124. 
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space is filled by diffuse corpuscles which, when they eddy, carry sat-
ellites around any body in their centers), the major question remaining 
is the exact nature of this force he assumes acting in almost empty 
space. 
It is here that we enter the first conceptual problem we have 
used in our earlier analysis - the application of the idea of simplicity. 
Newton utilizes this by restricting himself largely to a mathematical 
description of the forces of gravity rather than to an analysis of their 
nature.! Thence arises his great 'law• of gravitational attraction. 
Almost at once other historical problems such as the cause of the tides 
and their seasonal changes, the motion of comets, and even certain as-
pects of hydrodynamics fall into resolution. Surely what describes so 
well must bring with it intense intellectual satisfaction. What is~ in a 
sense, a relatively simple mathematical relation has eventuated in a 
great all-embracing synthesis of greatly diversified observations. 
Elegance is the fruit of patient labor - very patient because he used 
Euclidean geometry rather than the powerful calculus in much of his 
work. Implied by this is the idea that the ultimate simplicity of a 
theory may have little to do with possible mathematical techniques 
used in deriving it, as long as the techniques themselves do not intro-
1. See E.W. Strong, "Newton's Mathematical Way," in Philip W. Wiener 
et al (eds.), RST~ pp. 412-432. Also G. Buchdahl, "Science and Logic"~ 
B.J.P.S., 2(1951)~ 217-235. 
duce additional and different meanings to the final terms of their com-
mon solutions. 
With this concept of simplicity as couched in a vast synthesis 
of data by a mathematical law, Newton introduces as necessary postu-
lates the concepts of absolute time, space, and motion. Of course such 
concepts may well be true of reality, he thought, but one cannot find 
empirical confirmation of them. 1 His belief in the reality of such an 
absolute system is strengthened, however, by its success in predicting, 
llO 
without apparent exception, the data of the physics of his day. With this 
went the principle that 
We are to admit no more causes of natural things 
than such as are both true and sufficient to explain 
their appearances. To this purpose, the philosophers 
say, that nature does nothing in vain ..• for nature 
is pleased with simplicity, and affects not the pomp 
of superfluous causes. 2 
Newton thus conceives of physical simplicity as grounded in reality and 
mirrored in the maximum economy of his descriptive laws. 
Consonant with the above was his further rule that whatever 
events might be expressed by the same equation must be regarded as 
produced by the same causal forces. This belief in the uniformity of 
nature carried with it, however, an operational regulation that no prin-
ciple of physics has an a priori guarantee. Only continuing experiment 
1. With the exception of absolute motion, which he perhaps believed 
was demonstrated in the rotation of a container filled with water. 
See, however, Stephen Toulmin, "Newton on Absolute Space, Time 
and Motion," Phil. Review, 68{1959), 27. 
2. Quoted in Edwin A. Burtt, MFS, p. 214. 
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and observation can test our past conclusions from phenomena as to the 
nature of causative forces and the nature of space, time and motion. In 
a truly empiricistic tradition he leaves open the possibility of future 
more embracing understanding of physical ideas. To more correctly 
describe nature, if such may in future occur, is to more closely approxi-
mate the simplicity of nature itself. Scope and actual simplicity are 
collateral. 
Let us turn now to his use of scientific models. Several aspects of 
this are implied in our above remarks. Newton speaks frequently of 
physical hypothesis; in his usage this is any unverified assumption re-
garding nature. 1 Theories, on the other hand, he construes as abstrac-
tions from experiment and observation and 'queries' he defines as sup-
positions leading to further experiment. Now Newton refuses to use 
dogmatically physical hypotheses in his model of nature; though the 
model need not be inconsistent with such hypotheses or their assumed 
grounds, as we may reasonably accept on some non-scientific basis.2 
Further, for Newton, physics is a composite of mechanical principles 
generalized from empirical study (i.e., theories) and certain mathema-
tical assumptions of absolute space, time and motion. Together, these 
provide the premises of queries to nature, thereby revealing that a 
1. See E.W. Strong in PhilipP. Wiener et al, RST, pp. 416-417. 
2. Ibid., p. 423. Compare also A.R. Hall, SR, pp. 257-259, 273. 
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model, for Newton is the conjunction of generalized mechanical indue-
tions from nature and non -empirical mathematical principles (with the 
possible exception of absolute motion mentioned earlier). Such a model 
then is a non-final construct supposed as possible until experimentally 
tested by future observation and experiment. 
This conception of the nature of suitable scientific models was at 
once useful and disconcerting:: useful in that a cluster of generalized 
principles of both a non-empirical mathematical and an empirical 
mechanical nature could be applied to a wide range of experimental 
data, and disconcerting in that it obviated the neat mechanistic philosophy 
of Cartesian philosophy . 1 For, in contradistinction to the material plenum 
of Descartes which required no action at a distance, Newton introduces, 
for example, the action of gravitational forces across spatial intervals 
between material bodies since this provides the most suitable model of 
the physical world. 
That it was a model not without problems was clear to Newton, but 
he refused to ignore its embracing utility on such grounds. About the 
solution of these difficulties he was willing to conjecture, however. He 
did this in both a mechanical and theological manner, but always on the 
1. See A.R. Hall, SR, pp. 205-210, 260. Also Mary B. Hesse, "Action at 
a Distance in Classical Physics," Isis, 46(1955 ), 337-353 and E.J. 
Aiton, "Newton and the Cartesians," School Science Review, 40(1959), 
406-413. 
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level of hypothesis as he used that term. For example, in an attempt 
to explain the action of gravity mechanically he introduces the idea of 
a subtle ether lying in the otherwise empty space between bodies. 1 
Variations in the density of this ether from place to place might cause 
bodies in it to move toward less dense areas. But one must never for-
get that, while he was certain that bodies act at a distance only by the 
mediation of something else, he was just as certain that not only were 
such hypotheses entirely conjectural but that such speculation was of 
little worth and might even act so as to hinder further study. 2 
Newton also introduced theological hypotheses to explain gravity. 
In the Queries to the Optics he suggested that God, being omnipresent, 
moves bodies so as to prevent the whole complex of material bodies 
from falling into one another and so as to correct disturbances in the 
planetary orbits due to perturbations. 3 In his letters to Bentley this is 
repeated in detail, 4 with the addition that in an infinite universe the 
falling together might be into an infinite number of large bodies. One may 
argue, as did Stace, that this is the same type of argument as used by 
1. See Mary B. Hesse, FF, pp. 151-153; Sir Edmund Whittaker, A His-
tory of the Theories of Aether and Electricity (New York: Harper & 
Bros., 1960) p. 28; Max Jammer, CF, pp. 116-146 (particularly p. 
135 ); and H.W. Turn~ull (ed.), Thecorrespondence of Isaac Newton, 
2 vols., (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1959, 1960). 
2. See Cornelius Lanczos, AE, p. 44. 
3. See Mary B. Hesse, FF, p. 152; Sir Isaac Newton, Theological Manu-
scripts, edited by H. McLachlan (Liverpool: Liverpool University 
Press, 1950). 
4. See Milton K. Munitz, TU, pp. 211-219. 
Berkeley to account for the continued existence of unseen objects, 1 
but it must be remembered that the argument is conjectural and not 
an essential part of his model as Newton saw it. 
Nonetheless, this brings into focus a difficulty in the Newtonian 
model. While he is careful to apply the ideas of space and time in a 
physical manner so that 
the question of absolute space [for example] •.. concerns 
a mathematical notion whose legitimacy is established as 
soon as one intertial frame has been identified, not an un-
observable quasi -material medium [the 'sensorium of 
God'] brought into the theory to explain ~hings which 
would otherwise have been inexplicable; 
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the model, even if it only makes God present in space, and not identical 
with it as in Leibniz, 3 seems to require the introduction of hypotheti-
cal non-mathematical concepts such as the ether or the touch of God. 
Thus, 
at this stage ... the suggestion that the medium of 
gravitation might not have the properties of ordinary 
matter could not be taken into an increasingly mathe-
matical physics. Before this could be done, the notion 
of 'immaterial' had to be divested of its association 
with animism and given mathematical expression, and 
this had to wait until the nineteenth century.,4 
The Newtonian model thus is more suggestive of the possibility 
1. See W. T. Stace, Religion and the Modern Mind (New York: MacMillan 
Co., 1953) and K.G. Collier, "Obstacles to Religious Belief", Hibbert 
Journal, 56(1958), 140-147. 
2. Stephen Toulmin, "Newton on Absolute Space, Time and Motion," 
Phil. Rev., 68(1959), 24. , 
3. Ibid., pp. 220-222. Compare Alexandre Koyre, CS, pp. 93-124 .. 
4. Mary B. Hesse, FF, pp. 152-153. -
of a mathematical model of the universe, including only mechanistic 
elements of some type, than it is an attainment of this goal. Teleo-
logical elements need not be introduced into hiatuses in our knowledge 
in order to allow a philosophico-theological view of nature; such a 
view may obtain as an alternative perspective. 1 Likely the difficulty 
arises from Newton's attempt to find a mechanical analogue of action 
at a distance by some sort of contact. Modern models, instead, pre-
fer to present a coherent logical structure susceptible to mathemati-
cal expression without a collateral attempt at a model in terms of 
familiar processes. 
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Indeed one may argue that the Newtonian model never did present 
a theory of gravity in this sense. The ether concept he used, or the 
action of God in it, are physically absurd and the alternative idea of 
•action at a distance' without mediation was for Newton contrary to 
reason. 2 The achievement of a theory of gravity had to await the re-
jection both of such an ether and of real action at a distance, whatever 
difficulties we will in the future discover this new model to have. 3 
We may now leave Newton and move on to the influence which he 
exerted on the cosmological thought of posterity. In our brief discussion 
1. Compare Thomas H. Leith, "The Need for an Evangelical Philosophy 
of Science", Jour. of the American Scientific Affiliation, 11 (Dece.mber, 
1959), 3-13. 
2. Compare Melbourne Evans, ''Newton and the Cause of Gravity," 
American Journal of Physics, 26(1958), 619-624. 
3. See now Appendix C, on Newton's conception of the nature of scientific 
theory. 
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of this influence we will note particularly the critique of his views of 
methodology, his impact upon the theological attitude toward cosmic 
models, and the debate centering around his ideas on action at a dis-
tance. 
iii. The Post Newtonian Physical Universe 
Building upon a priori concepts that theories of nature must be 
consistent with the principle of physical continuity and the law of suf-
ficient reason, Leibniz was quick to oppose the cosmology of Newton. 
The former led him to reject Newton's attractive force as implying 
perpetual miracle and the latter led him to assume that, if there were 
material bodies surrounded by a void, there was no reason why a par-
ticular ratio and arrangement of matter and void should obtain. The 
resultant debate is best exemplified by his correspondence with Samuel 
Clarke, a disciple of the Newtonian view. 1 Clarke's reply to the 
Leibnizian arguments were simple. He denied that Newton taught ac-
tion at a distance at all; only that the attraction was invisible and in-
tangible; in any case attraction was empirical fact. 2 He also denied 
that the creative freedom of God was insufficient to explain the distri-
bution and amount of matter in space.3 
1. H.G. Alexander (ed.) The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1956). 
2. Ibid., pp. 53, 119 Cotes' preface to the 1713 edition of the Principia 
is the likely source of the problem here. 
3. Ibid., pp. 30-35. 
117 
While the subtleties of the debate are most intriguing, it is suf-
ficient to note their perspective. Clarke espouses the thesis of 
empiricism - what is observed must simply be accepted and described 
consistently; the reasons for affairs as they are can only be presumed. 
For his taste, Leibniz was too much of an a priorist, demanding that 
metaphysics of a preconceived sort must be obeyed in theoretical cos-
mology. On the other hand, Leibniz could well argue that the concept 
of God is made irrational (and incompetent if he had to correct plane-
tary perturbation) 1 and reduced to an ad hoc hypothesis to save the 
Newtonian model. Also, is it not presumptuous to introduce fictions 
such as immaterial forces into one's weltanschauung in order to 
2 preserve a clever theory? One may conclude that the Leibnizian 
rationalistic argument can be something of a stultification of science, 
but that the Newtonian-Clarke argument combined elements of a sort 
more suitable to a science with ideas not yet capable of formulation 
satisfactorily into the model available, 
However, the debate was far from over. Hesse and Jammer have 
provided us with detailed analyses of subsequent events and it is quite 
unnecessary to repeat, imperfectly, their work here. We may, however, 
distill out certain concepts. The first of these lies in the theological 
1. H.G. Alexander (ed.), The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1956), pp. 11-12. 
2. See Mary B. Hesse, FF, p. 163 and Max Jammer, CF, pp. 158-170. 
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orientation of cosmic models. The great Cambridge neo-Platonist 
Henry More had suggested, just prior to Newton, that nature demanded 
the work of immaterial spirit to explain motion, It was self-activating 
and worked in accord with the will of God. 1 Newton had revised this 
theistic view to an imperfect deism wherein God entered the mechani-
cal universe He had arbitrarily shaped, and whose laws He had arbi-
trarily promulgated at creation, only with occasional deft touches, and 
wherein God perceives the activity of matter through His presence in 
space and time as His 'sensoria'. And Clarke had, in a more providen-
tial spirit, interpreted God as continually controlling nature. 
But it was not long before the Newtonian model was frozen, in this 
regard, into varied arguments for design. 2 It was argued that nature 
and its workings were inexplicable apart from Divinity, that indeed the 
action of gravity was essential to the conserving of matter and life, that 
inertia is the property of matter alone but that the forces we find with 
it are explicable only on postulating Divine and continual action, and 
even that (in Maupertuis) the inverse square law was alone logical among 
possible alternatives and thus that God had provided nature with the grea-
test harmony possible. 3 The result of all this was to end up in a natural 
1. Max Jammer, CF, pp. 151-152. 
-- " 2. See J. Agassi, Review of Koyre, From the Closed World to the 
Infinite Universe, B.J .P.S., 9(1958), 241-244. 
3. See Max Jammer, CF, pp. 155-157. 
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religion wherein God reveals Himself so as to command the universal 
assent of man, with the Scripture intended only to corifirm these truths 
so discoverable from nature. 1 Such was hardly Newton's position! 
With deism's rejection of the Scriptures and of the neo-Platonists' 
moral laws, it moved toward a doctrine of pre-established harmony 
but very unlike that of Leibniz. And with a re-evaluation of the argu-
ments for design themselves, the harmony was sought within the uni-
verse and its structure, in isolation from any presumed creative or 
sustaining work of God. The problem of gravity in Newton's model 
was removed from his presumed ad hoc additions into a realm where 
attempts might be made to handle it mechanistically and mathemati-
cally. This is the second important concept in post-Newtonian cosmo-
logy and to it we now turn. 
Leibniz, in denying that spiritual or physical explanations can be 
employed in the realm of the other, had moved toward such a mechan-
istic resolution. Gravity became the continuous apparent impact of 
atoms in the mutual release of inherent activity according to a pre-
established harmony. But his model ended in a paradox - physical 
impact required spatially extended atoms while the philosophical mon-
1. See Basil Wiley, The Seventeenth Century Background (Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday & Co., 1955 ); R. Westfall, Science and Religion 
in Seventeenth Century England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1958); and Charles C. Gillespie, Genesis and Geology (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1951). 
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adology demanded 'forces' centered in mathematical points .1 It 
remained for others to attempt resolution of the dilemma, the first of 
whom was Boscovich in the mid-eighteenth century. His thesis spatia-
lized Leibniz' philosophical monads into points which have inertia; he 
rejects physical matter, as such, entirely. 
This type of dynamical thesis found few scientific adherents since 
one might well ask how forces could move (if 'things' are nothing but 
forces in their ultimate nature, and 'things' certainly seem to move) 
or how the inertia of objects which we experience could be thus explained? 
With the possible exception of Faraday, 2 the scientists left it to certain 
theologians and philosophers of the metaphysical idealistic school to 
bend a sympathetic ear. 3 
The conception of force as the primordial element of 
physical reality ... was not very furitful and productive 
for the advancement of theoretical physics. It was a 
construct that was not easily assimilab!e into a concep-
tual scheme of operational import ... 
An alternative, first expounded by Hobert Hooke, was sought in a 
purely mechanical theory of gravity. This generally took the form of 
some sort of impulse moving in an imponderable ether. Whittaker, in 
l. Mary B. Hesse, FF, pp. 163-164 and Max Jammer, CF, pp. 169-170. 
2. Sir Edmund Whittaker, HTAE, I, pp. 170-197. 
3. Such as Moigno, the theologian, and Kant, Fechner, and Spencer 
among the philosophers. See Max Jammer, CF, pp. 184-187 and 
Mary B. Hesse, FF, pp. 166-180. 
4. Max Jammer, CF, p. 187. 
f' 
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his definitive study, provides a thorough account of this. We may just 
notice here several views which have modern analogues in some sense. 
One is that of Bernoulli which regarded gravity as the result of pres-
sures by particles raining in from outer space. It, and the similar 
Cartesian vortex view, died with the absurdity of assuming pressures 
of this type associated with each and every particle of matter. Attempts -
and they were numerous and clever -to save the thesis ended in a mass 
of ad hoc hypotheses introduced for each special problem, such as 
elasticity.l 
Another more continuous model is provided by Euler's field theory 
as further developed in the nineteenth century by a number of great 
theoreticians. 2 
They were prepared to regard a field as a physically 
continuous medium .•. if propagation was affected 
by material changes in the intervening space, if it 
took time, if a mechanical model could be imagined 
for the action of a medium in producing the observed 
effect, or if energy could be located in the space be-
tween interading bodies. Any one of these three 
conditions might be regarded as sufficient and no one 
of them was ilidividuaijy necessary. 3 
Faraday's 'lines of force', 4 which were in physical analogy to 
elastic strings and in which the lines were physically real, became with 
l. See Max Jammer, CF, pp. 189-199; Mary B. Hesse, FF, pp. 130-188; 
and Sir Edmund Whittaker, HTAE, I, pp. 33-127. -
2. Sir Edmund Whittaker, HTAE, I, pp. 128-169. 
3. Mary B. Hesse, FF, p. 197. 
4. Ibid., pp. 198-206and Sir Edmund Whittaker, HTAE, I, pp. 240-278. 
Maxwwell a model for an electro-magnetic ether filled with tubes of 
magnetic force causing tension in the ether along their length and 
pressure laterally.1 Both models for explaining action at a distance 
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broke down as literal descriptions of nature since one simply regressed 
to explaining how the effects passed from one point in the 'line' or 'tube' 
2 
to another. Consequently with Kelvin, Poynting, and Hertz, there is a 
tendency to make the description a mathematical analogy only. 
Each point in space can be characterized by certain 
mathematical quantities representing the energy pre-
sent there without implying that any mechanical 
events are happening. 3 
Thus, by the time Lorentz and Einstein appear, models of the 
universe have not only become increasingly mathematical but certain 
aspects of the philosophical nature of such models were becoming quite 
4 
visible. First, it was clear that ad hoc modifications which allowed 
almost any phenomenon to be fitted into the model decreased the pre-
cision and falsifiability of the model. 5 Secondly, it was apparent that 
no precise concept could be given for determining the degree to which 
one could abstract from physical observation in establishing a useful 
l. Mary B. Hesse, FF, pp. 206-209. See also Joseph Turner, "Max-
well on the Logi~of Dynamical Explanation", Phil. Sci., 23(1956), 
36-47. 
2. See Mary B. Hesse, "Action at a Distance in Classical Physics", 
Isis, 46 (1955 ), 337-353. 
3. Ibid., p. 210. 
4. Compare Sir Edmund Whittaker, HTAE, I, pp. 279-334. 
5. Mary B. Hesse, FF, p. 188. 
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model with a minimum of assumptions. But it was apparent that ap-
proaches using continuous media of some sort to explain gravity and 
other forces reduced the ad hocness of the model and increased the 
potential of precise mathematization. The fruitfulness of this achieve-
ment of course did not necessarily demonstrate that a certain type of 
medium was adequately described, nor even that it existed at all. 
Indeed, some, such as Bernoulli, preferred to extrapolate from exist-
ing physical ideas rather than invent purely mathematical formalism 1 
while others, such as Kelvin, preferred a mathematical description 
operationally adequate without any assumption as to the real nature of 
2 
that described. 
Thirdly, the gravitational model remained more of an enigma 
than similar models for electro-magnetic questions. Nothing appeared 
to affect the straight line nature of gravity (i.e., the lines did not seem 
to be physically real), there was no way of determining if gravitational 
effects were instantaneous or took time to appear, and the question of 
whether the conservation of force required that when a body acted upon 
another some loss might occur, as a result, on a third body was not 
testable. 3 In any case, however, each model in the late eighteen hun-
dreds ceased to be discussed in terms of the mechanical nature of 
1. Mary B. Hesse, FF, p. 193. 
2. Ibid., p. 209. 
3. Compare Faraday's analysis mentioned in Mary B. Hesse, FF, 
pp. 204-205, also pp. 222-225. 
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events in the field outside masses or magnets but rather in terms of 
mathematical quantities assumed to describe energies there. Finally, 
we may note that these mathematical descriptions differ greatly. They 
range all the way from describing an incomprehensible affinity of 
bodies as in most theories of gravity, through describing excitations 
of space around single bodies (as in potential theory) or describing 
changes caused in some medium in the space between bodies (as in 
Helmholtz's polarization of the medium), to assuming the interaction 
is the result entirely of the medium itself as described in some of 
Maxwell's ideas.l Thus we may look forward either to future attempts 
at synthesis in some larger description or to long periods in which em-
pirical tests may leave several of these descriptions as open options 
for the same data, or bot'1, we are far from out of these problematic 
woods even today! 
But besides the above problems of action at a distance in post-
Newtonian cosmology, there are also other questions of interest to us 
in setting the stage for relativity. We may treat these much more 
briefly. The first is the problem of whether an assumed ether pro-
vided an absolute standard relative to which motion might be measured. 
In 1804, Young introduced the idea that light from distant stars would be 
1. See Joseph Turner, "Maxwell on the Method of Physical Analogy," 
B.J.P.S., 6(1955), 226-238. 
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displaced, while travelling down a telescope, by a distance equal to that 
which the earth travelled in that time. This was because he assumed 
that the ether surrounding the earth was at rest and not affected by the 
motion of the earth, so that light travelling in this ether will not partake 
of the motion of the telescope. Observation seemed to confirm this ab-
erration of the stellar image from the star's true position.! In 1845 , 
Stokes presented an alternative explanation for stellar aberration, 
however. Here he conceived the ether near the earth to move with the 
earth so as to have the same velocity as the earth's surface and also 
to have its elements irrotationai.2 And in 1886 Lorentz proposed yet a 
third explanation, in which the ether at the earth's surface moved with 
a velocity differing from that of the earth. 3 
While all three could be made to agree with aberration experi-
ments, the work of Michelson and Morley in 1887 in which the travel 
time of rays travelling parallel to, and perpendicular to, the direction 
of the earth's motion were compared, appeared to leave only Stoke's 
or Lorentz's theories in the field.4 And their work in 1897 on the pos-
sible variation of the velocity of the ether relative to the earth with 
height above the earth seemed to leave only Stoke's picture as an 
1. Sir Edmund Whittaker, HTAE, I, p. 109. 
2. Ibid., pp. 110, 386. 
3. Ibid., p.387. 
4. Ibid., p. 391. 
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explanation among the three. It appeared to be true for thousands of 
miles above the earth's surface. But a new idea was by then available 
as an alternative, and it restored Young's view as a possibility. 
In 1892 FitzGerald suggested that bodies in motion relative to 
the ether are contracted in size in the direction of their motion in the 
ether. Michelson and Morley's 1887 results could be explained on this 
basis, thus enabling the ether to be conceived again as stationary, if 
this contraction exactly counterbalanced the differences in time of 
travel by the two perpendicular paths. However, the point of interest 
to us is that effects are now introduced precluding any possible obser-
vation of a stationary ether! If we presume that such an ether provides 
the last possibility of an absolute spatial frame of reference (i.e., if 
operationally it is identifiable as absolute space), the possibility of 
experimentally discovering a privileged reference frame is obviated. 
Absolute space loses empirical meaning. 
Of course, one may reject FitzGerald's idea. One option is to 
accept Stoke's picture, but such an ether extending far above the earth 
without motion relative to the earth provides at best only an absolute 
frame for terrestrial experiments, and as we saw, stellar aberration 
is of little aid in farther extrapolation since a variety of theses may 
apply to it. Another option is to revise the whole problem by rejecting 
an ether and otherwise explaining FitzGerald's assumption. The ether 
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was originally intended to explain the transmission of electromagnetic 
effects and not intended as a device for saving an absolute spatial back-
ground. Since few accept it today as necessary to the former it may be 
rejected for the purposes of the latter. For this reason Einstein turned 
to another explanation of FitzGerald's theory, as we shall see. 
One other problem facing 20th Century cosmology rose early in 
the 19th Century. The German astronomer, Olbers, pointed out that an 
infinite universe of uniformly-distributed stars would give an exceed-
ingly bright sky since, though light from a given star falls off as the in-
verse square of its distance to us, the number at that distance will 
approximate the square of this distance (since the area of a sphere is 
proportional to the square of its radius). Thus an infinite number of 
stars, in an infinite universe in all directions, will result in a sky of 
stellar brightness (or, what is the same, have a light equivalent to that 
at the surface of an average star and thus a temperature for space of 
1 
about 6-10,000 degrees!) But our sky is not such, and at night is 
largely black. Either the universe is not infinite or some other effect 
must be found to explain the divergence. 2 
1. The brightness is not infinite because stars will screen one another 
in part, but it will still be thousands of times as bright as daylight. 
See H. Bondi, "The Structure of the Universe", Adv. of Sci., 17 (1961), 
401-405. 
2. See E. Finlay-Freundlich, Cosmology (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 5-9; D.W. Sciama, The Unity of the Universe 
(Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday & Co., 1959), pp. 90-99; Herman Bondi, 
The Universe at Large (Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday & Co., 1960), 
pp. 27-34; and Herman Bondi, Cosmology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1952) pp. 19-26. 
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One might assume obscuring clouds or that distant stars emitted 
much fainter light than those near us. Or one might presume the energy 
of distant light of a given wave-length was lower than for the same lu-
minous sources near us. This would require that, since energy is in-
versely proportional to the wavelength, there is some shift toward the 
red in distant spectra and that the effect is proportional to distance from 
us. In any case, this problem has turned out to be quite crucial in later 
thought though it was ignored for most of a century. 
Olbers preferred the first escape from the alternative of a finite 
universe. But he failed to realize that, unless the rest of the universe 
is younger by far than our immediate environment seems to be, the ob-
scuring matter will have heated up until it is just as hot and bright as the 
background sky. Being left with the only alternative for an infinite uni-
verse, that the distant stars must behave in a peculiar way, one might on 
grounds of economy of thought in the face of this non-uniformitarian idea, 
postulate a fairly small and finite universe. Indeed this would have been 
possible had there not been increasing empirical data showing that there 
was no evidence for such a model beyond the above dilemma, and had there 
not been various philosophical difficulties well-known as early as the 
Stoics. 
The second alternative, with distant stars emitting little energy 
appears grossly peculiar. It places us in a unique central position in a 
space containing stars with properties altering according to some 
spherical function as their distance increases away from us. One way 
out is to provide the universe with a hierarchical structure in which 
stars form clusters, and clusters form super-clusters, and so on. If 
distances are appropriately chosen between each element one can ob-
tain a very low finite brightness fitting the night sky we observe. The 
problem here is that observation should clearly reveal this hierarchy 
in the distances clearly visible to our telescopes. In the Nineteenth 
Century such was hardly the case and consequently the model was not 
discussed (indeed, it wasn't until Charlier in 1922 that the statistics 
were rigorously developed). 1 
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The third alternative was provided with a foundation in 1843. In that 
year Doppler enunciated his famous effect whereby receding sources of 
light appear to have their spectral lines shifted toward the red. If now, 
the universe is made up of stars receding from us with velocities increa-
sing in approximate proportion to distance, we may maintain the uniformi-
tarian thesis that their nature is not unlike stars in our vicinity but that 
light from them arrives here both reduced in energy and reduced in the 
number of photons per second. Thus the night sky is dark because the 
stars in the universe are receding from us. 2 The reduction of light can 
1. See George Gamow, "Modern Cosmology", Scientific Amer. (March, 
1954), 54-63, Also C.V.L. Charlier, "On the Structure of the Universe". 
Proc. Astron. Soc. Pacific, 37 (1925 ), 177-199. 
2. Raymond Lyttleton, The Modern Universe (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1956), p. 207. 
depend then, if we desire, solely on the rate of recession. 
Indeed, from the observed amount of light in the night 
sky the actual rate of expansion • . . can be estimated. 
Thus Olbers could have predicted the expansion of the 
universe and even made a rough estimate of Hubble's 
constant, a hundred years ahead of observers. His 
failure to do so is one of the greatest missed oppor-
tunities in the whole history of science. 1 
Of course, the specific nature of such expansion had to await 
Hubble's work and the theoretical studies after the advent of relativity. 
As we will see, there are quite distinct differences in current models 
which greatly refine the above discussion by placing it in new contexts. 
Included are even alternatives to the Doppler thesis itself wherein en-
ergy is absorbed and not re-emitted in passing through space. 
A similar problem to that of Olbers was introduced in 1874 by 
Seeliger. We will recall that Newton demanded an infinite distribution 
of matter in infinite space to prevent a finite distribution forming a 
single lump under its own gravitation. An infinite distribution would 
form, instead, an infinite number of great masses scattered through 
space.2 Of course, this presupposed universal gravitation, not proven 
until a century later, by Herschel, to extend beyond the solar system. 
But with universal gravitation arises a paradox if space and rna tter are 
infinitely extended, as Seeliger saw. 
1. D. W. Sciama, UU, p. 98. 
2. See G.O. Jones et al, Atoms and the Universe (London: Eyre & 
Spottiswoode, 1956 ), p. 211. 
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If we have a more-or-less uniform distribution of matter in an 
infinite Euclidean space, a sphere of radius R will have mass propor-
tional to R3 and will also have gravity toward its center proportional 
to 1/ R2 and the mass inside. The attraction is then proportional to R. 
An infinite universe is like a sphere of infinite radius so that there will 
be an infinitely intense gravitational field at points infinitely far from its 
center. Since the center may be anywhere, this will result in an infinite 
gravitational field around us •1 Seeliger concluded that to escape this re-
sult so foreign to experience, rather than postulate a finite universe, one 
should revise Newton's law of gravity by introducing a new term impor-
tant at great distances. 
There is little doubt that such an ad hoc solution is not very satis-
fying. One resolution is to introduce a hierarchical structure as in 
Charlier's model. The result is exactly as before: one can provide what-
ever finite gravitational field is desired by a judicious choice of the 
statistics involved. 2 But the theory and the experimental data were not 
available to determine the possible correctness of this model until well 
into our century. Thus no resolution was possible short of a finitist 
assumption. Resolution in terms of an expanding universe of some sort, 
1. Indeed, he felt that distant stars would thereby indeterminably influence 
the motion of planets, as if a modern astrology obtained. 
2. E. Finlay-Freundlich, Cosmology, pp. 5-9. 
-- -
as for the red-shift, had to await later work and the resultant models 
are exceedingly complex, as we shall see, since expansion itself in-
volves some force overcoming the gravitational attraction between 
galaxies. 
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On this stimulating note we will close our discussion of pre-
Einsteinian cosmology, already overly long but most important, and turn 
to the new theoretical framework provided by Einstein. Together with 
the observational data first made available in our century, it provides 
the background for our discussion of cosmological models in Chapter 
Four. 
2. The Development of General Relativity 
i. The Foundations of Einstein's Work. 
While Einstein's work marks a turning-point in physical theory, 
and indeed one of the first magnitude, it is nonetheless the case that pres-
sures requiring such a deviation existed for some time prior to his ef-
forts. If it sprang fully armed, like Athena, from the head of a genius, it 
was because it was adorned by the concepts of a number of earlier 
thinkers. These earlier studies arise from two sources: an attempt at 
explanation of new experimental data mentioned in the last section and 
efforts to develop the implications of Newtonian physics. Primary 
among th,ose of the latter type are the analyses of Berkeley and Kant. 
In his intesnive critique of the fundamental concepts of Newtonian 
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dynamics, Berkeley argued that absolute space, time and motion are 
without physical meaning. Rather, such concepts of space and time 
are neither perceived by the senses nor proven by reason, and motion 
as we know it is always relative. Similarly, 'force' taken as the cause 
of motion is to introduce into physics an occult quality. While a physics 
based upon forces does have utilitarian value since it leads to correct 
results we must never confuse it with metaphysical explanation! As a 
consequence, Berkeley firmly espouses a formalistic attitude toward 
science. Its theories are instruments for calculation and prediction of 
1 
the regularities of nature. 
Newtonian theory is then, for Berkeley, adequate insofar as the 
laws of motion and gravity fit the observed facts of nature but quite in-
adequate in that absolute space, time and motion play no useful role in 
this task. The best we can do is take the fixed stars as the frame rela-
tive to which motion and spatial relationship is to be measured.2 But 
he goes further. Hypothetical ideas such as 'force' and 'gravity', even 
though they are useful in a way that ideas of absolute space, time and 
motion are not, do not by their utility prove that anything in nature 
1. Max Jammer, CF, pp. 203-208; K. Popper, BPM, pp. 26-32; John 
Tull Baker, EST, pp. 69-80; and K. Popper, CBP, pp. 172-376. 
2. Empty space has no physical properties - the inertial and gravita-
tional properties of space are assumed to be due to matter in the 
universe. 
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corresponds either to the words themselves or to the relational depen-
dencies which they assert. They describe, not a real world. but a 
fictional world, which provides reasonably correct calculation and pre-
diction. Indeed, alternative theories to that of Newton may do as well 
or even better in this task! 
since 
Popper calls Berkeley's principle of analysis. 'Berkeley's razor' 
it allows us a priori to eliminate from physical 
science all essentialist explanation. If they have 
a mathematical and predictive content, they may 
be admitted qua mathematical hypotheses (while 
their essentialist interpretation is eliminated). If 
not, they may be ruled out altogether. This razor 
is sharper than Ockham 's: all entities are ruled 
out except those which are perceived. 1 
Jammer summarizes this in one sentence. ·"All that natural science can 
supply is an account of the relations among symbols and signs; but the 
sign should not be confounded with the vera causa, the real cause of the 
2 phenomenon." 
Thus in Berkeley we have the clear roots of modern relativistic 
physics as often conceived. It is necessary to question here whether, 
in his meta-physical views of God's control of the order of the world 
in spac_e and time, we do not have a re-introduction of absolutized 
1. K. Popper, BPM, pp. 31-32. Compare Max Jammer, CF, p. 207. 
2. Max Jammer. CF, p. 205. 
space and time, which, if true, makes human perception of these bear 
to the Divine order a similar relation to that which relative space and 
time in Newton bore to his absolute.1 It is sufficient to point out that 
Berkeley, insofar as physics is concerned, sees absolute space, etc., 
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as operationally unusable. Also, he makes explicit a variety of forma-
listie tendencies we have noticed earlier as to the nature of scientific 
theory. 
Kant, strongly influenced in his critical period by Berkeley, is, 
however, unwilling to stop here. Where Berkeley's empiricism, basing 
all knowledge upon experience furnished by reflection upon sense data, 
led to an extreme subjective idealism, Kant desires to point out that 
though knowledge begins with experience it does not necessarily all rise 
from that source. Instead, such concepts as space and time are forms 
of intuition organizing the content of sensation. They are not objects of 
perception but modes of perceiving objects. Hence, absolute space and 
time are removed from the phenomenal world in favor of spatial and 
temporal forms of the sensibility and placed, if anywhere, in the nou-
menal realm. 2 
The major point, as far as we are concerned, is that where 
Berkeley ended in an operationally oriented formalism with respect to 
1. See John Tull Baker, EST, pp. 5, 80. Compare Stephen Toulmin, NAS, 
pp. 25-27 and Gerald Holton, "On the Origins of the Special Theory of 
Relativity," Amer. Jour. of Physics, 29(1960), 631. 
2. Compare Max Jammer, CS, pp. 129-137. 
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physical theory# Kant introduced the active organization of sense data 
so as to present a NeWtonian world which is the necessary product of 
our minds. Where Berkeley ended with a Newtonian model only because 
of its utility~ Kant began with the incipient form of such a model pre-
scribed by the way we organize the data of sense. Popper d~nies that 
Kant proved what he claimed but agrees that he did show how success-
ful hypotheses might be possible and that our intellect is the source of 
their laws and imposes them upon nature.1 This seems to leave Kant at 
the level of purely arbitrary construction of theory# as in Berkeley# where 
fruitfulness alone limited the tenability of such artificial constructs. 
Kant would surely deny this~ believing he had shown the Newtonian world~ 
at least in its fundamentals, to be the necessary product of our experi-
ence. 
It is safe to say# however, that later cosmological thought has ori-
2 
ented itself most often in the direction of Berkeley's formalism. But 
it seems equally true that Kant came closer to the assumption of Ein-
stein whereby the situation of the observer is an essential element in 
the world view he presents. We do think, of necessity, in terms of space 
and time, whatever may be the novel relationship, unknown to Kant~ 
1. K. Popper~ NPP~ pp. 154-155. 
2. Einstein# while believing in theories as free creations of the mind~ 
rejected Kant's view that reason by itself can yield natural laws, 
some of which will be eternally valid (at least as he read Kant)~ in 
favor of that part of a Berkelian view requiring their testing by ex-
perience. Many other theoreticians~ denying Einstein's faith in a 
knowable reality1 go much further toward Berkeley than he. 
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conceived as existing between them, and the world we construct is the 
necessary product of our experience, though possibly not in the manner 
Kant believed. But much more on this later. It is enough that we see 
here the anti-essentialistic orientation of both Kant's and Berkeley's 
view of knowledge and the rejection of operational significance in ideas 
of absolute space, time and motion. Also, in both, are the roots of an 
antimetaphysical attitude in constructing physical theories. 
By the late Nineteenth Century, the Berkelian attitude toward ab-
solute space, time and motion was carried over to the rejection of con-
cepts of force, cause and even substance. Ernst Mach proceeded to 
reduce force and mass to purely mathematical relations between certain 
spatial and temporal measurements.1 Science was to discard the idea 
of cause and effect entirely. The Newtonian demonstration of absolute 
space in studying rotational motion he also rejected, 2 and in its place 
inertia is made dependent upon the large-scale distribution of matter 
. th . 3 1n e un1verse. 
1. See Max Jammer, CF, pp. 220-221. Also Ernst Mach, "The Signifi-
cance & Purpose ofNatural Laws" in Danto and Morgenbesser, 
Philosophy of Science (New York: Meridian Books, 1960) .. 266-273. 
2. See Max Jammer, CS, pp. 139-141. But see criticism in Adolf 
Griinbaum, "The Philosophical Retention of Absolute Space in Ein-
stein's General Relativityn, Phil Review, 66(1957 ), 525-534 and 
Stephen Toulmin, NAS, p. 27. 
3. See Max Jammer, CS, p. 141. Indeed the argument is essentially 
that of Berkeley. SeeK. Popper, BPM, pp. 32-33. 
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There is little doubt that in so reducing physics to an operational 
level Mach goes far beyond Berkeley in what he rejects but, much more 
importantly, in his anti-metaphysical biases. 1 Popper points out that 
for Berkeley there were true causes lying outside of physics and whose 
explanation lay in God. For Mach all metaphysical and theological tra-
dition is rejected. ''While Berkeley says that there can be nothing 
physical behind the physical phenomena, Mach suggests that there is 
nothing at all behind them." 2 Or, as Einstein in his obituary to Mach put 
it, "Concepts have meaning only if we can point to objects to which they 
refer and to the rules by which they are assigned to these objects." 3 
Let us note particularly those aspects of Mach which play a size-
able role in later physics. 
(1) Mach claimed that all physical statements had to point up relations 
among observable quantities. This attitude is surely that of Einstein 
in his definition of simultaneity in special relativity. Revised, so as to 
allow not only statements directly translatable into relations between 
observable quantities but also statements containing "words or symbols 
which are connected with observational concepts by long chains of 
mathematical and logical argument" 4 it is basic also to Einstein's 
1. See Joergen Joergensen, DLE, pp. 7-11. 
2. K. Popper, BPM, p. 34. 
3. Quoted in Philipp Frank, "Einstein, Mach, and Logical Positivism" in 
Edward Madden (ed.), SST, p. 84. 
4. See Philipp Frank in Edward H. Madden (ed.), SST, p. 86. 
139 
general theory. 1 This, of course, is not to say that either Mach or 
Einstein was wholly successful in this program. 
(2) He emphasized that physical theory should be simple and economi-
cal to thought. The largest number of facts should be subsumed under 
the minimum of principles, and theories may be compared in the degree 
to which they attain this.2 Here he assumes that scientific laws are 
summaries of experimental results aiding us in remembering them and 
predicting future occurrences. Einstein here accepted only the belief 
that experience is the test of theory, but followed much more closely 
Poincar~ 's view that theories are inventions freely created by the clever 
mind. 
(3) Mach applied his positivistiC criterion to the Foucault pendulum. Its 
plane of oscillation remains fixed, not relative to an invisible absolute 
space, but relative to the 'fixed' stars in the sky. Thus the fixed stars 
exert an observable influence on moving bodies, quite distinct from the 
law of gravitation? This fascinating idea plays a very sizeable role, in 
4 
an odd way, in Einstein's general theory but more particularly in the 
1. See Albert Einstein, Essays. in Science, trans •. A.Harris (New York: 
Philosophical Library, n.d.), pp. 107-108. 
2. K. Popper, BPM, p. 32. Also Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics. 
(La Salle, Ill. : Open Court, 1960), pp. 456, 550-555, 577, 599. 
3. Ernst Mach, SM, pp. 283-297. A view not unlike that of Seeliger. 
4. See R.J. Blin-Stoyle et al, Turning Points in Physics (New York: 
Harper and Bros., 1959), pp. 163-164. 
140 
Steady State cosmologies of recent years.1 It may play a part in future 
work on whether the behavior of terrestrial mechanical systems depend 
slightly upon their orientation (since nearby bodies in space are strongly 
isotropic as seen from the earth and they must exert some small pro-
portion of the total effect of the stars). 2 It has also been introduced in 
suggesting that, if the universe is expanding, the physical constants will 
alter with time. 3 
Scriven has called Mach a representative of the hypochondriacal 
phase in the philosophy of science, 4 and surely his view that there exists 
a purely phenomenal language devoid of theories is just this. 5 
"There is no sharp dividing line between an 'empirical 
language ' and a 'the ore tical language ': we are the ori-
zing all the time, even when we make the most trivial 
singular statement .... For even ordinary singular 
statements are always interpretations of 'the facts' in 
the light of theories." 
But for Mach "there is no place left in science for the understanding of 
nature beyond its representation." 7 We will see that not only did Einstein 
1. H. Bondi and T. Gold, "The Steady-State Theory of the Expanding Uni-
verse," Mon. Not. Roy. Astron. Soc., 108(1948 ), 253. Also see, in the 
same journal, ll3(1953), 34-42 for D.W. Sciama's discussion. 
2. Hermann Bondi, ''Review of Cosmology", Mon. Not. Roy. Astron. Soc., 
108(1948 ), p. 116 and Percy W. Bridgman, "Significance of the Mach 
Principle," Amer. Jour. of Physics, 29(1961), 32-36. 
3. See R.H. Dicke, "Eotvos and the Gravitational Red-Shift," Amer. Jour. 
of Physics, 28(1960), 344-347. 
4. Michael Scriven, Review of Toulmin, Philosophy of Science. Philosopfl.i-
cal Review, 64(1955 ), 124. 
5. SeeK. Popper, LSD, pp. 59 footnote *1, 75, 108, 423. 
6. Ibid., p. 423. 
7. R. Harre, An Introduction to the Logic of the Sciences (London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1960), p. 45. 
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vacillate on this point but that it plays a crucial role in subsequent cos-
mological thought. However, enough has been said about Mach's ideas 
to see that he plays a major part in the pre-Einsteinian heritage and we 
must move on. 
There were others of the same period who wrestled with similar 
problems. Mention may be made of Kirchoff who in 1876 built a system 
of mechanics excluding causes but differing with Mach in that matter 
(or mass), space and time are all intuitively given. In his system, since 
motion alone is the source of mechanical concepts, no complete defini-
tion of force is available. Some eighteen years later, Hertz's Principles 
of Mechanics appeared, similarly opposed to the use of force in mech-
. 
1 d . f . "b. t 2 an1cs, an argu1ng or max1mum economy 1n as1c concep s. However, 
as distinct from Kirchoff "for whom forces were represented only by 
their kinematic effects as accelerations ... [Hertz proposes] to conjoin 
with the visible masses of the universe other [concealed] masses obey-
ing the same laws" 3 so that the motion of visible bodies determines, and 
is determined by, the motion of the invisible bodies with force merely a 
mathematical description of their conjunction. Both men then "attempt 
to explain physical phenomena in terms of mass points and their physical 
relations" 4 and nothing more. 
1. See H. Hertz, The Principles of Mechanics, trans. Jones et al, 
(New York: Dover Pubns., 1956), p. 6. 
2. Ibid., p. 11. 
3. Max Jammer, CF, p. 227. 
4. Ibid., p. 229. On Einstein's attitude to Hertz's work see A. Einstein, 
ES, pp. 101-102. 
Along with this other tendencies may be noted. Machian -type 
views were similarly exhibited by Clifford in 1886, 1 and by his editor 
2 
Karl Pearson. "The terms matter and force, together with the ideas 
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associated with them, (should be J entirely removed from scientific 
terminology - (reducing] , in fact, all dynamic to kinematic." 3 Clifford 
also contributed the idea that the dynamical properties of matter are to 
be understood in terms of local distortions or curvatures in space - an 
4 
obvious anticipation of certain aspects of general relativity. Later, 
, 5 
Henri Poincare espoused a view slightly different from that of Mach. 
The laws of physics became, not statements about reality, but arbitrary 
stipulations about how words like 'force' and •straight lines' are to be 
used. They are expedient conventions. 6 This is then really an extreme 
logical wing of positivism as opposed to the extreme empirical wing 
represented by Mach's view that laws are summaries of experimental 
1. Wm. K. Clifford, The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences (New York: 
Dover Pubns ., 1955 ). 
2. See also his Grammar of Science(London: Everyman's Library, 1937). 
Another little-known writer of similar views is J.B. Stallo, The Con-
cepts and Theories of Modern Physics (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1960) written in 1881. 
3. Wm. K. Clifford, CSES, p. lxv in Pearson's preface. 
4. See his chapter on the bending of space. 
5. See his Science & Hypotheses, trans. W.J .G. (New York: Dover Pubns., 
1952) and his "Principles of Mathematical Physics" reprinted in the 
Scientific Monthly, 82 (1956 ), 165-175. Also Ernst Nagel, The Structure 
of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), pp. 260-267. 
6. But see Adolf Griinbaum, PRAS, p. 531. 
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1 / 
facts. Einstein read Poincare and followed his idea that physical prin-
ciples and operational definitions must be practical and consistent. He 
rejected the Machian idea that laws of a general nature are inferred 
from experience but accepted his position that they must be tested by 
experience~ although, as in Poincar~~ the free invention of the mind. 2 
Let us turn to a slightly different problem. Early in the Nine-
teenth Century, Lobatchevski and Bolyai and~ in the mid -century, 
Riemann~ had introduced novel geometries. The earlier systems were 
hyperbolic and infinite while that of Riemann was spherical, finite, and 
unbounded. These led to the elimination of the last traditional charac-
teristic of absolute space - its Euclidean character - although Gauss and 
Lobatchevski believed that contemporary experiment seemed to preclude 
3 
non-Euclidean geometry from applicability to physical space. However , 
by the time Riemann had presented his work, with the comment that its 
assumption of homogeneity of space did not include the influence of matter, 
Clifford (as we noted) could introduce the possibility of joining Riemann's 
geometry with physics so that local inhomogeneities in the metric could be 
4 
related to its material content. Thus matter and motion manifested the 
1. It may be noted in passing that Hertz considered laws to be prescrip-
tive interpretative symbolic statements and not~ as in Mach, a descrip-
tive shorthand for experientally correlated perceptions. 
2. Compare Hakan Tornebohm~ A Logical Analysis of the Theory of Rela-
tivity (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1952 ), pp. 182-187. 
3. See Max Jammer, CS~ pp. 146-149. 
4. Ibid., pp. 160-162. 
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varying curvature of space. 
In 1900, Schwarzchild attempted just this fusion using astronom-
ical data to test whether space exhibited a curvature. He concluded 
that it did, though not settling whether it was hyperbolic or spherical. 
" But at this point Poincare argued that one does not measure space by 
itself but only objects in space, and since this involves assumptions 
about light travelling in straight lines and such, the geometry we choose 
is a matter of convenience. Thus he concluded that we should use Euc-
1 
lidean geometry since it is logically simplest. However, as Einstein 
was to claim some twenty years later, Euclidean geometry greatly com-
plicates observation in cosmology 2 and, in any case, hyperbolic geometry 
appears to contain the fewest simple assumptions. 3 
Thus, with the arrival of new geometries in the previous century, 
and with the work of Mach, Poincar~. 4 and those of similar spirt the 
stage was fully prepared for Einstein's magnificent synthesis. 5 To it 
we will now turn to see how it utilized such novelties in handling the work 
1. See Max Jammer, CS, p. 163. Also G.J. Whitrow, The Structure and 
Evolution of the Universe (New York: Harper and Bros., 1959), pp. 68-76. 
2. He did not prove this, however, as later work revealed, contrary to 
Jammer, CS, p. 164. Compare Adolf Grunbaum, PRAS, p. 531. 
3. See Menger, quoted by Jammer, ibid., p. 163 footnote *71. On Poincare 
, --
and simplicity see Andre Lamouche, Le principe de simplicite (Paris: 
Gauthier- Villars, 1955 ), pp. 127-129. 
4. An excellent study of Poincare is found in Tobias Dantzig, Henri 
Poincare (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954). 
5. See Emile Borel, L'espace et le temps (Paris: Presses Universi-
taires de France, 1949), pp. 1-32. 
of Michelson and Morley and the increasing studies of more distant 
regions of the universe available from observational astronomy. 
ii. The Theory of Special Relativity. 
In 1905 Einstein published his epochal paper~ On the Electro-
dynamics of Moving Bodies, destined to precipitate a veritable flood 
of novel technical discussion on the nature of the physical world. The 
specific genesis of the new thesis and its content are quite technical, 
1 
and have been placed for that reason in an appendix, but the broad 
origins of its concepts have been outlined already. It will be our pur-
pose here merely to present the general methodology Einstein uses. 
The next section will point up the factors requiring further generaliza-
tion, from which sprang subsequent cosmological discussion of great 
variety and subtlety. 
The two major sources of analysis of Einstein's own ideas of his 
work are those of Schilpp and Einstein-lnfeld, 2 along with a number of 
his own essays. McCrea points out that Einstein's basic objective was 
to provide a unified system of physics wherein the unrelated concepts 
of discrete particles and a surrounding field, and wherein the laws of 
mechanics that treated particles but could not treat the field and field 
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1. See Appendix D, ''The Mathematical Principles of Special Relativity." 
2. Paul A. Schilpp (ed.), Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist (New 
York: Harper and Bros., 1959) in two volumes and A. Einstein and 
L. Infeld, The Evolution of Physics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1950). For a briefer outline see W.H. McCrea, "On the Objective 
of Einstein's Work," B.J .P.S., 8(1957 ), 18-29. 
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concepts that could not handle point singularities might be synthesized.1 
To do this, he attempted to express the laws of physics entirely by field 
equations involving independent variables which are space-time co-
ordinates. One early and partial aspect of this was the special theory 
of interest here wherein the laws of electrodynamics and dynamics were 
made invariant under the same transformations. 
Let us look at Einstein's method in achieving this construct. The 
first thing one is struck by is his desire to use very general hypotheses 
and to use as few as possible. 
The theory of relativity is a fine example of the fundamental 
character of the modern development of theoretical science. 
The initial hypotheses become steadily more abstract and 
remote from experience. On the other hand it gets nearer to 
the grand aim of all science, which is to cover the greatest 
number of empirical facts by logical deductions fro:m the 
smallest possible number of hypotheses or axioms. 2 
It is clear that this involves the initial postulation of general principles 
not derived from experience directly, for surely his use of rigid meter 
sticks and ideal clocks, for example, is not a definition in terms of 
laboratory operational factors. 
The methodology involves a second point, namely that Einstein 
conceived his view as a broadly heuristic device. 3 The device involved 
1. W.H. McCrea, OEW, p. 19. 
2. A. Einstein, ES, p. 69. See also pp. 12-21. 
3. Ibid., p. 71. 
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the rejection of absolute motion and its associated dynamics and the 
close interweaving of spatial and distance measurement so that two 
events may be simultaneous in one reference frame and not in another, 
and, concommitantly, that the distance between two events depends up-
on the reference frame relative to which it is measured. 1 Now only 
equations which are not affected by a Lorentz transformation are ad-
missable as expressions of natural laws. But it then appears that the 
four-dimensional manifold becomes more a construct for calculation 
and prediction than an explanation of 'reality' or of 'physical existence'.2 
We recall that in Lorentz's view ordinary Galilean transformations 
were taken as fundamentally true but apparently violated because the 
measurement of moving bodies could not reveal their true properties. 
"This was aesthetically unsatisfying, but neither contradictory nor im-
"bl " 3 poss1 e. It expresses a fact regarding moving bodies so far examined 
and not necessarily a property of motion itself, since some future phen-
omenon might reveal the actual distinction between a stationary and mov-
. t 4 d f mg sys em. But this Einstein denie . He rejected contraction' and 
1. G.C. McVittie, "Distance and Relativity/' Science, 127(1958), 503. 
2. Indeed we can talk of distances in the solar system only because 
differences inherent in different frames of reference are within 
experimental error. Only as these accumulate, as in the advance 
of the perihelion of Mercury must we use other concepts (general 
relativity). Ibid • ., pp. 504-505. 
3. H. Dingle, OSRT, p. 302. This of course assumes Lorentzts view 
of nature. 
4. Ibid., p. 204. 
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'time dilation' since, even in thought, one could not identify the bodies 
experiencing these changes. Rather, the Lorentz transformations were 
necessary because the meaning of time, as Einstein defined it, demanded 
them and not because one could not overcome nature's caprice upon our 
instruments. Length, time intervals, and mass are not "objective prop-
erties of external events or things, but the results we obtain when we 
1 
perform certain operations of measurement." 
Einstein's theory, then, turns out to be identical in operation and 
mathematical formulation with that of Lorentz though the physical mean-
ing is vastly different. One seems to be left with a choice between them 
only on what are philosophical, esthetic, or axiological grounds ! 2 This 
has bothered many and may be taken as our third point regarding Ein-
3 
stein's methodology. For example, Brown argues that 
no mention was made of forces which would cause the 
instruments to read differently, the clocks to go slow, 
and so on, and we were left once more with nothing but 
mathematical relations together with pseudo-epistemology, 
involving a lot of hypothetical obser4ers attached to any-
thing from an electron to a galaxy. 
He concludes that relations between measurements made by observers 
should be derived as conclusions and cannot be postulates. 
1. Quoting Einstein, ibid., p. 2 05. 
2. See Margenau's revealing comment, P.A. Schilpp (ed.), AE, 
pp. 245-246. 
3. G. Burniston Brown, "'Have We Abandoned the Physical Theory of 
Nature?," Science Progress, 44(1956 ), 619-634. 
4. Ibid., p. 625. 
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In 1908, Ritz 1 introduced a theory rejecting an ether but also the 
electromagnetic equations themselves since they appeared to him to be 
built on the ether idea. He died before completing a new set of electro-
magnetic equations but his assumptions are interesting. Along with the 
assumption that light is emitted with constant velocity from sources of 
varied velocities, he rejects the necessity of changing the concept of 
time at a distance and holds the Galilean transformations to be gener-
ally valid! This view is surely, in some ways, simpler than Einstein's 
and involves less purely utilitarian novelties. It never gained much 
hearing because Ritz died leaving electromagnetism without a general 
2 
theory. Dingle is advocating a renewed study of it today. Also, in 
1921, Robb 3 developed a system using measurement without Einstein's 
assumption of rigid measuring rods and perfect clocks. It finds ad-
4 herents today among the kinematic relativists. We shall examine 
these briefly later to the degree they have achieved recognition in cos-
mology. 
Thus one can hardly say that special relativity has gained unfeigned 
allegiance in all quarters of physics. It has had great success, both in 
1. Ann. Chim. Phys., 13(1908), 145. 
2. Herbert Dingle, "A Proposed Astronomical Test of the 'Ballistic' 
Theory of Light Emission," Mon. Not. Roy. Astron. Soc., ll9(1959), 
67-71. 
3. Alfred A. Robb, The Absolute Relations of Time and Space (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1921). 
4. W.H. McCrea, "The Evolution of Theories of Space-Time and Mech-:-
anics" Phil. of Sci., 6(1939), 137-162. 
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applied physics and in stimulating the later development of the general 
theory of Einstein, but it may yet fall, in part at least, with new tests 
or with a possible shift to some other scheme such as that of kinematic 
relativity, 1 however unlikely this may appear at present. 2 There can 
be little doubt, however, that its widespread acceptance, in contradis-
tinction to the work of Lorentz, Ritz, Robb, and others is a composite of 
historical accident, esthetic choices on grounds of economy, preference 
in terms of fruitfulness in seeiningly embracing larger areas of physics, 
its place as a source of the general theory, and the tendency toward a 
more widespread operationalistic attitude among workers in the physical 
sciences. Opposition, on the other hand, has rested largely on epistemic 
or metaphysical disagreement, questioning of criteria for deciding on 
elegance and simplicity, disagreement with part or all of the general 
theory, and the belief that other theories can be developed so as to cover 
at least equally wide areas of physical data. All these we will analyze 
later. But, finally, our most important conclusion must be that, with the 
decline of the ether in other areas of physics as a useful or consistent 
concept, the special theory has been the historical alternative and any 
other scheme must do at least as well in handling it, and its concommi-
l. To be analyzed later. See pp. 231-zt~-~. 
2. We will discuss the question of falsifying the speeial theory and 
its competitor in Chapter Six. 
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tant, absolute space1 in scientific work. 1 
iii. The Generalized Theory of Relativity. 
We saw, in the previous section, that Einstein developed the 
electrodynamics of Maxwell and Lorentz so as to show that, for the 
laws of mechanics and electromagnetism to be valid between inertial 
systems (i.e., Galilean frames without rotation or acceleration rela-
tive to one another) one must redefine 'simultaneity 1 so that it has 
meaning only relative to some given coordinate system. Consonant 
with this was the requirement that the shape of measuring devices and 
the speed at which clocks moved depended on their motion with respect 
to this coordinate system. 
It soon became clear that this independence in physical laws of 
the state of motion of the coordinate system was restricted unduly to 
the uniform motion of coordinate systems in respect to each other. 2 
Nature would then appear to depend on our choice of coordinate systems 
and their arbitrarily-chosen uniform state of motion. Consequently 
Einstein sought a system wherein the laws were independent of such a 
choice. For the previous theory, while it left a relative meaning for 
1. Major sources for technical description of the theory are: H. Torne-
bohm, LA TR; R.C. Tolman, Relativity; Thermodynamics and Cosmo -
logy (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press~ 1950 ): J .L. Synge, Relativity: The 
Special Theory (Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co.1 1956 ); C. M4iller1 
The Theory of Relativity (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Pre"ss, 1957); and 
W.H. McCrea1 Relativity Physics {London: Methuen and Co., 1954 ). 
A fine bibliography by G. Holton is given in Amer. Jour. Phy., 
30{1962 ), 462-469. 
2. See W .H. McCrea, OEW, p. 23. 
the concept of velocity, retained the treatment of acceleration as abso-
1 lute. 
Removing the inertial system from its privileged position proved 
most difficult. Where the special theory deviated fundamentally from 
classical mechanics only in postulating the constancy of light indepen-
152 
dent of the linear velocity of its source a more fundamental change is 
required here. 
2 
Einstein labored on such a change for a decade. 3 The 
key appeared to him to be the equality of inertial and gravitational mass 
(i.e., the observed fact that all falling bodies have the same acceleration 
in a given gravitational field), which equality he could not fit into his 
special theory. 
In a homogeneous gravitational field all motions take 
place in the same way as in the absence of a gravita-
tional field in relation to a uniformly accelerated co-
ordinate system. If this principle held good for any 
event whatever (the 'principle of equivalence'), this was 
an indication that the principle of relativity needed to 
be extended with respect to one another, if we were to 
reach an easy and natural theory of the gravitational 
fields. 4 
This required a theory whose equations retained their form for 
non-linear transformations of the coordinates; but now the coordinates 
lost their simple physical interpretation. "[It] could no longer be re-
quired that differentials of co-ordinates should signify direct results of 
1. A. Einstein, ES, p. 78. 
2. A. Einstein.etal, PR, p. 111. 
3. For his labors in outline see A. Einstein, ES, pp. 79-84. 
4. Ibid., pp. 80-81. 
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measurement with ideal scales or clocks." 1 The theory following from 
this is outlined in Appendix E~ for the technical dis.cussion of world 
models is founded upon, or deviate from, this and it will be well to 
have it available later. 
Let us close this chapter with a short analysis of Einstein's me-
thod. First, he tells us he conceives of two types of theories, the con-
structive which builds a picture of more complex phenomena out of a 
relatively simple scheme (as in the kinetic theory of matter) and the 
principle type which starts with empirically discovered processes and 
then suggests mathematically-formulated criteria which separate pro-
cesses, or theoretical representations of them, must satisfy. The former 
is synthetic in method and is characterized by clarity, adaptability, and 
completeness. The latter is analytic and appears more secure in foun-
dation and exhibits logical perfection. Relativity is of this latter type. 2 
This implies, for him, a variety of things. One is his opposition to 
the inductive method at a late stage in science. 3 Laws of an advanced 
stage in physics are the '!free inventions of the human intellect." 4 They 
arise from intuition working along with restrictions placed upon our 
imagination by experience: "[we) desire to make physical theory fit 
1. A. Einstein, ES~ p. 81. 
2. Ibid., p. 54. 
3. Ibid.~ p. 69. 
4. Ibid., p. 15. 
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observed fact as well as possible." 1 "In practice the world of phenom-
ena uniquely determines the theoretical system, in spite of the fact that 
there is no logical bridge between phenomena and their theoretical 
. . 1 " 2 . prmc1p es. Thus one may call h1m an advocate of what we will see 
is Popper's hypothetico-deductive method to this degree. 3 Induction 
is used only in organizing sense experiences so as to suggest that a 
synthesis may be obtained. 4 Consonant with this is his rejection of the 
pursuit of Kantian a priori's. Science has to work hard to seek out 
the characteristics of complex experience~ and though our concepts re-
fer to this they are not deducible therefrom and certainly never arise 
without it. 5 
Another implication of the principle method, as he calls it~ is the 
nature of the theories we construct. He tells us these should be based 
upon as few fundamental concepts and postulates as possible. ''It is the 
grand object of all theory to make these irreducible elements as simple 
1. A. Einstein~ ES~ p. 48. Alsop. 7. See Einstein in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), 
AE~ pp. 9~ 131 ff. 
2. Ibid., p. 4. This is why he favors Kepler's method but differs with 
Newton who, he believes~ thought the basic concepts and laws of his 
system arose from experience. Ibid., pp. 16, 22-39. Compare our 
remarks on Kepler and Newton earlier. 
3. Ibid., p.7. 
4. Ibid.~ pp. 10, 18. 
5. Ibid.~ pp. 59, 63. 
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and as few as possible." 1 But this basis must be developed with the 
highest rigor and precision if we are not to lose these values, and pre-
cision comes from starting with relatively simple physical events since 
complex ones (as in biology) may not yet be susceptible to rigor. We 
demand "supreme purity, clarity, and certainty at the cost of complete-
ness" 
2 but we assume the laws thus derived will be valid for all 
natural phenomena, although we may not yet see how to deduce them 
from it. 3 At this point he prefigures the Unified Science- movement. 
It is interesting to note that he goes so far as to claim his theory 
is logically complete. Were a single conclusion to prove wrong it must 
be given up. It cannot, he thinks, be modified. 4 This is surely, then, an 
example of a highly falsifiable theory and the account of its corrobora-
tion will occupy us later. But there are essentialistic nuances in the 
thesis that it cannot be modified and to this we now turn. 
He tells us that 
our experience hitherto justifies us in believing that 
nature is the realization of the simplest conceivable 
mathematical ideas. I am convinced that we can 
1. A. Einstein, ES, p. 15. Also P.A. Schilpp (ed.), AE, I, p. 13 where 
Einstein notes that a theory is more perfect the 'simpler' the struc-
ture it postulates and the more field equations in it are invariant. 
2. Ibid., p. 3. 
3. Ibid.,p.7. 
4. Ibid., p. 59. 
discover by means of purely mathematical constructions 
the concepts and laws connecting them with each other. 1 
This is because nature itself is rational and intelligible - so much so 
that he holds a Spinozistic attitude toward it as a superior mind.2 But 
he is also convinced we actually have uncovered ultimate truths about 
reality, if only in part. Both convictions are essentialistic. 3 
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The nature of the universe as he conceives it, and the correspond-
ing economy and inclusiveness of laws describing it (noted earlier), place 
upon him a heavy utilization of the idea of simplicity. Relativity was 
presented as an alternative to the older views of nature, not only because 
it was confir~med impressively by experience, but because it simplified 
the description of the facts connected by these older theories and because 
it embraced more empirical data. 4 In part this was done on psycholo-
gical grounds, as in his rejection of absolute space and time, with the 
desire to more fully unify and penetrate events. 5 In part it is logical, 
in the sense that its picture is consistent and more cohesive of the con-
cepts of earlier physics. 
He asks us to realize that the physical world must be seen as a 
l. A. Einstein, ES, p. 17. See also Einstein in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), AE, I, 
pp. 75-95, 145. 
2. Ibid., p. 11. 
3. Note A. Einstein et al, PR, p. 145. 
4. Remember, however, that logical simplicity need not correspond to 
mathematical simplicity. See Einstein in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), AE, I, 
pp. 137-141. 
5. A. Einstein, ES, pp. 28-39. Further on this see A. Einstein et al, 
PR, pp. 113, 152. 
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four-dimensional continuum. Then if we assume therein a Riemmanian 
metric and ask what are the simplest laws this matrix can satisfy we 
arrive at the relativistic theory of gravitation in empty space. If, in 
that space, we assume a vector field (which can be inferred from it) 
and ask what the simplest laws might be which such a field can satisfy, 
we arrive at Maxwell's equations for empty space. 
In the limited nature of the mathematically existent sim-
ple fields and the simple equations possible between them, 
lies the theorist's hope of grasping the real world in all 
its depth. 1 
On this essentialistic base general relativity reduced inertia, gravita-
tion, and the metrical behavior of bodies and clocks to a simple field 
quality, that of depending on bodies. "Space and time were thereby di-
vested not of their reality but of their causal absoluteness (absoluteness 
affecting but not affected) which Newton had been compelled to ascribe to 
them." 2 
Einstein spent much of his later life in the pursuit of a unified 
theory even beyond his general relativity. He felt that the latter found 
gravitational fields connected to the structure of space but left electro-
magnetic fields an independent entity handled only by additional terms 
in the general field equations. Eventually both must correspond to the 
1. A. Einstein, ES, p. 19. 
2. Ibid., p. 37.-
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verified structure of space.1 Along with this went the demand that we 
seek ''the description of physical reality in terms of fields which sa tis-
2 
fy partial differential equations without singularities," that is the re-
quirement that the laws of a unified theory must handle atomic particles.3 
Only then could quantum theory, electrodynamics, and mechanics fall in 
one great system. 4 
Thus we may close this chapter where it began - with Copernicus -
on the problem of action at a distance, and therefore the problem of the 
ether, for it re-appears in Einstein. He claims that he has a medium in 
general relativity like and yet unlike it: unlike it in that it is free of all 
mechanical and kinematic properties but like it in that it helps to deter-
mine mechanical and electromagnetic happenings.5 Such a medium must 
exist because the space-time continuum contains gravitational potentials 
y..MIJ . But it remains for a unified theory to discover if it determines the 
nature of atomic particles. Only in such a generals cheme will the anti-
thesis of ether and matter fade away, for matter will be merely, not a 
singularity, but a concentration of one basic field. 
1. A. Einstein, ES,. p. 74. See also Einstein and Infeld, EP, p. 260; 
Einstein et al, PR, p. 152; and P.A. Schilpp (ed.), AE, I, pp. 144-145. 
2. A. Einstein, Es:-p. 45. Implicit in this is the assumption that the 
field idea is more fundamental than the concept of particle. Compare 
Einstein and Infeld, EP, p. 259. 
3. Ibid., pp. 38-39, 45. 
4. Ibid., p. 20. See also W.H. McCrea, OEW, pp. 27-29. 
5. Ibid., pp. 108, 111. 
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IV. A CONCEPTUAL HISTORY OF POST-RELATIVISTIC COSMOLOGIES. 
1. Evolutionary Models of the Universe. 
i. The Models of Einstein, de Sitter, Friedmann, Lemaftre, and others. 
Cosmology may be defined, in as suitable a manner as any, as the 
attempt to unify astronomical data into a systematic and inclusive order 
whereby models are obtained which act as regulative standards for pre-
sent and future study. These models, each defining what is to be called 
1 
a 'universe', are to be the subject of this chapter. V\'hile it is of the 
greatest interest that such synthetic constructs should turn out to vary 
greatly it is perhaps even more interesting to note the way in which the 
data of astronomy is introduced into the logical development of each 
theoretical model. Possibly it is the latter problem which determines 
as a consequence the diversities in the former. 
Now there can be no doubt that our discussion in Chapter Three is 
of the greatest importance in providing the background for our analysis, 
in this chapter, of the methodological considerations involved in con-
structing modern cosmological theories in all their variety. For as we 
proceed it will be apparent the debt such considerations owe to the work 
1. A cosmological model may be defined as a construct, postulated as 
coherently describing the major features of the physical universe. 
Behind it will be a theory considered to explain the processes of the 
model. The conjunction of model and theory is a hypothesis about 
the laws governing astrophysical processes as a whole and the 
character of future observation which should be possible if the laws 
are true. 
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outlined earlier, just as it will be apparent that may of the epistemo-
logical and metaphysical ideas involved in these past labors arise again, 
though they be cloaked in novel apparel. However, for our immediate 
purposes, the development of differing cosmologies must be seen to ori-
ginate in the relativistic ideas of Einstein in conjunction with the novel 
spatial metrics of the past century. The more profound considerations 
of a philosophical type will unfold as we proceed from this context. 
Hence, we will turn to the development of general relativity into a cosmo-
logical scheme in initiating our study. 
Let us introduce our discussion by recalling the new geometrical 
concepts of the Nineteenth Century mentioned above. We noted that 
Riemann, Gauss, Bolyai, and Lobachevski had introduced geometries 
1 
which did not impose the parallel postulate of the Euclidean system. 
Such mathematical constructs are called congruence geometries, i.e., 
they postulate that the metrical properties of bodies are independent 
of their position or orientation in space. In Riemann's system, the 
analogue to the planes of Euclidean geometry is a sphere of radius R. 2 
The infinity of straight lines in Euclidean geometry is replaced by great 
circles on this sphere, all thereby being closed and of finite length 277R. 
1. See p. t'f3. 
2. A special case is an ellipsoid not described here. 
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Such circles will intersect; thus Riemann's geometry is without para!-
lel lines. 
If we compare a Euclidean triangle to a Riemannian triangle an 
interesting difference arises which the accompanying diagrams may 
clarify. In the Euclidean case the interior 
angles add to 180°, d·..fe fo..('~and OA and OB are 
straight lines (i.e. the shortest distances be-
tween the points 0, A, and B, the geodesics1 meet only once). If we 
treat these lines as light rays, such a space is 'open'; the rays do not 
return to meet again. Also, a circle of radiusL will have a circumfer-
ence.z.:v-fand an area TTL~ 
In Riemann's system, the sum of the interior angles is> 180° by 
an amount wroportional to the area of the triangle d<fe and OA and OB 
are great circles (i.e. the geodesics will 
cross twice as shown). If such lines repre-
sent light rays, the rays return again to 0 
and our space is 'closed'. A circle of ra-
diusLwill have a circumference(z.:v-.t[{i.e. equal to ..zJT..I(i-~La)]and an 
and is called the curva-
ture. It is positive. 
Lobachevski and several others developed yet another geometry, 
one in which there are lines of infinite length and wherein there are an 
infinite number of parallels to a given line. The analogue here is a 
162 
hyperbolic surface. In such a geometry the 
sum of the interior angles is< 180°, tL >ft9 
and the geodesics do not meet again. Such a .L B ,_, 0~ 
II --~ A -
space is then 'open'. A circle of radius -.f 
will have a circumference >.zT-t Ui.e. equal 
to .zlTL {/- /(L~) J and an area lTL.l {t-KL/tz) where -t'«-tTT~ and 
K t ' t . t• 1 , .ne curva ure, IS nega 1ve. 
Now it has been shown that these are the only congruence geome-
tries possible. Thus if space has isotropic and homogeneous character, 
these will be available to describe it. 2 But the problem remains as to 
which describes physical space as found by scientific study, for the above 
characteristics need not be unique a priori in determining space as it 
actually appears. Also, if physical space should appear to be curved, we 
may ask whether it has a positive or negative curvature, and above all 
why this should be so. 
At this point we recall that Riemann suggested that space might 
curve because of its material content. 3 We also remember that Einstein 
' 
1. For a general survey of geometries and cosmology see H.P. Robertson, 
"The Expanding Universe," Science in Progress, Second Series, 
G.A. Baitsell (ed.), (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940). 
pp.l47-167. 
2. Compare H.P. Robertson, ''Geometry as a Branch of Physics" in 
P.A. Schilpp (ed.), AE, I, p. 378. 
3. Seep. 19-3. 
163 
in his general relativity, discovered that the geometry of a spatial 
region therein was dependent upon its relation to matter. This might 
appear to obviate a congruence geometry as the matrix since Einstein 
initially showed that the geometry describing space would vary with dis-
tance from a massive body. But he soon noticed that, on a very large 
scale, one might assume matter was distributed at random so that one 
could sensibly speak of the average curvature of a region. It was this 
idea which leads to our first model, yet another product of Einstein's 
1 
fertile mind, and to it we now turn. 
Einstein had derived the relation G..-411 - ~ 8..Mu · G =-I<· T-o for the 
gravitational field in the interior of matter and radiation, as we noted 
1. 2 ear 1er. The left hand side expresses the potential distribution (and 
hence the spatial matrix) and is a tensor of curvature of the second-
order, constructed from the ?.-u 's and their derivatives up to the 
second degree. The right hand side is a symmetrical second-order 
tensor representing the matter or radiation. The constant K guarantees 
the conservation of mass and momentum and may be given by I(= B7Tlf/c,z. 
where '1 is Newton's gravitational constant. But such a relation assumes 
that the metric is flat at infinity or, to put it differently, the universe 
involved assumed a core of masses surrounded by a spatial metric 
1. See his paper of 1917, "Cosmological Considerations on the General 
Theory of Relativity," in Einstein et al , PR, pp. 175 -B8. 
2. See Appendix E. 
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approaching the Euclidean case at great distances and exhibiting cur-
vature only in the neighborhood of these masses. 
Such a universe Einstein considered both contradictory to what 
he knew of galactic distribution, which appeared to go on randomly to 
the limits of telescopic visibility, and foreign to the basic idea of gen-
eral relativity which would deny a universe in which there was a region 
of possible inertial frames. Also, such a universe should include a 
1 
Newtonian collapse of all masses into o.n.e central mass. Therefore 
he explored the possibility of a spatial metric in which there is no flat 
metric at infinity. This proved most unsatisfactory, chiefly because 
the idea of an infinite model involved obvious difficulties. It failed to 
resolve Olbers' and Seeliger's pazmdoxes for an infinite universe. 2 
Also a net residual curvature to space might still remain even if we 
smoothed out all the curvature around each ponderable body. As a con-
sequence he presented an alternative finite model. 
In this model matter was distributed uniformly (on the large scale) 
but without relative motion. The appropriate metric Einstein considered 
to be a Riemannian space of constant positive curvature, i.e. a closed 
space. The curvature expressed the residue remaining after the smooth-
ing out mentioned above.3 Now it is rather clear that such a static 
1. See A.E. Einstein et al, PR, p. 133. 
2. A. Einstein in Milton K. Munitz (ed.), TU, p. 275. 
3. It must be noted that there is a curvature to space even without the 
additional term noted below. It simply makes possible a static dis-
tribution of matter, as Einstein believed observation demanded. See 
A.E. Einstein et al, PR, p. 188. 
model is hardly consonant with the idea of general relativistic motion,, 
but this Einstein and others resolved only later. The model involved 
then no important relative motion of galaxies so that their world-lines 
(which are geodesics along the time-direction of space-time) cannot 
diverge or converge. Since they are parallel, one can say that the uni-
verse has a straight time-direction, or that the universe is cylindrical 
in time though spherical in space. 
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Such a universe, however, cannot fit the early field equation 
G--""u-~~ ..... v·G=-K·"[;. 11 without change. One may introduce a constant 
universal negative pressure, proportional to the density of matter in 
space, to provide such a resolution but there was at this time really no 
physical evidence for this. Consequently Einstein sought to amend the 
field equations by an additional tensor A '3-" that retained the tensor 
character of the left hand side, which indeed becomes the most general 
second-order tensor consonant with the requirements of the field itself.1 
Here /\ = 1/Rz and is thus a cosmic constant of curvature (where R is 
the net radius of curvature of space), but it is also proportional to the 
mean density of the uniform distribution of matter assumed. Hence the 
amount of matter in the universe must depend on its radius in a s pheri-
cal model. 
The model has several interesting properties. Firstly, local ir-
regularities in the metric still handle the gravitational attraction of 
1. See A.E. Einstein et al, PR, p. 186. 
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bodies, though these are insufficient to destroy large -scale stability. 
Indeed, the cosmic constant is really descriptive of a sort of repulsion 
superimposed upon gravitational attraction so as to cancel it out on the 
large scale. Secondly, a ray emitted from any source will travel on a 
closed geodesic, thereby making it theoretically possible that the light 
from a star would reconverge on its initial source given sufficient 
time. Since stars will move locally in the model we might see a 
'ghost' quite like the source star were it not for the fact that local spa-
tial irregularities would likely distort the focus. Thirdly, the curvature, 
while taken as positive by Einstein, need not be so for the universe to 
have finite density or to fit such observations as were available to him.1 
Fourthly, the cosmic constant seemed to prevent there being any solu-
tions for the field equations if the universe contains no matter - a factor 
Einstein considered important since the 1_.._ 11 's control both the gravita-
tional and-inertial field at a point, and these would vanish were no mat-
ter available, thereby contradicting Mach's idea of the origin of inertia 
to be discussed later. Finally, the model curves only space and not time. 2 
1. Another reason for choosing a spherical, rather than some other, 
closed system lies in the constant curvature of the former so that 
all points are equivalent. Einstein mentions this homogeneity idea 
in his paper in M.K. Munitz (ed.), TU, pp. 277-27 8. 
2. This may be seen by noting the equation for a small spatial interval 
in Einstein's 1916 paper, ds 1 = -R-tJC~-~z.S,N 2X(t:i'8~.s"vze,.{'p~z)+c:z.~t:z. 
where x" tJ, ¢ are angular variables fixing a point. Note the 
independence of the time term ! 
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There is inherent in this the flavor of an absolute character to time, 
seemingly repugnant to the rest of relativistic theory as Einstein saw 
it. 
We may also summarize Einstein's arguments in favor of his mo-
del rather briefly before moving on. Firstly, it does not a priori limit 
general relativistic assumptions regarding the variability of the poten-
- 1 
tials ?.-v to regions other than that at great distances from matter. 
Secondly, it eliminates boundary condition problems for spatial infin-
2 
ity. Thirdly, it fitted the small stellar velocities generally considered 
to obtain in his time. 3 Fourthly, it handles inertia as conditioned by 
matter, as in Mach.4 And finally, "this view is logically consistent. and 
from the standpoint of the general theory of relativity lies nearest at 
hand. 115 
Whatever its favorable points might be, Einstein •s model turned 
1. A. Einstein et al, PR, pp. 177, 180. 
2. Ibid., p. 183. 
3. Ibid .• pp. 183, 188. 
4. LOC. cit . ., Also, A. Einstein in M.K. Munitz (ed.), TU, p. 279. 
5. Ibid., p. 188. For analysis of Einstein's cosmological model see 
E. Findlay-Freundlich, Cosmology, pp. 48, 51-53; G.C. McVittie, 
General Relativity and Cosmology (London: Chapman & Hall Ltd., 
1956 ), p. 181; G.C. McVittie, Cosmological Theory (London: 
Methuen & Co., 1952). p. 64; R.C. Tolman, RTC,. pp. 331-345; 
Sir E. Whittaker, HTAE, II, p. 183; Hermann Bondi, Cosmology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1952 ), pp. 90-98; Leopold 
Infeld in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), AE, pp. 477-485; H. Tornehohm, LATR, 
pp. 137 -138; G.J. Whitrow, SEU, pp. 101-105; and J.L. Synge, RGT, 
pp. 179-184. A fine popular account is Arthur Eddington's, 
The Expanding Universe (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1958) 
but it suffers from inexactness. 
out to have a fatal flaw of a purely theoretical nature - the field equa-
tions turn out to have a solution in the absence of mass even with the 
A term! Of course there are other difficulties both in its logical 
and theoretical foundations as well as in any attempt to apply it now 
that we know., since Hubble, of the red-shift in distant galaxies. But 
this particular failing is crucial to Einstein's fourth argument above 
and will be explored here. The criticism is due to de Sitter. 
Very soon after Einstein's paper, de Sitter showed that 
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G..uv- ~ ~-~~· G +A G_. 11 =- 1<. • ~v could have a solution for -z:,=o,~ that is 
for empty space. Einstein had thought that if .i\ were positive he could 
obviate such a solution. This he had thought important, since Mach's 
principle had to be, somehow, tied into the field equations. He desired 
to make the 1-l} potentials fully determined by the distribution of mass 
and energy in the universe. Thus he had resolved the problem of choos-
ing boundary conditions to accomplish this, apparently impossible in an 
infinite space., by introducing a closed space which was unbounded, though 
finite, filled with diffused matter. An empty universe should then have no 
inertial field since this would make it impossible to determine the pot-
tentials. A finite distribution of matter in closed space seemed the only 
way to establish an inertial frame. 
De Sitter, however, showed that Mach's principle is not so resolved 
in general relativity. But the new model has other interesting facets of 
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a more positive nature.1 Its interval equation 
c( .s .z. =-If ~~;x ~-!f 3..:sntlz.~ (aez.rSNI/zt!J r.f¢ 2)+ R 2cas 2 ,X ~t:~ 
reveals one such facet. We note that time is no longer as independent 
as in Einstein's interval equation mentioned earlier. Time, as well as 
space, has a 'curvature'· Time is proportional to .s.cc J(. for a hypo-
thetical observer at rest (i.e. one where de~.J dfl and d'r-are all zero). 
It can be shown that, as a consequence, the period of vibration of light 
will increase the farther we are from the emitter, or, to put it differ-
ently, time slows at great distances. A philosophical and physical 
novelty occurs by the mere alteration of one factor in a geometrical 
equation! But we see a new red-shift of a new type (in addition to Ein-
stein's gravitational shift noted earlier) postulated before red-shifts 
were actually demonstrated conclusively to occur in the distant reaches 
of the universe. 2 
2 This reveals a second facet of the model. Einstein's model had a 
large-scale stability arising from balancing cosmic repulsion by gravi-
tational attraction. De Sitter's model lacks such stability. Were one to 
introduce matter particles into it these would recede, because cosmic 
repulsion was dominant, with ever-increasing velocity even if they had 
1. De Sitter's paper ap13eared in the M.N.R.A.S., 78(1917), 10 ff. See 
also Wm. Wilson, 'De Sitter and the Expanding Universe," 
Sci. Prog., 48(1960), 43-47. 
2. With the possible exception of three observations on extragalactic 
nebulae resulting from Silpher's pioneer work in 1912. Two of these 
showed the red-shift and one was inconclusive. 
170 
no initial velocity relative to an observer. Put rather inexactly, one 
may say "de Sitter's world was full of motion but contained no matter, 
while Einstein's world was full of matter but contained no motion." 1 
A third facet is the relation to Einstein's model in terms of 
space-time analogues. We saw that for Einstein space-time was the 
four-dimensional analogue of a cylinder wherein space was spherical 
and time linear. De Sitter finds the analogue in a sphere, since time 
partakes of the curvature. Actually, the ). which in Einstein was equal 
to yRa is here equal to 3/R."· The models thus differ in size relative to their 
respective radii of curvature. Now both men considered this cosmic 
constant to be positive, thereby obtaining a closed space; surely a gra-
tuitous assumption. But de Sitter's ;\ is not connected to the mean 
density of the universe as was Einstein's. Curvature, for de Sitter, is 
an intrinsic property of the space it assumed. In addition, both pre-
sumed a static universe, but whereas Einstein's was truly static, de 
Sitter's was only static because no matter existed in it to show its ex-
2 
pans ion. 
Before we leave these two early models of a static type., let us 
1. S.F. Mason, A History of the Sciences (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul Ltd., 1953 ), p. 461. 
2. Willem de Sitter in M.K. Munitz (ed. ), TU, p. 311. See also G.J. 
Whitrow, The Natural Philosophy of Time (London: Thos. Nelson 
and Sons, Ltd., 1961), p. 240. Also footnote .#2, p. 17 3, 
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mention several points of some pertinence.1 First: both models seem 
to express the limiting cases for static models. There is only one other 
homogeneous static model - that of the special theory of relativity - and 
it is relevant only to the absence of gravitational fields (at least for 
models based on the general relativity theory). 2 Secondly: the cosmic 
constant in both models is present primarily to provide the greatest 
mathematical generality to the field equations and only secondarily be-
cause it seemed essential to describing the properties or curvature of 
the world. 3 Since Taub's work in 1951 the latter has been seen to be 
not entirely valid,. because the unmodified equations (i.e. those in which 
~-= o) may, under certain circumstances yield curved space in the ab-
sence of matter. 4 Thus, where Einstein felt A essential to handling 
matter in space and de Sitter felt it essential to curvature, its real 
ground for both is a logico-aesthetical one. Third: the A. term really 
plays the role of a preventative to introducing a time singularity for 
I?= o. This is a great advantage over many subsequent models which 
1. De Sitter's model is discussed in detail in Erwin Schrodinger, 
Expanding Universes (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press) and in 
the works of Tolman, McVittie, Synge, Whittaker, Finlay-Freundlich, 
Whitrow, and Eddington mentioned earlier. 
2. R.C. Tolman, RTC, pp. 333-337. 
3. Compare W. de Sitter in M.K. Munitz (ed.)., TU, pp. 311-312 and 
footnote #3, p. /6 ¥. 
4. A.H. Taub, "Empty Space-Times Admitting a Three Parameter 
Group of Motions," Ann. of Math. 53(1951), 472 ff. 
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must labor mightily to escape the same problem, but it is obtained only 
at the expense of using models poorly suited to the actual observations 
of nature as we know them today. One suggested escape, to be discussed 
later, is to place the Einsteinian model asymptotic to our universe long 
ago and the de Sitter model asymptotic to a distant future state. 
In the years immediately following 1917 considerable effort went 
into digesting the import of the preceding two models. It was quite clear 
that in Einstein's model the radius and density were both fixed by A J 
so that. if matter extended far enough and was uniform, space will curve 
into a closed sphere of radius R. But such a sphere was in equilibrium 
under gravitational attraction and cosmic repulsion, and this hardly 
seemed to fit accumulating observations interpreted as the recession of 
distant galaxies. This problem we will discuss separately later, but it 
turned attention to the theoretical recession implicit in de Sitter's mo-
del. Here there was no matter and repulsion of hypothetically-
introduced particles went on unopposed. Attention thus turned to the 
possibility of models of very low density apprcximating that of de Sitter, 
but also to the A. term itself which seemed empirically ad hoc. 
In 1922, the Russian, Friedmann, introduced the possibility of ob-
taining a model whose radius was a function of time. 1 The unusual 
1. A. Friedmann, "Uber die Krummung des Raumes," Zeit. fur Physik, 
10(1922). 377ff. 
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character of this suggestion is accentuated by his allowing the possible 
rejection of the A term used by de Sitter in obtaining his model contain-
ing hypothetical recession. 1 
We may recall that Einstein had assumed that A was positive. One 
reason for this was that a universe containing particles of matter and 
radiation will exhibit pressures such as radiation pressures, cohesive 
pressures, and, in analogy to a gas, kinetic pressures. Such pressure 
in his model must be everywhere the same (for isotropy and homogen-
eity) and he gave the equation (l'~.r')F{-t)=o to describe this. Here ;0 
is the density of matter, tfl is the pressure, and F is a function of dis-
tance ../2., But his assumption, regarding the constancy of pressure 
with distance, he thought necessitated r(-4)=0, De Sitter, on the other 
hand, took (/'+'_.P=oJ while if F{-l)=~+;a=o we have Euclidean space 
and the special theory of relativity. Now if .F~)=~ Einstein showed 
that it follows that the pressure should be positive or only weakly nega-
tive. And this required that ;0 must be sufficiently large to prevent/' 
being more than weakly negative at most. But since A= 'flT(r'""'":s-~)~ A 
must be positive (and consequently so must YRl ). 2 It was the study of 
1. It is interesting to note that, in the same year, Cornelius Lanzos 
also showed that de Sitter's model could be transformed into a model 
of variable radius by substituting coordinates in de Sitter's ds 2 
interval equation which were functions of time. 
2. See the discussion in Paul Couderc, The Expansion of the Universe 
(London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1952), pp. 151-153 and in H. Torne-
bohm, LA TR, pp. 139-147. 
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reconciliations of models containing matter with the gravitational field 
equations so as to give no negative pressures that led Friedmann to 
the recognition that this could be done even if i\ :;; 0. 
Actually he derived solutions for A ~ o, but let us study his solu-
tions for zero cosmical constant, reserving the others for later analysis 
elsewhere. It is the zero case which is in the most striking contrast to 
our earlier models. Friedmann started with an isotropic model for 
space, but one in which the density of matter varied with time. When he 
finished he had shown that such a model could not be static for the case 
of a closed universe (i.e. in the case of + curvature). It is notable that 
he ignored the other possibilities wherein curvature might be negative 
or zero. 
1 It was not until Heckmann's work in 1931 that both the curva-
ture and the cosmic constant were given negative, zero, and positive 
values together in a rigorous treatment. In the case of this curved spa-
tial form, which is positive, it can be shown that it will have a radius 
expanding from zero to a given maximum and back again, perhaps in-
definitely. 2 This model then removes the need for a singularity for the 
time at which expansion begins, since the model may pulse endlessly. 
The immediate issue was to determine whether this model fitted 
observation. Obviously the tests would ascertain only which phase in 
1. But see his discussion of the possibility of negative curvature in 
Zeit. fur Physik, 21(1924), 326 ff. 
2. See Appendix F, Note 1 for a brief mathematical treatment. 
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the expansion-contraction cycle our universe might be in, and for how 
long this might have obtained. This discussion we will reserve until the 
following chapter. But we may note that Friedmann's study was largely 
ignored and immediate attempts at empirical study of its consequences 
were therefore not attempted. It was not until five years later that a 
A 1 
Belgian, Abbe Lemaitre, restudied similar questions. 
1\ In Lemaitre 's discussion the field equations involving were 
given scrutiny anew. His 1927 paper, therefore, anlayzed the universe 
of Einstein and de Sitter in detail since they both conceived the cosmic 
constant to be necessary, and indeed even evaluated it as positive. First, 
let us look at Einstein's model. We recall that this took as propor-
tional to the mean density of diffused matter and radiation in the universe. 
Of course he recognized that in actuality it is 'clumped' into stars and 
galaxies, but this divergence from the model was assumed to disturb the 
general gravitational-repulsional stability only locally. However, 
Lemaitre argued that such 'clumping' destroys the precise balance of the 
gravitational attraction and cosmic repulsion in general so that the latter 
predominates and the universe expands in those portions where the stars 
and galaxies have formed. Any condensation thus causes expansion, and 
since expansion increases the distance between 'clumped' matter, the 
1. Translations of this work are, "A Homogeneous Universe of Constant 
Mass and Increasing Radius accounting for the Radial Velocity of 
Extra-Galactic Nebulae," M.N.R.A.S., 91(1931), 483-490 and "The 
Expanding Universe," Ibid., pp. 490-501. 
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original equilibrium is yet further upset so that expansion proceeds at 
an accelerating rate indefinitely. 
The de Sitter universe he also criticized. De Sitter had considered 
that the actual universe was likely of sufficiently low density to approxi-
mate his empty model, with distortions in the metric in the immediate 
vicinity of matter only, leaving the generally static and curved universe 
~ . 
unaffected. Now, however, Lema1tre argues that matter, no matter how 
diffuse, will move under the cosmic repulsion and scatter in all directions. 
Only if matter is quite densely distributed can gravitation overcome this. 
Thus de Sitter's model, if applied to our universe, cannot be static unless 
the latter highly fortuitous circumstance arises precisely. 
Consequently, in 1930, he gave further consideration to the manner 
in which the actual universe might be described, the above models having 
failed. He suggested that the universe might have begun as an Einstein 
form, but this was unstable and has expanded or contracted ever since 
condensation began to occur. However. no matter is added to the universe 
as time passes, and since observational work by Hubble and others shows 
that it expands, matter becomes more and more rarified as 'clumping' 
goes on. Consequently, our universe is evolving toward the form de-
scribed by de Sitter. The equation describing this is the Friedmann 
equation which relates i\ to the rate of expansion, the total mass, and 
the radius of the model. 
With the increasing observations of red-shift in distant galaxies, 
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and with this interpretation of them as due to the expansion of space, 
it became possible to estimate the mass and size of the universe, 
assuming the expansion rate could be related to the shift as a Doppler 
effrect and not as due to an Einsteinian gravitational shift, a de Sitter 
time retardation, or something else. Indeed one can estimate the size 
of the early Einsteinian form! Hubble's new shift-distance work in 1929 
was indeed so used, but we will leave its discussion until later. Here 
1\ 
we may note instead that Lemaitre subsequently revised his picture to 
incorporate even a pre-Einsteinian stage, one in which matter was 
highly compressed in a very small space - indeed into a primordial 
atom. However, because of instability, this explodes instantly and the 
1 Einsteinian and later forms arise subsequently. 
We will be turning to an analysis of other interpretations of the 
Einstein-to-de Sitter model later, so it may be well to take this oppor-
A 
tunity to outline in some detail Lemaitre 's recent thought on his own 
model, now over twenty-five years old. We will use the systematic 
analysis he himself gave it. 
(1) He considered space locally to exhibit elliptical topology, and on the 
1. Five of his most important papers from 1929 to 1945 are printed to-
gether in Georges Lema1tre, The Primeval Atom, trans. B.H. and 
S.A. Korff (New York: Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1950). See also 
"The Primeval Atom Hypoth~is and the Problems of th~ Clusters of 
Galaxies" by him in R. Stoops (ed.), La Structure et !'Evolution de 
l'Univers (Brussels: Inst. Intern'!. de Physique Solvay, 1958), 
pp. 1-31. 
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grounds that the universe will exhibit similar distributions of matter 
beyond the present range of visibility. the universe itself must be closed 
into a spherical or elliptical form with a radius some ten times that of 
the region which we can see. 1 
(2) Quantum theory reveals that a physical system may be described as 
an assemblage of potential states. The most probable distr~bution is 
for all these states to be occupied and the least probable is for only one 
to be. The degradation of energy (i.e. the tendency to increased entropy) 
describes the tendency of energy to split into more and more 1bits 1, 
while a minimum entropy would describe a single 'bit'. as yet undivided. 
Such a minimum state cannot evolve from something earlier, so we have 
a beginning state as simple as can be described physically. Subsequent 
splitting is a priori indeterminate. and only when the number of energy 
'bits 1 becomes very large can we use the predictability offered by laws 
describing large numbers of unpredictable phenomena. 2 
(3) Some day. when we really understand the nature of atomic processes 
and also why our universe has the finite mass that it has. we will be able 
to describe this first quantum unit. Until then we may call it a primeval 
atom, but even then the essential unpredictability of its later division 
l. G. Lemaitre in R. Stoops (ed.}, SEU, pp. 2-3. 
2. Ibid., pp. 4-7. One will argue that his application of quantum inde-
terminacy is quite debatable. However, one can discuss the primeval 
atom per se without tying it in to atomic physics. This we will do 
later. 
will never allow a fully deductive theory~ based on its nature~ to be 
derived. 'Deductive cosmology cannot begin before the splitting has 
proceeded far enough to reach practical macroscopic determinism." 1 
(4} Cosmology begins with 'zero' space expanding and filling up with 
pieces of the primeval atom. These pieces then lose kinetic energy 
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in proportion to the expansion~ i.e. as YR. (Velocity here is measured 
as a difference between the velocity of the piece and the normal velocity 
of the substratum at that point. If we assume both velocities have the 
same direction~ then if a particle has an abnormally high velocity it 
will simply move on to reach places where the normal velocity is grea-
ter). "We must therefore look for a notable attenuation of the relative 
velocities of atoms in the first period of expansion. 2 
(5) The initial fragments disintegrated into protons~ electrons, and 
gamma radiation. The fragments thus became smaller and many of them 
have disappeared. Some still remain in the form of uranium or thorium 
atoms, for example, because of a long half-life (i.e. a slower disinteg-
ration). 3 The emitted radiation and particles exist today as one source 
of what we call cosmic rays. 4 After a few billion years of expansion 
1. G. Lemaitre in R. Stoops (ed.)~ SED, p. 8. 
2. Ibid., pp. 10-12 and G. Lemaftre, PA, p. 143. 
3. G. Lemaitre, PA, p. 142. -
4. G. Lemaitre in R. Stoops (ed.), SEU, pp. 10-13, 29. 
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most of the naturally-occurring atoms we know had been deformed and 
had settled down into a statistical equilibrium in the form of gas. 1 This 
was the Einstein universe, a space-time equilibrium with space full of 
matter and radiation. After several billion years the gas condensed lo-
cally into proto-galaxies and, under the resultant repulsion, space re-
sumed its expansion in these regions. 2 Some regions, where the gas is 
not yet condensed remain today as cosmic dust clouds and nebular clus-
ters. Were we to determine their density we could have an idea of the 
3 density of the Einstein stage, whereof they are a sample. At present 
the rather general expansion has proceeded for some four billion years 
and we are currently, as we move toward a de Sitter state, about 100 
times the volume of the above Einstein stage. 
(6) The present observations of Hubble's radius, together with the Fried-
mann equations, yield a density of 10-27 gm./ c.c. at present. Now, to 
have a density equivalent to an atomic nucleus as we know it, the radius 
would have had to be about 10 13 ems .. Thus the radial size of the prime-
1 . 10-14 4 va atom IS that of our present universe. The age we give the 
I. Because collisions are then elastic and not sufficiently violent to 
A 
cause nuclear transformations. See G. Lemaitre, PA, p. 143 and 
G. Lemaitre in R. Stoops ~ed.), SEU, pp. 13-14. -
2. Ibid., p. 152 and G. Lemaitre in R. Stoops (ed.), SEU, p. 14. 
--- ---3. Ibid., p. 153. 
--- ~ 4. Ibid., p. 140 and G. Lemaitre in R. Stoops (ed.), SEU, pp. 23-24. 
universe will depend on how closely the Einsteinian static conditions 
were fulfilled. The range he suggests is of the order of 20-60 billion 
1 
years; preferably the lower half of this range. 
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Let us turn, before leaving Lema'ttre for the present, to the aru-
ments he suggests are involved in the formation and validation of his 
theory. One may note first his rejection of any a priori esthetic de-
sign which the universe we do not see must have. Rather we should 
move from the character of our neighborhood to more distant regions. 
If our neighborhood exhibits, for example, spatial curvature and we 
find matter continuing to the far reaches of our telescopes, then we 
may assume curvature there also. We can show that it will be suffi-
cient to close space on itself in a volume some thousand times the cur-
rent range of our viewing (assuming a density of 10-27 gms./c.c.).2 
Secondly, he regards the static solutions of Einstein and de Sitter to be 
the product of an unconscious predilection, quite independent of the 
fact they do not fit modern observation. Thus he renews Friedmann's 
3 
studies of changing models. 
Thirdly, he is convinced that quantum indeterminacy has funda-
mental lessons for cosmology to learn. It removes detailed predicta-
bility from the model, the more so as we go back in time where laws 
l. G. Lemaitre in R. Stoops (ed.), SEU, p. 24. 
2. Ibid., p. 3. 
3 .. Ibid., p. 4. 
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of large numbers of events cannot apply. It also shows us that we will 
never be able~ even in thought, to describe the earliest state except in 
a tangential manner. 1 Connected with this is a fourth facet. The begin-
ning involves the start of any notions involving change and diversity. 
Space and time are such notions~ so that the primeval atom is the ground 
of space-time. Also, being inaccessible, it allows one to conceive it as 
created or to make it consonant with naturalism. 2 
A fifth point is his rejection of the pulsating model of Friedmann 
and others because the initial matter of the universe would be in a 
state of maximum entropy being the resultant of an earlier contract-
ing phase. But fresh matter should have minimum entropy, so that in-
stead of being a 'gas' in statistical equilibrium, it is unstable and forms 
an assemblage of 'bits 1 travelling in all directions. 3 The latter models 
he believes better fits subsequent stages of development in the universe. 
As a sixth point let us stress his repeated claims that varied aspectsof 
his theory have testable consequences. Notable are the requirements 
that primary cosmic rays should be less abundant in interstellar hydro-
gen than in stellar matter 4 and that intergalactic gas should have a 
5 desnity approximating the galaxies themselves; neither being usual 
in other models. 
1. G. LemaTtre in R. Stoops (ed.), SEU., pp. 4-6, 8. 
2. Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
3. Ibid., p. 9. 
4. Confirmed, he believes. Ibid., p. 12. 
5. As yet unconfirmed, he says. Ibid., p. 23. 
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Consonant with his first point, and alternative to the sixth, is the 
A 
belief which Lemaitre expresses in the ability of his model to handle 
observations handled only to varied degrees by other models. Here he 
mentions the abundance of hydrogen in the nebulae, 1 the small amounts 
of some light elements in the stars, 2 the existence of gas clouds within 
galaxies, 3 and the clustering of galaxies. 4 Finally, an eighth point is his 
use of the cosmic constant. De Sitter and Einstein dropped the constant 
after the work of Friedmann and others, as we will see. With this Le-
maitre did not agree, considering it essential to uniting geometry with 
gravitation, possibly furitful to future work toward unifying general rela-
tivity and quantum theory, 5 and perhaps even of use in some fundamental 
theory (such as Eddington's to be analyzed later). 6 Along with this went 
an additional assumption that the finiteness of the universe more natur-
7 
ally follows from a positive curvature than from an open model. 
After this rather lengthy hiatus in our outline of models involving 
A 
expansion, let us resume our study. While Lemaitre 's views are well 
known today among cosmologists, they went unnoticed in the little-known 
Belgian journal in which they appeared until de Sitter and Eddington drew 
1. G. Lemaitre in R. Stoops (ed.), SEU, p.l2. 
2. Ibid., p. 13. 
3 • Ibid., p. 17. 
4. Ibid., p. 24. 
5. Ibid., p. 15. See also G. Lema1tre, 'The Cosmological Constant," in 
P.A. Schilpp (ed.), AE, pp. 439-456 and Einstein's reply, pp. 684-685. 
6. Ibid •• p. 27. 
7. Ibid., p. 26. 
attention to them and they were published in English as we noted ear-
lier. In the interval of three years1 H.P. Robertson independently 
1 
analyzed the possible models involving changing size but in a novel 
fashion - he used a kinematic approach ignoring the dynamical field 
equations of general relativity entirely. 
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It is important to notice here an important point which has been im-
plied in our earlier discussion. The metric of space-time and the top-
ology of the universe are not the same1 and models can be derived giving 
different topologies for varied matrices independent of the field equations 
of general relativity. For example1 Einstein's metric (given on p. 166 
footnote "'2 )1 depending on how it is arranged connectively~ might take 
2 
a spherical form or an elliptical form. Combined with the field equa-
tion containing A (since1 via the 1-., metric tensor1 known through the 
metric equation above, the left hand side oft he field equation could be 
determined except for A ) one could determine1 from the value given 
the matter-energy tensor ?:11 the actual value of A . Taking matter 
constant in amount and at rest on the average1 Einstein's model deman-
ded Z:.u vanish except for a component representing the density of mat-
ter in it1 and using empirical values for this~ one could ascertain R 
"1 _ I/ z 
and then " - / R . This shows the separate role of the metric, topology 1 
1. H.P. Robertson, "On the Foundations of Relativistic Cosmology, 11 : 
Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci., 15(1929)1 822-829. 
2. See pp. ''o-z. and L. Infeld in P.A. Schilpp {ed.), AE, pp. 481-483. 
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and field equation quite clearly. 
Such considerations led Robertson to seek the most general qua.-
dratic metrical equation that could form an isotropic and homogeneous 
universe in a coordinate system wherein the fundamental particles 
would be at rest. Now a congruence geometry can be derived with posi-
tive .. zero, and negative curvature and each can describe the homogeneous 
1 
and isotropic space we consider the universe to have. Each geometry 
has its own matrix equation representing the line interval in that system. 
If' to this we add a fourth time dimension, preserving isotropy and homo-
geneity in the new manifold, we can develop the three metrical equations 
to fit these three curvature ranges also. But within these three general 
forms are infinitely many topologies tor various values of the constants 
involved! Robertson's work reveals the need for restrictions, given by 
experiment to the tensors of the field equations, involving the actual phy-
sica! nature of the world. The topologies, says general relativity, must 
~ be delimited by the field eqq.ations. This we will now do in Appendix F. 
Our conclusion .. in Note 2 ot the appendix, is that one has broadly 
four types of models (including two cases for ~ =o) with an infinity of 
specific cases theoretically possible in each. But it must be apparent 
that yet many other infinities are available to us. Perhaps space is not 
1. Se_e pp. tt.o-t6z. 
2. ~ee Appendix F, Note 2. 
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quite isotropic and homogeneous and the metric equations must be 
altered. Perhaps the field equation should involve A -Fo. Perhaps one 
may deny their validity in general (or at least in the hyperdense state). 
Possibly one may merge the models in varied ways. And perhaps one 
may deny the constancy of the mass and radiation in our universe. All 
this quite apart from empirical problems such as ascertaining the den-
sity or rate of recession of nebulae in our actual universe! It is little 
wonder that the above models serve only as guides in later work and 
A 
that# beginning with Lemaitre# the relation of theory to observation in 
these was extensively studied. Collateral with this went a searching 
analysis of the theoretical presuppositions involved in the models# even 
to their roots in special relativity. The rest of our dissertation will 
involve a critique of this work, but for the moment let us turn to the 
1 
work stimulated by Robertson and Lema'ttre. 
Since we do not intend an exhaustive historical study, but only a 
delineation of what is essential to understanding the grounds of choice 
among models as seen by their various proponents and antagonists, we 
may select what now appears to be the important analyses beginning in 
the early thirties. One of the most valuable of these was the analysis 
of the general types of models obtained when A is retained in the field 
1. See also H.P. Robertson, EU, pp. 147-167 and "Geometry as a 
Branch of Physics" in P.A-:-Schilpp (ed.), AE, I, pp. 313-33~ for 
later discussion of his ideas. 
equations and is given values which are positive or negative. Perhaps 
the best sources are the 1933 paper by Willem de Sitter where these 
1 
models are analyzed in some detail, and also his paper of the previous 
year, published in Holland. 
The analysis is similar to that in Appendix F, Notes 1 and 2, and 
we will simply summarize the results here. De Sitter found that, if~ 
is negative, all models for positive, zero, and negative curvature have 
a form like the case of Note One, i.e. they all pulsate. There are dif-
ferences, however. While all moaels have a finite pulsation period, the 
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change in A varies with the magnitude of A . On the other hand, if 
A 1s positive, one obtains an expanding universe :for both zero and 
negative values of curvature, but also a possibility of both expansion 
and oscillation for the case of positive curvature, depending on the mag-
nitude of A . Obviously much depends on the cosmic constant of the 
2 
revised field equation of general relativity! 
In 1930 Eddington had turned to a critical examination of the Ein-
stein model. 3 At the time Eddington was convinced that the universe 
had enough matter to be roughly Einsteinian and yet enough motion to be 
l. W. de Sitter, 110n the Expanding Universe and the Time-Scale, 11 
M.N.R.A.S., 93(1933 ), pp. 628 ff. See also his Kosmos (Cambridge: 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1932), particularly the chapter reprinted in 
Milton K. Munitz, TU, pp. 302-319. 
2. Now see Appendix F-;-Note 3. See also H. Tornebohm, LATR, pp. 135-
147 and H. Bondi, Cosmology, pp. 78-122. 
3. A.S. Eddington, "On the Instability of Einstein's Spherical World, 11 
M.N.R.A.S., 90(1930), 668-678. 
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somewhat like de Sitter's model. As an aid in his search for an inter-
J\ 
mediate solution, Lemaitre offered his work to Eddington •s attention. 
It took much more cognizance of astronomical data than had Robertson's, 
and from then on attention turned to an examination of the vast arrays Of 
models, such as de Sitter was offering, so as to delimit them in some man-
ner. It was this which led Eddington and others to a close analysis of the 
implications of th~ theoretical constructs offered for consideration. The 
impact of Eddington's discovery that Einstein's model was unstable must 
play a pivot role in these analyses! 
We may reserve our discussion of the nature of the instability of 
Einstein's model for a moment in order to point out the implications it 
involved. Einstein had introduced the cosmic constant into his earlier 
1 
field equation for varied reasons: to provide generality, as a preven-
2 
tative to a time singularity for R = 0, as a means to obtaining a finite 
3 
density of matter, and to handle the difficulty of absolute rotation (if 
one had a sphere in empty space), and to provide a repulsion counter-
acting gravity (i.e. to obtain a static model) if we may express his es-
the tic and logical grounds in a variety of ways. But now de Sitter had 
achieved a solution for no mass while retaining the constant ~, (Indeed 
no one has yet found field equations insoluble when no mass is present). 
1. See pp. /o~ 1118-lf>V, 
2. Compare E. Finlay -Freundlich, ~~ pp. 48-49. 
3. Richard C. Tolman, RTC, pp. 339-341. 
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Also by the early 1930's, not only was observation apparently showing 
us a non-static universe, but models were being derived for values of 
A both negative and zero. And, at the same time, here was Einstein's 
1 
presumed stability based upon a positive 1\ proving illusory! 
Einstein re-appraised his introduction of this novel term in the 
light of these events and no longer applied it. This rejection of what he 
had been considering so necessary mathematically, if not physically, 
caused consternation among cosmologists. Just what direction this re-
action took will become clearer as we comment. in the remainder of this 
chapter, on the work of Eddington and others in the years following. 
Einstein's first investigation of a model involving A= o was a gen-
eralization of his original static universe. The metric involved, as a 
consequence, an A2 term allowing for an expanding closed space. In 
1932, a year later, he and de Sitter investigated another model, in this 
case an open one involving no cosmic constant. 2 It also took i! .J the 
curvature, as zero. Thus, in conjunction with their belief that observa-
tions of red-shift in distant galaxies implied expansion, their model in-
volved a finite amount of matter and radiation expanding in an infinite 
Euclidean space.3 Here one could conceive of the matter as uniformly 
1. See the Council Report, "The Expansion of the Univers," M .. NR.A.S .• 
91(1931), 412 and P. Couderc, EU, pp. 136-137. 
'2. A. Einstein and W. de Sitter, "On the Relation Between the Expansion 
and the Mean Desnity of the Universe," Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci., 18(193'2.), 
'2.13ff. 
3. Compare R.C. Tolman. RTC, pp. 415-416. 
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dispersed and exerting negligible pressure, or radiation exerting a 
pressure corresponding to the density term. 
It is interesting to note that Hubble, on whose work the expansion 
was postulated, denied the expanding model! He preferred a static, 
almost Euclidean, model. 1 His reason was that the Einstein -de Sitter 
model led to a dens.ity far larger than that apparent from estimating the 
galactic masses alone so that the difference would have to be made up 
by inter-galactic radiation or matter. Hubble thought this would absorb 
much more light than he felt was the case. The model is, however, an 
attempt to deduce a cosmology rather directly from the galactic data of 
the day. 
These studies turned theoreticians to an analysis of the general 
results we have outlined in Note 3 of Appendix F in terms of models in-
volving physical conditions thought necessary in the light of observational 
astronomy, theoretical physics, and philosophical predilections. In other 
words, restrictions were sought on the rather general analysis we have 
outlined in that Note. Perhaps it would be well to organize this general 
discussion into a systematic and graphic form. 2 The varied models in-
volving both types of field equation offered by Einstein are now available, 
in our new Note, so that we may turn to an analysis of several points 
1. Edwin Hubble, "Effects of Red -Shift on the Distribution of Nebulae," 
Astrophys. Jour. 84(1936), 517ff. See the discussion of this model in 
H.P. Robertson, "Relativistic Cosmology," Pro. Amer. Phil. Soc., 
93(1949), 528-529. 
2. See Appendix F, Note 4. 
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therein which require immediate attention. 
ii. Later Developments, Assumptions and Problems. 
Our remarks here far from exhaust either the questions of inter-
est or even the answers to those we will ask. We will conclude this sec-
tion with a compliation of the former and spend a portion of the next 
chapter on a critique of the answers, but several items require fuller 
explanation before moving on. One such is the relationship of the Ein-
stein state to those evolutionary models connected with it. Eddington, 
we noted above, showed that Einstein's static universe was unstable. We 
recall that in that model the radius is adjusted to the mass it contains 
so that gravitation and cosmic repulsion are in the equilibrium. Edding-
ton pointed out that any small fluctuation will permanently destroy this 
equilibrium. The static relation is given by .3 "~t;ll = R (~- t~-7T~) so 
that;O must equal :A/,_7r for ~z~t'z to equal zero. Now if ,.0 should 
become < X7T i.e. if the universe should expand slightly, c:(z~t-z will 
..,.., } --
become positive and expansion, and consequently further diminution of 
density will go on endlessly. A similar argument will apply for contrac-
tion. The question remaining is, of course, why such a fluctuation should 
occur at all. 
We stated above that we would reserve some of the more recent 
analysis of this point and others until we are dealing with the problems 
of corroborating such cosmological constructs. But certain background 
is requisite and will be noted now. From 1930 to 1934 a variety of 
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analyses on this question appeared. 1 We have already outlined Le-
A 
maitre's discussion of the problem. McCrea and Me Vittie argued, in 
their early notes, as follows. The cosmic constant had been intended 
to provide a negative pressure for a uniform positive density of matter. 
Einstein, in 1931, pointed out that this holds only for a static field, but 
if we remove this restriction there can be a positive uniform density 
with zero pressure for ~ = 0 . Einstein therefore had proposed drop-
ping A , Now if this is so., dzf</dt: z. can never be zero so there is no 
equilibrium state. The problem of finding an agency to start expansion 
dissolves as a result! 
In their joint paper, ''The Expanding Universe," they improved 
upon their above analysis. They pointed out that one might intuitively 
expect that, from what we know of radiation and matter, they are un-
likely to remain in equilibrium but will likely move in the direction of 
one or the other. But McCrea and McVittie concluded only that this 
may or may not determine expansion or contraction: the mathematical 
analysis they use leaves the question unsolved and may even suggest, 
as did their earlier notes, that there is no problem to solve. They 
1. W.H. McCrea and G.C. McVittie, ''The Expanding Universe," M.N.R.A.S., 
92(1932), 7-12 and their earlier notes in the same journal, 91(1930), 
128ff. and 91(1931), 274ff.; G.C. McVittie, ''Condensations in an Expand-
ing Universe," 92(1932 ), 500-518 and "The Mass Particle in an Expand-
ing Universe" in the same journal, 93(1933), 325-339; and Herbert 
Dingle, "On Isotropic Models of the Universe with Special Reference 
to the Stability of Homogeneous and Static States," M.N.R.A.S., 
94(1934), 134-158. . 
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A . 
criticized Lemaitre and Eddington, however, for saying condensation 
has nothing to do with disturbing the equilibrium but that all that is 
needed is for the pressure to change suitably, since this leaves the 
reason for a pressure change as we noted. 
McVittie, in his 1932 paper, developed a theory for the earliest 
stages of the formation of condensation in an Einstein universe once it 
has begun to expand. He concluded the process of formation was pro-
bably complete before the universe had expanded 50%. But he reiterates, 
in his paper of 1933, that no light can be thrown on the question of dis-
turbing the equilibrium initially. Here he is particularly critical of 
1 
Narlikar who had suggested the formation of a condensation is accom-
panied by an increase in A so that expansion would begin. McVittie 
remarks that the proper mass of the whole universe would have to de-
crease if i\. is to increase, and Narlikar fails to show it is the forma-
tion of condensations and not this change in proper mass which actually 
starts the expansion. The question of contraction or expansion without 
a change in proper mass then remains unsolved! 
We may safely leave the question of the mechanism of the pressure 
change held requisite by Eddington I think, as unresolved for the moment. 
The alternative is to accept Lemaftre's solution. 2 Our later studies of 
Gamow, and his co-workers, and their critics will perhaps aid us in re-
1. See his note in the Phil. Mag., 7, 14(1932), pp. 433-436. 
2. Dingle's paper is little improvement on McVittie's work. 
solving the question to our satisfaction. 
Another problem arising from our outline of the models of Note 
Four is the question of singularities occurring in many of them. De 
1 Sitter, in his paper of 1933 was among the first to note that the stars 
seem to be older than estimates of the time that had elapsed since the 
radius of many models was minimal, such estimates being based on 
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the current Hubble data. He believed that the idea of shrinking the uni-
verse to a mathematical point at the beginning of current expansion is 
gratuitous. He believed all one must do is bring the galaxies close to-
gether at this point. There is no doubt this is either to return to a 
static model at this time (which he also assumed, as noted earlier) 
or to assume what must be proven - that a singularity does not exist. 
The question has thus tended to be left in a state little better than this 
among cosmologists, the discussion reverting to philosophers interested 
in the problem. We will analyze their work in the next chapter, but we 
may note a more recent ingenious attempt to avoid the question entirely 
in a manner vastly better than de Sitter's rather ad hoc solution. 
In 1949 Kurt Godel suggested the possibility of a residual angular 
2 
momentum in the material content of the universe. Possibly due to the 
1. Willem de Sitter, "On the Expanding Universe and the Time Scale," 
M.N.R.A.S., 93(1933), 628-634. 
2. Kurt Godel, "An Example of a New Type of Cosmological Solution of 
Einstein's Field Equations of Gravitation," Rev. Mod. Phys., 21(1949), 
447ff. See also his paper in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), AE, II, pp. 557-562. 
Also see discussion in J .L. Synge, RGT, pp. 331-338 and G.J. Whitrow, 
NPT, pp. 257-261. 
belief that the field equations of general relativity imply some sort of 
Machian inertial principle, this idea had been ignored and, if Godel is 
correct, may introduce the possibil~ty of avoiding a singularity in past 
1 
time. This is because, in his model, the local times based on the 
motion of matter in various regions of the model would not fit together 
to give a single time-history for the whole. His analysis points out 
that a single cosmic time requires three-dimensional spaces ortho-
gonal to the world lines of matter, and in his model this is avoided by 
a general rotation of all galaxies relative to what he calls the •compass 
of inertia. ' 
We shall say more about GOdel's work later in examining the ar-
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guments for and against creation as a cosmological concept, but we may 
mention a third problem of rather great importance introduced by Godel. 
This is the possibility of inhomogeneous and non-isotropic models. 
" ' ~ Godel's universes have an absolute rotation of matter (given by c.. .:il = 
rlflT;D ~ where ~=A- ;a is density, and ¥ is Newton's gravita-~ ' ) ~ 
tional constant), thus his model falls in the latter class. But our universe 
might also be more complex than the homogeneous 'fluid' models of 
radiation and matter we have so far studied. Orner and Heckmann have 
discussed such possibilities. Orner's model involves a general expansion, 
but with a velocity differing, at a given time, from place to place. Hence 
1. See the outline of kinematic relativity later for another study of 
this problem. 
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each region has its own beginning in a dense environment expanding to-
ward a de Sitter state in infinite time. 
1 Heckman postulates the presence of some shear and rotation 
everywhere in the motion of matter. We shall see, in our discussion 
of kinematic relativity, in the next chapter, that classical Newtonian 
analogues are possible for the Friedmann models. Heckmann shows 
that all homogeneous analogues with isotropic expansion and rigid ro-
tation can avoid any singularity. All show only a regular maximum of 
density at t = o. Indeed, if we allow this small angular velocity of 
matter we can obtain models with ).. ""0 but infinite time scales~ He 
goes further to construct models from certain solutions of the Einstein 
field questions. These will show a motion of matter asymptotically 
isotropic for t = oo if any anisotropy is present. Finally, he tries the 
development of difficult models showing rotation. These will always 
show shear. He found indications that some of these models have no 
singularity for .i\. ~ o. 
So we may safely say that Godel, Orner, and Heckmann provide 
not only the possibility of avoiding a singularity in time, but suggest 
future work of great importance on anisotropy and inhomogeneity in 
cosmology. 
Let us conclude this section with an outline of the assumptions 
1. See the report of his London lectures in early 1959, The Observatory, 
79(1959), 130-131. 
197 
and problems apparent in the eyolutionary models we have discussed. 1 
Comparing this with a similar summary for competing models~ we may 
then focus sharply on the issues requisite for the last two chapters. 
Also, converging on the discussion at that time will be Popper's analysis 
in Chapter Two and the historical lessons we have learned from Chapter 
Three. 
The major assumptions appear to be as follows. 
(1) Tolman has remarked that 
we have a natural interest and natural pleasure in trying 
to develop the consequences of any set of mathematical 
assumptions without reference [necessarily J to possible 
physical applications. 2 
This express-es rather well the delight of the theoretician but it is ob-
viously applicable to every cosmological scheme of a rational nature. 
Surely we must qualify it then~ for the purpose of this section~ by an-
other remark due to Davidson. "(The] concept of the 'expanding 
universe 1 [is] ... probably the most profound challenge to theoretical 
interpretation in the history of science." 3 Advocates of evolutionary 
1. For bibliography see H.P. Robertson~ "Relativistic Cosmology~" 
Rev. Mod. Phys.~ 5(1933)~ 62ff. up to 1933; 0. Heckmann~ Theorien 
der Kosmologie (Berlin: Springer, 1942) up to 1941; and J .L. Synge~ 
RGT~ for an extensive bibliography up to 1960. H. Bondi~ RC~ also 
has a fine bibliography. A popular study of the Einstein - de Sitter 
model is W. de Sitter~ "The Size of the Universe~" Proc. Astron. 
Soc. Pacific~ 44(1932)~ 89-104. 
2. R.C. Tolman, R.T.C. p, 445. 
3. W. Davidson~ "The Character of the Universe/' Discovery~ (May~ 1961), 
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models in cosmology must certainly agree that the former generally, 
and the latter specifically, is their primary assumption. 
(2) Tolman further remarks, 
[Since] we have based our treatment on acceptable phy-
sical theory, we have the right to expect that the theoretical 
behavior of our models will at least inform and liberalize 
our thinking as to conceptual possibilities for the behavior 
of the actual universe. 1 
While all of this applies also to competing schemes, the distinctives 
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here must be the physical theory taken as basic and the presumption that 
the models developed therefrom best inform and liberalize theory con-
struction in cosmology. 
(3) Tolman considers most important of all 
the right to hope that the models can be so constructed 
as to assist in the correlation and explanation of the ob-
served phenomena of the actual universe, and indeed may 
even be sufficiently representative as to permit some 
cautious extrapolation forward and backward in time, 
which will give us not too fallacious ideas as to the past 
and future htstory of our surroundings. 2 
Thus advocates of these models must claim both a broad synthetic value 
and an explanatory character to their work. Debate then rests on whether 
their theories are best corroborated by observation in astrophysics. Is 
1. R.C. Tolman, RTC, p, 445, See also his statement, "(By studying 
models] we shall certainly make progress in understanding the be-
havior of nature on the largest possible scale, and this presents a 
task as interesting as the human mind can set, and provides a goal 
as noble as the human spirit can conceive." Ibid., p. 333. 
2. Ibid., p. 445. 
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cosmological speculation made more testable than ever before by such 
models? But there is a further point - their usual presumption of suf-
ficient uniformity in nature to allow extrapolation in time and, one might 
add, in space to aspect and regions not now observable. This we will 
call our fourth assumption. 
(4) Most evolutionary models assume a 'cosmological principle'. This 
means that the universe will appear statistically the same at different 
places at the same time. Specifically, most hold that all observers will 
see the distant content of the universe appearing to recede from them. 
This assumes a homogeneity and also a spatial isotropy. With the possi-
ble exception of models like those of Orner, Godel, and Heckmann this is 
assumed in all models and is believed to be confirmed by present obser-
vation. The basic issue is its applicability to unexplored regions and 
times in the distant past and future. It may be possible, however, to 
find ways in which the models involving even anisotropy may aid us in 
finding how cosmological observation might change at such places and 
times. Another problem is whether the 'cosmological principle' is de-
veloped a priori or a posteriori to observation. There is no doubt 
that the latter is important in any satisfaction we may have with the 
empirical value of the models, but the former is of great importance 
since it gives definiteness and mathematical tractability to the models. 
This question we will explore thoroughly later .1 
1. See pp . .ZY'f--307J s..z'l-5"36. 
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(5) But more fundamental in general is the assumption that general 
relativity provides the acceptable physical basis in cosmology. General 
relativity is amplified so as to be related to the entire universe and its 
content, i.e. the general properties of the universe are made to depend 
upon the distribution of mass just as do the properties of a local metric. 
A number of questions arise here. Is it true that all parts of the uni-
verse influence all other parts? Is general relativity itself beyond dis-
pute? And is the fact that the field equations do no~ give unique solu-
tions, so that many varied models are possible, so embarrassing that 
we must rethink the whole basis of our study? While one is reminded 
of de Sitter's comment that 11 [the] theory I have outlined to you is not 
even the theory of today, but perhaps of last month .... Theories are 
continually being improved and adapted to new observed fact, 11 1 which 
is surely commendable, one also gets a feeling of some ad hocness in 
the process. 
Let us recall Bernard Jaffe's remarks. 
The theoretician supplements Einstein's principles by 
functions of his own, adding a new symbol here, remov-
ing another there, changing coefficients or exponents, 
rearranging the formulas when new difficulties appear 
or new interpretations occur to him. Every line repre-
sents the creation of a new universe; every sheet of paper 
that is crumpled and tossed into the waste-paper basket 
signifies a universe destroyed. In the morning he con-
structs and in the evening he tears down, god and demon 
at once. 2 
1. Willem de Sitter, SU, p. 104. 
2. Quoted in Ralph Thiel, And There Was Light, trans. R.C. Winston 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., (1956) 1957), p. 390. 
While1 in a way~ this describes the history of science (and of specula-
tive philosophy)~ Jaffe shows us we must avoid dogmatism most care-
fully and demand corroboration for any conviction the models may 
provide. 
(6) But there must be a caution against undue scepticism. This is the 
assumption~ common to the evolutionary models as well as others 1 that 
mathematical complexity~ and the inability to more than visualize 
models by analogy, is no reason to reject them. 1 First, complexity 
may introduce models with an increasing range of possible application. 
There is no a priori reason, perhaps, for believing that mathematical 
models must be simple if they are to describe the actual universe - but 
of course simplicity as a concept requires more precise dilineation. 2 
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And secondly, visualization is certaintly too abstruse for the non-
mathematician and is usually ignored by the mathematician who prefers 
to stick to his equations. 
Certainly models involving expansion or finitude, though quite ab-
struse, enable us to escape paradoxes like those of Olbers and Seeliger. 
One also recalls the predictions of instability in Einstein's early model 
before there was any real empirical data which might confirm it. Indeed, 
general relativity seems to oppose stability in principle. Here we enter 
the question of the inductive or hypothetico-deductive nature of theoreti-
1. Compare Paul Couderc, EU, p. 142. 
2. One must recall here our discussion of the models of Chapter Three 
and Einstein's thought on economy and simplicity, however. 
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cal constructs. Also, expanding models must, in general, predict non-
negative values for pressure and density in the universe. They also pre-
diet a relationship between spatial curvature and the matter-radiation 
content of the universe. Thus one may conclude that complexity is in-
volved in the ability to make precise predictions potentially testable to 
experience. 
But there remain some major problems in addition to those noted 
above. We may summarize them here for future analysis, grouping them 
in classes of similar character. 
(1) There is first the question of successfully testing constructs in cos-
mology rising from metaphysical predilections or with such implications. 
Dauvillier states, "Une hypothese cosmonogique plausible ne doit presen-
' , 1 
ter aucun caractere metaphysique." But what then of problems like the 
'cosmological principle' involving the possible change of scientific laws 
with time? If some do not, how we decide which these laws are on non-
subjective grounds? Or do only some constants in the laws of nature 
change and are they fundamentally related? We may ask too whether the 
idea of creation is opposed to the spirit of scientific inquiry; whether 
closed models are to be preferred on the grounds that the totality of an 
infinite universe could not be handled scientifically and whether this 
a priori limits the realm of scientific study; whether there is a cosmic 
I. A. Dauvillier, Cosmologie et Chimie (Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1955 ), p. 198. 
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time for the entire universe and whether it is the same as the age of 
the universe; whether 1space' and 'time' are no longer independent 
metaphysical qualities but merely preserve a distinction of operational 
import; and so on? We shall occupy ourselves with these problems, 
1 
at length, later. 
(2) The models postulate relatively simply conditions which may not 
fit the actual universe even closely. But the more general we make our 
theory the more parameters it admits and so the less compelling is any 
particular choice. Thus we choose models that are simple on the grounds 
we can study variations in the uniformity of the background they provide 
for details. Models invovling such ideas as Orner, Godel, and Heckmann 
present may therefore be indicated. 
(3) The problem of i\ still remains. We may ask if it spoils the logical 
simplicity of the original field equations and if it is introduced ad hoc as 
Couderc claims. 2 (One recalls a similarity to Neumann's attempt in 
1896 to add a term to the Poisson equation to avoid the Newtonian pro-
blem of an infinite universe). 3 Einstein later rejected the constant 
since it failed to do what it was designed to do while Weyl, Eddington, 
and others made it fundamental to their system. 4 Tolman rejects it 
on the same grounds as Einstein and also because it can have a precise 
1. See pp.S¥-S-S63J3o7-3'39. 
2. Paul Couderc, EU, p.l36. 
3. Loc. cit., and R..C. Tolman, R.TC, p. 344. 
4. See the following section. 
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value only by ideas like those of Eddington which he believes are pre-
mature.1 Thus we must see if J..f;O has any real value logically and/ or 
empirically. In any case, the A we obtain must not give predictions 
differing with observed planetary motions for example. 
(4) Does the principle that inertia is the product of the physical struc-
ture of the universe fit only the field equations of general relativity? Is 
the principle itself valid or may a revised version including not only 
gravitational but electromagnetic and nuclear forces be required, as 
Weyl claims? 
(5) We may ask if it is true that there are no a priori reasons to prefer 
curvatures in the model which are specifically positive, negative, or nul 
in character. Again, we inquire if the fact that open models, having 
imaginary radii, are hard to conceive has any import. Also, is it of any 
importance to corroboration that if the universe is closed we might prove 
it someday to be so and also determine rather precisely its characteris-
tics but that, if it is open, many ideas of its exact character are always 
possible? This point is based on the realization that one can always 
place a lower limit on the density of the universe (by using the mass of 
the galaxies which we see) but never an upper limit on it (since we may 
miss invisible or dark matter or matter beyond our telescope range). 
(6) Another interesting question is whether such ideas as entropy and 
the conservation of energy and momentum can be applied to the entire 
1. R.C. Tolman, RTC, p. 444. 
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universe. If so, do entropy principles require an origin of the universe 
at one time and a heat death later? Relativisitic thermodynamics, for 
example, shows certain models may oscillate without reaching a state 
1 
of maximum entropy on expansion. 
(7) Again, we may ask whether the galactic red-shift of observational 
astronomy is connected in such a way to expansion constructs that it is 
of use in testing them and if our data on mean density in the visible 
universe is sufficiently precise to aid in A. and curvature problems? 
(8) An interesting problem is be hyperdense state in all models with 
singularities. Is it possible that, since matter and the gravitational 
field are perhaps not distinct here, general relativity may fail in such 
a stage? Or is it possible that the singularities may be avoided by the 
claim that the extrapolation of our limited data is too crude, that we may 
avoid the problem by studies like Heckmann's or by rejecting the univer-
2 
sal application of the conservation of energy, or that our models are 
based upon large-scale approximation so that a very tiny radius may be 
avoidable, in pulsing models anyway, as we refine our construct? Per-
haps one should simply ignore the problem as being outside the realm 
of scientific study - but if one is at all philosophical cane one be so blase? 
Also, should it be assumed in expanding models that all galaxies 
1. Compare Paul Couderc, EU, p. 170. 
2. Bohr, for example, suggests it fails inside stars. 
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are of about the same age? Is there empirical evidence that they are? 
If the universe pulsates, do any evidences of the previous pulse remain? 
In pulsing models~ need the elements in each pulse be the same? Again, 
is Godel right in implying that differing regions of the universe may 
well have their own 'age', to that all parts of the universe need not be 
in the same stage? Is it then possible that observation has not extended 
outside our Godel region and that all the empirical testing that we have 
done provides no clue as a result, to the question of whether he is right? 
,. 
(9) Can the varied models handle, as Lemaitre suggests his does, the 
formation of elements~ stars, galaxies, and cosmic rays? Are any to be 
preferred on this ground a priori or empirically as best achieving such 
a purpose? 
(10) Are certain models obviated by giving ages which are smaller than 
those established for the content of the universe? 
(11) Is it a serious problem in the acceptance of certain models that they 
leave events beyond a fixed distance forever beyond our ken? 
(12) Tests for general relativity apply to the empty spaces around a body 
to distances of the order of the solar system. It is quite different to say 
that it must apply to the universe as a whole, 'filled 1 with matter and 
radiation rather than empty. In extrapolating its utility~ however, evolu-
tionary theorists usually assume that its rationality and inner logic makes 
such wide applicability possible; that galaxy clusters and clusters of 
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clusters may indicate the kind of gravitational action one would predict 
from general relativity; and that it provides the only theory of gravita-
tion applicable to the entire universe, so that, if one is to speculate at 
all, one must use the general theory. Are such arguments of value? 
(13) The actual universe may change in mean density at great distances, 
or the distribution of matter on a very large scale might be erratic. This 
could influence the supposed uniform conditions our models usually give 
the universe, thus making them poorer approximations, but in a way of 
1 
which we might never be aware. Is there any way to see if this is the 
case, and if not, is the problem scientifically meaningful? 
(14) Expanding models predict an approximately linear red-shift with 
distance until the rate of change in N at the time the light is emitted 
becomes important. 2 Can we test this? Can we decide whether expan-
sion has speeded up, remained constant, or slowed down with time? 
(15) The models also assume the pressure due to matter is negligible. 
This is probably confirmed by astronomical evidence. But the models 
also assume the total mass of matter in them is constant too. This ig-
nores the flow of radiation from the galaxies into internebular space. 
The problem here is to estimate this, and above all, to decide if it is a 
3 function of time. This is important in determining how the pressure 
1. R.C. Tolman, RTC, p. 483. 
2. Ibid., p. 393. Compare p. Ho. Appendix F. 
3. ibid. .. pp. 417-419. 
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and density of radiation change with time. In particular~ if the pressure 
decreases regularly with expansion~ Case G models are impossible. 
This lengthy list surely shows the complexity involved both in de-
ciding on the suitability of one evolutionary model over another and in 
comparing their corroborability with competing types of models to be 
outlined in Section Three. Naturally. to many of the problems our an-
swers must be tentative.r but the important thing will be to determine 
their testability in comparison with the implications of the alternative 
model types~ to ascertain whether Popper's work is of value here~ and 
to find just how cosmologists indeed do decide upon their choice of 
model. But two unusual evolutionary schemes must be presented before 
we discuss the alternative steady-state constructs. One of these assumes 
a logical relationship among the fundamental constants and laws of nature. 
The other commonly denies the general relativistic foundation for cosmo-
logy. We dare not ignore either~ since the acceptability of evolutionary 
models might well be influenced to a serious extent by the conclusions 
these provide. 
2. The Fundamental Models of Eddington~ Dirac, and Jordan. 
i. Eddington •s Deductive Model. 
In his history of his thought on the presumed relationship existing 
among certain constants of nature which will provide the first of our 
models here~ Eddington tells us that it was Hermann Weyl whose work 
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first suggested the idea to him. 1 Thus it may be advisable to make a 
few brief remarks on the pertinent portions of Weyl's work before mov-
ing on. 
In 1918, Weyl wrote the first in a long series of attempts by various 
theoreticians to unify electromagnetism with gravitation into one all-
embracing theory. 2 We noted earlier 3 that Einstein conceived this to 
be the goal of all physics, but unlike Eddington he was far from sure that 
4 
Weyl's work carried conviction. The pro's and con's of the conviction 
it carried need not concern us here, though it might be well to note that 
Weyl is hardly unique in the questions his magnificent work leaves open, 
for the development of a unified field theory is still an apparently un-
achieved goal for theoretical workers even after forty years of brilliant 
attempts. What we are interested in is how such a unified theory might 
lead to Eddington's fundamental theory in cosmology. 
We might call Weyl's theory an extension of traditional geometri-
cal ideas, inclusive even of the non-Euclidean systems mentioned earlier. 
The novelty lies in his assumption that two units of length, originally 
1. A.S. Eddington, "The Recession-Constant of the Galaxies," M.N.R.A.S •. 
104(1944), 200. 
2. H. Weyl, "Gravitation and Electricity," reprinted in A. Einstein et al, 
PR, pp. 199-216. 
3. p. IS"?. 
4. Compare A. Einstein, ES, p. ll1 and A. Eddington, Space, Time, and 
Gravitation (New York: Harper & Bros., (1920) 1959), p. 174. 
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coincident, and thus originally identical, will not remain so if they are 
moved through different paths in the geometry he uses. Since this makes 
the comparison of lengths at finite separation indeterminate, to achieve 
useful comparison we must assume only infinitesimal displacements. 
Wey1 suggested that this is best done by considering a standard unit of 
length at each point in space, and relative to which we may measure 
lengths situated beside them. The totality of these unit rods is called a 
'gauge system', and in his system this provides a more complex matrix 
than the varied geometries used in all the models we have discussed so 
far. 
Now just as the intervals, el.s 1 were always given in terms of the 
potentials, j.-u) in our earlier work, here the change in length, A..l1 will 
depend on the displacements so that, for very small displacements, 
A= le,4, +-k.~.4z +ks43 ~h{<4¥, The h~ will vary with the location in 
space. In the earlier models the 1:S describe the field in the neighborhood 
and they determine the geometry of space-time consonant with the law of 
gravity. Here, the ,is describe some field, taken by Weyl as the electro-
magnetic one, and consonant with some appropriate law, taken to be Max-
well's equations. As a result the metric for Weyl's model is a combina-
tion of both the above for a universe containing gravitational and 
1 
electro-magnetic fields. 
1. For detail see H. Weyl, Space, Time, Matter, trans. H.L. Brose 
(New York: Dover Pubns., (1922) n.d.); H. Wey1, The Philosophy of 
Mathematics and Natural Science, trans. 0. Helmer (Princeton: 
Princeton Univ. Press, (1949) 1959); A Eddington, STG, pp. 167-179; 
A. d'Abro, EST, pp. 330-340; E. Whittaker, FEE, pp. 127-131; and 
J .L. Synge, RGT, pp. 354-371. --
electro-magnetic fields.1 
Eddington noted that, whereas earlier models involved a curved 
topology (at least around matter) independent of the metric used, Weyl 
requires that curvature depend on the gauge. One cannot say that the 
curvature is the same at two different points since it depends on the 
gauges assigned to the two points. 
Conversely, the radius of curvature of the world pro-
vides a natural and absolute gauge at every point; and 
it will presumably introduce the greatest possible sym-
metry into our laws if the observer chooses this, or 
some definite fraction of it as his gauge. 2 
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As a consequence, the "curvature of space indirectly provides the gauge 
3 
which we use for measuring the amount of matter in the world." 
We may now turn to Eddington's elaboration on what he conceived 
to be the consequences of Weyl's suggestive ideas. The fundamental 
point here is that Weyl's theory requires that the mass of the universe 
determine the curvature of space-time. "The cosmological factor(.:>..] 
which Einstein added to his theory later is part of ours from the very 
4 
beginning," says Weyl, and to this Eddington adds, ''I would as soon 
think of reverting to Newtonian theory as of dropping the cosmical 
1. For detail s-ee H. Weyl, Space, Time, Matter, trans. H.L. Brose 
(New York: Dover Pubns., (1922) n.d.); H. Weyl, The Philosophy of 
Mathematics and Natural Science, trans. 0. Helmer (Princeton: 
Princeton Univ. Press, (1949) 1959); A. Eddington, STG. pp. 167-179; 
A. d 1Abro, EST, pp. 330-340; E. Whittaker, FEE, pp. 127 -131; and 
J .L. Synge, RGT, pp. 354-371. 
2. A.E. Eddington, STG, p. 176. 
3. Ibid., p. 177. 
4. H. Weyl, STM, p. 297. 
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1 
constant." Just how then does Eddington conceive this credo to apply? 
Eddington makes two points quite clear. First, his suggestions 
are not final but he is certain that he is on the true cosmological path. 
And, secondly, his theory is largely a priori, i.e. it predicts before 
observation what certain properties of the universe will be. 2 For this 
reason we may call his model 'fundamental'. It predicts on the basis 
of Weyl's suggestions, the value of /\. (and thereby the rate at which 
distant nebulae will recede) and the ratio of the mass of the proton to 
that of the electron in a manner which he calls 'building the world. t 3 
The construction begins with the idea that some fraction of the 
curvature of the model is to be used as gauge. "What we call a metre 
at any place and in any direction is a constant fraction 4•!3 :A of the 
radius of curvature of space-time for that place and direction." 4 Thus 
he says that two different hydrogen atoms at different places in the 
model are alike only if each is an identical fraction of the curvature of 
space-time where each is located. Eddington then suggests taking the 
radius of curvature of the entire model, R, as the standard unit of 
length. 
1. A. Eddington, EU, p. 24. 
2. Ibid .• p. 98. See also A. Eddington, The Philosophy of Physical 
SCience (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, (1939)1949), p. 171. 
3. A. Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World (Ann Arbor: The 
Univ. of Michigan Press, (1928)1958), p. 230. 
4. A. Eddington, EU, p. 98. 
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But from R Eddington believes the law of gravitation G~u = ~ cg....,u 
follows, and thus the existence of A . The cosmical constant is ''based 
on a fundamental necessity of physical space •.. and if ever the theory 
of relativity falls into disrepute the cosmical constant will be the last 
stronghold to collapse." 1 Of course, one unstated premise of all this is 
the idea that the world is finite and likely spherical. 
If now we accept the relation which Einstein derived for relating 
the mass of the universe, M, to the radius of his static model (taken by 
Eddington to be the initial state for later expansion as we saw earlier), 
Re given by G M / 2 = ~7T Re (where G is the constant of gravitation), we 
' /C 
may relate this to H as the standard. The route is rather devious but 
we may outline it as follows. If we assume there are N protons and 
electrons in the Einstein universe (in approximately equal numbers) we 
may assume they act upon one another. Indeed, if we consider the mass 
of an electron (say), we will find it is determined by its charge and ~ 
all the other particles in the universe. 
2 
The relation is R/m = efmecz 
(where e. is the charge and me the mass of an electron) utilizing the 
3 
wave equation of quantum mechanics. But we may then substitute this 
in the above relativistic equation of Einstein whereby we obtain "'//? = ;:,; 
(where we consider M::: N~ as sufficiently accurate, the mass of the 
1. A. Eddington, EU, p. 104. 
2. Which Eddington called the 'uranoid'. 
3. A. Eddington, EU, p. lll. 
electrons being so small by comparison) and thus express it in terms 
of R. 1 
2 It is unnecessary here to follow the detail of his argument but 
we may mention certain consequences noted in various of his papers on 
3 
the subject. An early source is his 1931 paper where he claimed to 
calculate A 1 and thus the rate of expansion of the universe~ by pure 
theory. This paper he updated in 1935 4 and in 1944 5~ relating the val-
ues of N~ R~ M~ and /\. by means of the theoretical relations mentioned 
earlier and certain newer experimental data. What is so remarkable to 
Eddington here is the immense size of certain constants in experimen-
tal physics and certain unexpected similarities which turn up in them. 
We saw that Weyl provided the suggestion to Eddington that we 
connect the fundamental constants of atomic physics with the size of the 
universe. Suppose we estimate~ using the best figures of his later work, 
the value of N calculated by combining the 'Y/{ and V.;,v relations of 
6 
the previous page. It is easy to see that N = lTz.e'je zmi> zme z.J and 
1. A. Eddington, Err,;- p. ll2. 
2. Given in particular in his 1946 posthumous publication~ Fundamental 
Theory~ and his earlier Relativity Theory of Protons and Electrons. 
3. A. Eddington~ "The Recession of Extra-Galactic Nebulae," 
M.N.R.A.S., 92(1931), 3-7. 
4. A. Eddington~ 11The Speed of Recession of the Galaxies," M.N.R.A.S., 
95 (1935 ), 63 6 -63 8. 
5. A. Eddington, RCG, pp. 200-204. 
6. This really expresses the square of the ratio of the electrical to 
gravitational attraction between an electron and a proton. 
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-10 e = -st. 7 7 X 10 CGS U N 7? we get =/.57 x 10 • The mass of the universe 
will then be ~ 10 5 s- grams and the corresponding R::::. nuo" light years. 
The limiting speed of recession of the galaxies ( = R/c ) turns out to 
2 be 5-10 x 10 km./ sec./ megaparsec which is that actually observed~ he 
believed! 
One may note then a remarkable identity. The ratio of the electri-
cal attraction to the gravitational attraction is ~ ;;T which in turn is 
the ratio of the radius of the universe to the radius of an electron at 
present! In his 1944 paper he goes on to utilize this to calculate the time 
since the Einstein static universe 'burst' and concludes it to be about 
9 1 4.7 x 10 years. 
Another point which he stresses (in particular in his 1935 paper) is 
7'1' • 2S6 
the fact that N"' /.57 X 10 1S also 13' X 2 (approximately). This 
he considers significant since 256 and 136 are important integers in the 
theory of the double wave vector which is the starting point of general 
relativistic wave mechanics. 2 
This rather Pythagorean analysis represents one of the most un-
usual attempts at synthesis in the entire history of science. But is it 
1. He adds an estimate of the time preceding this. about 86 x 109 'l~ars 
based on the assumption c;:ondensations were already present~ there 
being insufficient time for mere gravitational instability to cause the 
expansion. 
2. A. Eddington~ PPS, pp. 170-179 and also his NPW~ pp. 232-237. 
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satisfying in the sense that its assumptions are convincing? Very few 
theoreticians consider it to be, although few have been capable of hand-
ling all aspects of this highly difficult theory. Let us look for a moment 
at the assumptions of the theory, and then proceed to point out certain 
questions which they riase. As has been our practice in the earlier 
models, most of our analysis of what cosmologists think of these will be 
considered only when we reach the next chapter. 
Eddington's assumptions should not be difficult to discover since 
his writings are both prolific and generally perspicuous. We have already 
mentioned these: his a priorism with its adjunct of 'world building', and 
his rather precise ideas as to the origin and closed finite nature of the 
universe. What does the former mean for him? In essence it signifies 
that "not only the laws of nature but the constants of nature can be deduced 
from epistemological considerations, so that we can have an a priori 
knowledge of them." 1 The constants referred to are the ratio of the 
masses of the electron and the proton, the fine structure constant of 
atomic theory, the gravitational constant, and the number of particles in 
the universe, and from these one can construct the world of physics. Im-
plied is the idea that an intelligence unacquainted with our world, but able 
to see the way we think, should be able to attain the knowledge we have of 
1. A. Eddington, PPS, p. 58. 
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the universe and its content. 
But what he actually does here is to begin with an elaborate type 
of relativity inclusive of gravitational and electromagnetic theory, and 
therein, with his own version of both cosmological and quantum mech-
anics, claim to deduce certain very embracing but specific conclusions. 
This is closer to his version of a priorism than the pure rationalism 
he is usually held to have had. In it knowledge is placed prior to ob-
servation but not to the development of the plan for observation. 1 
A priorism then, as Eddington uses the term, is not the usual philoso-
phical one but rather the use of certain relativistic and quantum ideas 
to construct a model for the systematizing of nature, testable by later 
experiment. This is really an odd version of the hypothetico-deductive 
method then - the hypothesis being the product of the kind of pure thought 
and application of previous science which is rather peculiar to Eddington 
and knowable to an intelligence unacquainted with our world only if he is 
acquainted with Eddington's thought processes! 
Of course Eddington claims that, our minds being what they are, 
if we think consistently, we can see that past physics must eventuate in 
the conclusions it has reached about the general laws governing the world 
as it appeared to our minds. We need not examine the rather Kantian 
1. A. Eddington, PPS, p. 24. For a critique see E.F. Caldin, The Power 
and Limits of Science (London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1949 ), pp. 93-
104 and Sir James Jeans, Physics and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, (1942 )1948), pp. 72-78. 
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1 
epistemology implicit here, but Eddington would have to show us why 
experiment has had to play so large a part in past physics if it is all so 
apparent to pure thought~ why one would have to be inconsistent to be-
lieve the laws to differ from what they are, and why not everyone finds 
his peculiar relativistic and quantum theories so obvious 2, and this he 
appears to fail to do. Rather, in the light of our remarks earlier~ we 
must examine briefly his presumed deduction of the fundamental laws 
and constants of physics, in the form of a certain model, from his pre-
mises. 
Let us first outline a number of problems. 
(1) Is the initial base, a Weylian unified theory, acceptable for the pur-
poses Eddington gives it? The answer here must be no. It is apparent 
that the unified theory is not self-evident as a necessary plan for obser-
vation. Eddington attempted, with great labor, to show that it is the 
necessary product of the way we think 3 but hardly anyone has agreed 
1. Extensive analysis may be found in Johannes Witt-Hansen, Exposition 
and Critique of the Conceptions of Eddington Concerning the Philosophy 
of Physical Science (Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gads~ 1958); John Yolton, 
The Philosophy of Science of A.S. Eddington (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1960); Susan Stebbing, Philosophy and the Physicists (New York: 
Dover Pubns., Inc., (1937)1958); and the various Eddington Memorial 
Lectures at Cambridge University. 
2. For example Max Born, Experiment and Theory in Physics (New York: 
Dover Pubns., Inc., (1943 )1956 ), pp. 36-38. 
3. See his Fundamental Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1946), 
published posthumously. Also his PPS, pp. 177ff. 
even that it has served as a useful hypothesis for unifying physics, let 
1 
alone that we must agree with it. Whether they are justified we will 
discuss in Chapter Five. 
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(2) His assumption of a closed and finite universe with its initial stage 
a static Einsteinian one is gratuitous. Of course his view of .i\ as posi-
tive plays a part in this, but it too is assumed on the basis of the unified 
2 
theory. Thus, while his model might be correct, only experiment will 
reveal its tenability to us! 
3 (3) No one doubts the brilliance of his attempted synthesis , but many 
doubt both the necessity of the deductions involved and Eddington's 
4 
epistemic assumption that the laws obtained are prescriptive. Now 
Eddington believes that his synthesis was seen to be a priori only after 
he had extensively investigated varied important physical laws and the 
constants in them. This made him think through why he had reached the 
conclusions he had, and he discovered, he believed., that it was because 
1. Compare Max Born., ETP, p. 38; H. Weyl, PMNS, p. 238; J .W. Yolton, 
PSE, pp. 92-108; E.F. Caldin, PLS, pp. 94-95; P. Couderc, EU, p. 138; 
Herbert Dingle, "Modern Aristotelianism," .Nat~ , 139(1937 ), 784-786, 
1011-1012. 
2. A. Eddington, EU, pp. 15, 25, 98ff.; P. Couderc, EU, p. 139; Noel 
Slater, Eddington's Fundamental Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1957) pp. 16-18., 39-49, 65-67, 145-146, 177-180, 260., 274-280. 
3. Particularly since the work of Whittaker, Bastin, Kilminster, and 
Slater. See N. Slater, EFT. 
4. See Eddington's reply to H. Dingle, MA, in Nature., 139(1937), 1000-1001. 
Being prescriptive, laws do not apply to description of an actual world 
we cannot know, but to the model our mind constructs because of the 
way it thinks; thus these general laws are a priori. 
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thought demanded them. 1 If we reject, for the present~ necessary truth 
in the a priorism of his ideas, may we accept them a posteriori ? 
Slater tells us. "especially in the early days of his theory. Edding-
ton amended his calculations, where they did not fit closely to observa-
tion. by refining and complicating his (mainly dimensional) arguments 
until they did fit." 2 This being so~ Eddington's claim to their logical 
necessity on his epistemic grounds would seem to be denied. The ques-
tion whether they are deducible from physical principles will depend on 
further work as to just what the necessary principles must be, including 
those of Eddington. But the physical principles he uses are hardly neces-
sitated even as an a posteriori guess from his studies. One need not end 
up with his view of relativity~ with his specific model of the universe. or 
with his ideas on atomic structure, for as we have seen. many other models 
have been suggested and~ we will see~ others will derive quite different 
conclusions from the remarkable relationships among physical constants 
which he noted. 
In summary, we may say that what Eddington really did was to 
suggest certain physical laws and a certain model of the universe to begin 
with and thereby claim to relate (or at least suggest the relation of) all 
1. Eddington's reply to H. Dingle, MA, in Nature, 139(1937). 1001. Also his 
PPS, pp. 67, 143, 190, 195, 203-204. 
2. Noel B. Slater, EFT, p. 4. 
physical science. 1 This is a highly significant contribution as many 
2 
have noted , but his cosmological ideas will have necessary priority 
for acceptance only if his deductive scheme and no other handles the 
unusual relationships among physical constants which he finds. 
ii. The Models of Dirac and Jordan. 
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In 1937 Dirac challenged cosmologists with a differing interpreta-
tion of the constants. He suggested that, while Eddington was likely sub-
stantially correct (though Dirac felt his proof was not rigorous) in his 
theory which allowed the deduction of values like the fine structure con-
~ 
stant e ~c and the ratio of proton mass to electron mass, the theory for 
large numbers (those approximating 1039 ) seems inadequate. Instead, 
noting that if one took the age of the universe as 2 x 109 years (based on 
the value for Hubble 1s constant held at that time and a simple expanding 
model from a singularity at t = 0 ) and expressed it in terms of units 
~ 
given by atomic constants, such as e / mc3 one will get approximately 
1039 . "This suggests that the above-mentioned large numbers are to be 
1. John W. Yolton, PSE, pp. 88-108. 
2. See Susan Stebbing, PP, p. 75; Reginald Kapp, Towards a Unified 
Cosmology (London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1960), p. 215; R. Stoops 
(ed. ), SEU, pp. 35, 306-307; W .H. McCrea, letter in Nature, 139(1937 ), 
pp. 1002-1003; A.D. Ritchie, Reflections on the Philosophy of Sir 
Arthur Eddington (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1948), pp. 28-29; 
J. Witt-Hansen, ECE, p. 22; N. Slater, EFT, p. 4; F. Hoyle, NMEU, 
p. 382; H. Bondi and T. Gold, STEU, p. 259; and E. Whittaker, FEE, 
p. 131, 203. 
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regarded, not as constants, but as simple functions of our present epoch, 
expressed in atomic units." 1 Hence he takes all large numbers like 1039, 
1078, so common in Eddington's work, as just tJ t .zJ etc .. Whatever 
simple numerical coefficients these large numbers might have (~ 3XtoJ') 
should eventually be determinable theoretically when we have a suffi-
ciently comprehensive theory of cosmology and atomicity. 
One consequence he pointed out was that the number of protons and 
neutrons must increase in proportion to t" ~ One could hardly expect to 
find evidence of this since it might occur only inside stars and, in any 
case, any rate of increase would be minute. Another consequence was 
that G (the gravitational constant) o< ~t', If one calls (G x the mass of 
a thing) its gravitational 'power', this power increases in the universe, 
and thus presumably in nebulae, in proportion to ~. 
Let us point out the varied assumptions of greatest importance 
here. 
(1) In a letter in reply to Dingle's accusation that Eddington and Dirac 
were cosmolatrists 2, Dirac presents us with exposition of his scientific 
methodology. 3 He argues that science should be a balance of building up 
from observation and deducing by reason from speculative assumptions. 
This was why he began with certain observed constants in nature and 
1. P.A.M. Dirac, 'The Cosmological Constants," Nature, 139(1937), p. 323. 
2. See H. Dingle, MA. pp. 784-786. 
3. P.A.M. Dirac, letter in Nature, 139(1937 ), 1001-1002. 
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constructed from them dimensionless numbers. The numbers showed a 
remarkable clustering around 1039 and 1078 • But if one denies Edding-
ton's scheme, or anything like it, the large values must lack any funda-
mental significance and very possibly are the accidental result of the 
time at which we measure them. But the clustering, on the other hand, 
is fundamental and holds for all time~ so that a change in one value in a 
clustering will require all others in the cluster to increase in the same 
ratio. 
This requires that those in the 1039 cluster increase oc:: "t" , and 
those in the 10 78 cluster increase c< t" a. He also suggests, following 
Chandrasekhar, 1 that if one includes such 'constants' as the average 
mass of a star and of a nebula one will get clustering around 1 ~ and 1 ~ 
powers of 1039 • This would lead one to expect these masses to increase 
at 1 ~z and 1 31~ powers, respectively, of the rate of increase of the 1039 
cluster. Thereby one could calculate the rate of increase in average 
mass for stars and nebulae and thus the rate of increase of the average 
number of stars in a galaxy. 
It would appear that Dirac 1s system is more involved in devising 
numerical constants to correlate observation and predict facts than it is 
interested in explaining the root of such remarkable coincidences. 
(2) Dirac therefore holds that the large constants are not only possible 
ones, as Eddington claimed, but rather obey the law that any two large 
1. S. Chandrasekhar~ ''The Cosmological Constants, 11 Nature , 139(1937 ), 
757-758. 
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dimensionless numbers occurring in nature are connected by a simple 
mathematical relation in which the coefficients are of an order of magni-
tude unity. This is because~ choosing any atomic unit of time (and not 
z 
necessarily just e/mcs = 'electron radius '/velocity of light) one will 
get an age for the universe (based on his assumed model) that differs 
by at most a few powers of ten from 1039. 
(3) His assumption that N~ the number of atoms in the universe~ is grow-
z ing in proportion tot: introduces a quite new idea into our post-relativistic 
models - the continuous appearance of new matter into space. 
(4) Dirac's model of the universe has zero spatial curvature and its l?{t-) 
1 
is proportional to t~ with a singularity at -t=o . He assumes~ in this 
paper~ the conservation of mass in the universe so that ,_PR 3 remains con-
stant. The model develops as he shows that ;0 (the average density of 
matter in space) is proportional to 1/Hubble's constant in atomic units. 
( « le/et:c) / Now., since the reciprocal of Hubble's constant is taken to be //? 
• I/ 3 /._ ) ~ ~.J 
and s 1nc e ,c -"' / R and I? t ~ - '-- th (-I ll/.tf:)/_ //_ ~ en /R= /3 '-'. This made 
very small (only 1/3 of zx 10., years) and presented a conflict with the 
age of bodies within the universe. Hence Dirac suggested that nuclear 
processes went on more rapidly in the past than at present. 
The model also involves zero curvature since., if curvature were 
present., this would define a radius with length eX .R(-t). But then ;0 R ~ 
1. It appears in his paper in the Proc. Roy. Soc., A., 165(1938)., pp. 199ff. 
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which must remain constant, would imply a constant N, which because 
of his law in (2) would have to be related to large dimensionless numbers 
which he believes change in time. This is absurd; hence space is flat, 
He then uses this to show that A= o in his model. The model is then that 
of diagram two, Note 2, Appendix F. 
One other final point. In Dirac's model G changes with the recip-
rocal of time but in general relativity G is a constant with time. Direac 
desires his model to be consonant with general relativity so he introduces 
, :z / 
a new scale of time wherein t = r ~r" (so that r and t: agree at 'C=o ) 
and G can now be considered constant. 
Before leaving Dirac, let us delineate several difficulties with his 
theory. 
(1) The origin of the clustering around certain large numbers is not ex-
plained, save to say it is the product of our epoch expressed in certain 
assumed fundamental atomic units of time. 
(2) The entire scheme, at least as far as Dirac presents it,. is hardly 
testable to see if changes do in fact occur with time. 
(3) He provides no suggested mechanism for the appearance of new mat-
ter into space. Indeed he complicates the problem, in his second paper, 
by assuming mass is conserved. 
(4) Bondi 1 suggests another weakness, in that, while it assumes G is 
1. H. Bondi, Cosmology, pp. 162-163. 
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constant in the new time scale t 1 the charge of an electron (being part 
of one of the large dimensionless numbers) should change. Yet the con-
servation of charge is fundamental to Maxwell's equations~ and these in 
turn are part of general relativity. Thus his novel time scale allows his 
ideas for G to be reconciled with the general theory~ but it fails to recon-
cile the change in electronic charge with the same theory! 
As a final fundamentalistic model let us turn to that of Pascual 
Jordan. The argument is most succinct in his paper published in Nature 
1 in 1949~ and we will outline it here. Jordan tells us that he prefers to 
begin the devlopment of a cosmological model from the dimensional 
analysis of empirical constants rather than by constructing a model from 
field equations chosen as hypotheses. Now he believes that Eddington., 
though he failed to show why there are dimensionless constants~ did re-
veal how unbelievable it is that these should arise by chance from simple 
and fundamental natural laws. Thus Jordan proceeds to attempt a syn-
thesis of his own. 
Jordan considers that we know six fundamental things about the uni-
verse: the velocity of light (c); the gravitational constant ( ~ = BlTG/c~ ); 
the age of the oldest bodies ( R ~ ~x1o ~ years); the mean density of 
1. Pascual Jordan., "Formation of the Stars and Development of the Uni-
verse/' Nature, 164(1949)~ 637-640. The thesis is given much more 
elaborately in his Schwerkraft und Weltall (Braunschweig: F. Vieweg 
andSohn, 1955 ). It is also discussed in a little-known volume by Hans 
L. Dorrie, Genesis (Munich: C.H. Beck~ 1959) and in P. Couderc, EU, 
pp. 222-224. 
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. . -z.• 1 -'~ 
mass m the umverse (A~Io gm./c.c.); the Hubble constant (""=c ~~); 
and the radius of the universe (R). Nowe we may construct from these 
dimensionless constants such as«~ ~ ... and ~c2"'1 2 and it is remark-
able that all these are approximately equal to unity! Jordan feels this un-
usual fact justifies the following interpretation. 
Let us take R as the radius of a spherical Riemannian space and 
the Hubble constant as due to a Doppler shift. Then K=cR so that the 
radius increases at just the velocity of light - an attractive result Jordan 
feels - and «R=/, implying that space must have once been very small. 
Now, if M is the mass of the universe ( ~.....«. re ~ ) we get by substituting, 
JiM~ R (which fits Einstein's relation li 1'1 = -~t7r2R for a closed space 
and a time-dependent R). Thus if R varies, then either h or M must 
vary with time. But one may write AM~K as k. M ~ ~ He 2 which 
means that the negative potential energy of gravitation for the entire uni-
verse is equal to the sum of the rest energies of the masses of the stars. 
Hence the total energy of the universe may be exactly zero, so that ~l'f~/? 
is a direct consequence of the conservation of energy which, he thinks, 
requires that the evolving universe always have zero total energy. 
But we also have varied dimensionless constants in microphysics. 
If we take the mass of the meson (m) and the electronic radius (..L.) as 
1. Based only on the masses of galaxies and ignoring any intergalactic 
matter. 
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fundamental here, '1ln, is of the order of magnitude of the total number of 
elementary particles in the universe ( ::t 10 80 ). Also, ~ ( ~ 1~ H ) is 
the same size as the ratio of the gravitational to the electrical attraction 
between two elementary particles. But ~ increases with the age of the 
universe since R does; indeed it is the age of the universe expressed 
L -ZJ in elementary time ( % ~ 10 sec.). Similarly once can show that 1l 
varies as '/,.q, 
Why not then assert that the number of elementary particles is of 
z 
the order of II ? Dirac thought this violated the conservation of energy, 
but Jordan says that we have seen that it need not. If we do assume that 
matter must be continually created, where does it occur? Jordan points 
out that the upper limit for the mass of the stars is about 1035 gms. (or 
they contain of the order of 1060 protons) and this is proportional to R :r:-z 
Thus the average mass of a star depends on the age attained by the uni-
verse at its formation! After this,, the mass of a star is constant apart 
from secondary processes. Hence a star generated when the universe be-
3/z 
gan must have mass proportional to (this age) This in turn implies 
that the gravitational constant is a function of A. 
Now the region where the 'creation' of new matter takes place 
z 
must fit the relation M« /1 , just as does the entire universe (so as 
to satisfy the conservation of energy). Jordan believes this requires 
that matter be created as whole 'drops' with mass and radius fitting the 
conservation of energy laws at the instant of its formation. He also 
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considers that the droplet density is that of an atomic nucleus (of the 
order of a proton mass in a space with the dimensions of elementary 
length). The size of a 'drop' will then be proportional to le , so that 
60 -.l/z .1/,; today 'drops' have of the order of 10 (proportional to ~ or /1 z ) 
elementary particles in them and are then stars in their own right! 
Such droplets will be so dense that their negative gravitational ener~;y 
just balances the energy of matter, thereby preserving the conservation 
of total energy. 
One final feature. He pictures the universe as a four-dimensional 
manifold with a cone shape but with subsidiary apices. At any given time, 
a cut across the cone may leave a large three-dimensional part and 
perhaps several smaller isolated parts, each unfolding in time. Eventu-
ally the smaller parts coalesce with the larger universe since, if these 
had a constant mass density and Aoo< f/H: we may suppose that when .h 
has the same value as that in the larger universe it will assume a mass 
of exactly the same value as that we recognize as characteristic of a 
new star. Jordan believes these lesser worlds are then the sources of 
super-novae of Type I. 1 
Jordan, Ludwig, and Mueller have also treated the essentials of 
the problem quantitatively, with the constant of gravitation being fitted 
to general relativity. The relativity resulting is a projective type 
1. P. Jordan, SUW, pp. 254-272. 
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(i.e. one with a fifth dimension) with a variable gravitational constant. 1 
The assumptions here are quite like those of our two previous 
models and may be noted briefly. The problem with these should at once 
be apparent. 
(1) Jordan assumes that the model need not involve a violation of the 
conservation of energy event hough the conservation of mass is violated. 
(2) The model has a space closed# finite~ and expanding. There is no 
satisfactory reason given for the first two however. 
(3) The upper limit on stellar size is fixed by his presumed laws of 
cosmic development and not by the tnore usual dynamical arguments of 
astrophysics. Also they do not have the origin described by Eddington 
and Lemaltre# or that of most other cosmologists~ who consider them 
the product of condensation of diffuse matter. Jordan's ideas# of course# 
are consonant with his assumption that inter- and intra-galactic matter 
are negligible. 2 
(4) Jordan predicts a rather precise rate of supernovaie appearance based 
3 
on A. It seems several hundred times too large based on observation. 
(5) The model presents the first attempt which we have seen to describe 
the processes of the origin of matter in our universe. The idea that it 
goes on continuously is like the early suggestion of Dirac. 
1. P. Jordan# Ann. der Physik~ 1(1947)# 219ff. and G. Ludwig and C. Mueller~ 
Ann. der Physik~ 2(1948)1 76 ff. Also Jordan's SUW, pp. 128-160. 
2. See Hoyle •s note with R. Kapp1 'Development of the Universe~" Nature# 
165(1950)# pp. 68-69. 
3. H. Bondi, Cosmology# p. 164. 
231 
(6) Finally, the various dimensional constants are connected, as in 
Eddington, with a basic but unusual relativity theory. In this case the 
age of the universe plays the fundamental role, and thereby he presumes 
expansion. 
With this outline of Jordan's thesis we must leave some of the 
most fascinating discussion in cosmological theory. It is interesting 
that very few cosmologists have been convinced by any of them, but their 
stress upon the synthesis of the major constants of physics has left a 
permanent mark. Our next model, and those of the steady-state later, 
place considerable stress upon these but from quite varied perspectives, 
so let us turn then to these to complete our outline for this chapter. 
3. The Kinematic Model of Milne. 
Since most of our discussion of this model, and those of the steady-
state to follow, will be found in the following chapter, we will outline here 
only the fundamental ideas. The important technical aspects, as usual, 
will be placed in appendices. The reason for this procedure, in contra-
distinction to our lengthy outlines of the usual expanding models and the 
fundamentalistic schemes, lies in the fact that the discussion of kinema-
tic analysis and the steady-state hypothesis centers largely around a 
discussion of cosmological methodology, rather than around a great var-
iety of models based on varying constants in certain ways, and includes 
aspects of the general relativity models as well as the nature of the 
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dimensionless constants. Hence we have presented the great variety of 
the latter in some detail while the new models to be discussed, being 
much more delimited, may be presented in their technical detail rather 
more briefly, the stress being placed upon the basic attitudes involved. 
Around the mid-thirties, the British mathematician E.A. Milne 
presented a novel relativity theory differing rather fundamentally from 
1 
that of Einstein. Since the original presentations have undergone some 
revision,. we will stress the comments Milne makes later about his 
h . 1 . 2 sc erne 1n severa maJor sources. 
Milne begins with the assumption that it may be possible to discover 
that some of the laws of physics, heretofore presumed to rest only on ex-
perience, really are not ultimately this arbitrary, but are of the nature of 
theorems. Why else should they be so exact, so simple, and why else 
should they invariably hold good? If he is correct, then he claims that 
physics may be essentially like mathematics. "A theorem, and therefore 
1. E.A. Milne, Proc. Roy. Soc., A, 156(1936), 62ff.; "The Constant of 
Gravitation," Nature, 139(1937), 409; "On the Origin of Laws of Nature.," 
as previous, 997-999; "World Relations and the 'Cosmical Constant'," 
M.N.R.A.S., 94(1934), 3-14; Zeit. fur Astrophysik, 6(1933), 1-95 (this, 
one of the original papers, is reported in W.O. Wermack and W.H. 
McCrea, "On Milne's Theory of World Structure," M.N.R.A.S., 93(1933), 
519-529); and ''Remarks on World-Structure.,'' as previous, 668-680. 
2. See E.A. Milne, "On the Nature of Universal G::.~avitation," Mon. Not. 
Roy. Astron. Soc., 104(1944), 120-136; Kinematic Relativity (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 194:8); Modern Cosmology and the Christian Idea of 
God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952 ); and "Kinematic Relativity," 
BUll. de l'Academie Internationale de Phil. des Sciences, A, 3 (1947 ). 
7-51 and discussion. 
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a law of nature proved deductively, is therefore richer than the original 
axioms; and the status of a law of nature is enhanced, not diminished, by 
being arrived at deductively." 1 In this, he is in the tradition of the 
1fundamentalistic 1 models just discussed. 
However, as we noted for Eddington, for example, this deductive 
scheme is suggested a posteriori by certain characteristics believed 
found in physical (in this case, astronomical) observation. One of these 
characteristics is the clustering of matter in space, largely into galaxies. 
2 
Another is the apparent recession of these galaxies from us. Thus they 
provide the only natural frames of reference for describing the motion 
of the contents of space. Perhaps then one may assume, not as does 
general relativity that all frames of reference are equivalent, but only 
that the galactic centers are, and also that the laws of nature are desc-
ribed in the same way from such centers. The latter may not be true, 
but one may start with such an assumption as an ideal. 3 
One may then begin with an idealized system of receding galaxies, 
each describing the whole and thus the laws of nature in the same way 
for a hypothetical observer on each. This implies a homogeneous model 
to this degree. Only as we assume both identity of description and iden-
l. E.A. Milne, "Remarks on the Philosophical Status of Physics," 
Philosophy, 16 (1941),, 363. 
2. E.A. Milne, KR, p. 2. 
3. Ibid., p. 4. 
tity of laws for each center do we avoi? assuming any laws of nature; 
we desire rather to discover what the laws of nature would be in such 
an ideal system. Homogeneity is thus defined - it is not an observa-
tional ass~mption at all! 1 
Next, to construct a dynamics, we must have a time scale. This 
we obtain by assuming that galaxy centers separate with uniform velo-
cities. Adding to this the awareness of passage of time on the part of 
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an observer on each of these centers we have all that is necessary to 
provide a time scale if we allow these observers to signal one another. 2 
Then, if one assumes only a Euclidean space, one can show that the re-
suiting model involves an expanding spherical swarm of centers filling 
this space, its kinematics being that of special relativity. This he calls 
3 
the 'substratum'. It is the 'ttheatre for the theorems of dynamics .... 
[You] cannot prove theorems in dynamics without ... [such] frames 
of reference everywhere in space. 114 
1. E.A. Milne, KR, p. 5. One may of course, assume some other struc-
ture, but Milne believes his tests out so well as to likely preclude 
fundamental inhomogeneities. 
2_. Ibid., p. 6. By means of light, but without assuming any specific em-
pirical properties for it. See Appendix G. But the Loreni;z formulae 
therein fall out of the analysis. They are not presupposed on empiri-
cal grounds. 
3. Ibi.~, p. 8. These assumptions are minimal. Milne seeks to exclude 
all appeal to empirical laws, though not observation, so as to obtain the 
greatest economy of thought. See E.A. Milne:., "On the Orjgin of Laws 
of Nature," Nature, 139(1937), 997-999. 
4. Loc. cit. 
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Milne next uses this 'substratum' to construct accounts of dyna-
mics~ gravitation, and electrodynamics and to relate these to the usual 
accounts of these in physics. It eventuates that the time for Newtonian 
dynamics is not the time scale for the expanding model, i.e. the scale 
on which the Lorentz formulae of special relativity are based. This, he 
claims, points up the fallacy of basing both, as in general relativity, on 
the same scale. It is then possible to discover whether, if a suitable 
time scale is chosen, the dynamical laws thus derived agree with the em-
p~rical dynamics of traditional physics. While the kinematic model~ Milne 
believes, is self-consistent in its own right, this justifies (if there is the 
large agreement between the two dynamics which he claims to find) the 
1 
a priori choice of the model. Indeed, unlike traditional p"h.ysics which 
cannot explain why the laws of dynamics should be what they appear, 
kinematic relativity seems thereby to define "abstract entities which are 
the counterpa:.~t of entities existing in nature." 2 "T':le laws of dynamics 
hold good because particles in the presence of actual galaxies resemble 
the abstract particles of our theory moving in the presence of abstract 
representations of galaxies." 3 
Thus M5.lne 's system pays full attention to Einstein's epistemology 
since only elements in principle observable are permitted. Also, he con-
1. E. A. Milne, KR, p. 11. 
2. Loc. cit. 
3 . Ibid., pp. ll-12 . 
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siders it remarkable that one can go as far in physics as he does with 
no appeal to quantitative laws. One must not scoff at, but rather reckon 
with, so powerful a system, he claims .. for in it regularities emerge de-
d·.1ctively which fit observation rather well. 1 He uses, by analog-y, the 
development of four-dimensional geometries before their utility was 
apparent to argue that perhaps his technique may do the same for physics.2 
If the universe is rational one should be able to deduce the laws it obeys: 
the only irrationality remaining is that of creation itself. 
We may complete this presentation of the conceptual foundations of 
Milne's system by noting his points of difference with general relativity. 
Firstly, he believes the latter fails to account for gravity .. instead claim-
ing that bodies move under the influence of 'curved' space-time which 
is then just the reintroduction of an ether.3 Secondly, he thinks that it has 
abandoned the Lorentz formulae which have been so valuable in physical 
work, and in its place has put general relativity which has contributed 
little to mathematical physics. For example, it cannot accomodate elec-
tromagnetic phenomena, it cannot explain the origin, sign .. or magnitude 
of the gravitational constant, and it leaves unfounded the direction which 
time appears to have. 4 Thirdly, the theory deals with smoothed-out 
averages in its field equations, but if nature ultimately involves singulari-
1. E.A. Milne, OLN, p. 998. 
2. Loc. cit. 
3. E.A. Milne, ONG, p. 121. 
4. Ibid., p. 121. Also pp. 123-124. 
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ties this may imply that relativity will not contribute to O'..lr microscopic 
1 
knowledge of nature. Fourthly,, the tests for relativity, at the very best, 
only confirm it and do not prove it; and he is not so sure that the con-
firmation is particularly sound. Fifthly, if ~ is included it seems to 
posit a force increasing as the distance between particles, in addition to 
their inverse square attraction. And even if it is not, other general 
relativistic expanding models in any case, consider galaxies as particles 
with fixed spatial coordinates carried apart by the expansion of their sec-
tion of space-time by a sarface 'time coordinate equals a constant'. Now 
if such models, as they usually do, presume a space-time of constant 
curvature, and therefore a uniform density, they must postulate homo-
geneity. This M:.lne believes is sufficient of itself to explain expansion 
----
and gravitation without utilizing space-time or Einstein's field equations! 2 
Sixthly, and finally, Milne believes Einstein and his followers for-
got the lessons of special relativity and introduced symbols in their more 
general discussions of relativity whose value was not yet ascertained in 
terms of operations that could actually be carried out. Coordinates, for 
example, can ~e assigned only by observers who are introduced first. 
They take over unexamined also such ideas as uniform clocks and un-
1. E.A. Milne, ONG, p. 122. 
2. Ibid., pp. 123-124. See also his OLN, p. 998. and his Sir James Jeans 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1952), pp. 160-161. 
alterable length measures without noting that, for example, there are 
two kinds of time, one appropriate to electromagnetism and the other 
to mechanics and gravitation. 1 
In closing this section let us outline areas involving problems as 
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seen by the eyes of certain critics of the system. As usual, our analysis 
of these must await the two chapters following. 
(1) The singularity at t=O presents various difficulties. One is the ex-
tesnive use of the design involved in the nature of the universe at that 
time to argue to deity. 2 Here such questions as the peculiar use of a 
non-Maxwellian distribution of velocities, 3 the relation of the t and 
r scales to the question, 4 and the immense energy of the photons near 
. 5 
t = o ar1se. 
(2) The relationship of t and 7 has certain problems also. Why stop 
with two types o£ time? 6 If physical phenomen.a in the t and J scales 
are interconnected, how does one draw the line between t and T ? 7 
Is there any a p:riori reason why different physical phenomena should, 
1. E.A. Milne, ONG, p. 128. See also G.J. Whitrow, SEU, pp. 131-133. 
2. E.A. Milne .. MCG, in particular and also his~ .. pp. 11-12, 25. 
3. See A. Eddington .. EU, p. 64. 
4. See A. Grunbaum, "E.A. Milne's Scales of Time," B.J .P.S., 4(1954) .. 
329-331. 
5. See P. Couderc, EU, p. 218 who claims that very massive (high mass-
energy) particles belong to the 1' scale instead. 
6. Ibid., p. 217. 
7. Ibid., p. 218. See also M. Johnson, TKN, pp. 105-107 .. 117. 
or should not, have varying time scales .1 If length in the "'f"' scale is 
invariant but atomic frequencies increase, how can the latter occur 
unless there is a decrease in the atomic radii with "7 ? 2 Also, how 
does one tie the six parameter Lorentz group of time t to the ten 
parameter gravitational group in J" ? 3 
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(3) The concept of 'substratum' raises a number of questions. Couderc 
thinks the relation of the gravitational attraction to free particles, so 
that the latter move as they do" is not made clear. 4 Bondi asks whe-
ther, if the substratum is a continuous frame and yet exemplifies by 
galaxy centers, this implies that only some of the fundamental particles 
have 'materialized'. 5 Also, he inquires how a continuum of fundamental 
particles could give rise to free particles agglomerating around only cer-
tain of these centers. He suggests some loosening of the strict cosmolo-
gical principle may be necessitated. 6 
(4) The model Milne presents has a variety of other problems. The 
specific curvature of space is still an open question. 7 The measurement 
of time is considered by Milne to be more fundamental than that of length, 
1. H. Bondi, Cosmolo_gy, p. 12 6. 
2. P. Couderc, EU, p. 218. 
3. Loc. cit. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Loc. cit. 
H. Bondi, Cosmology, p. 137. 
Loc. cit. 
M.K. Munitz, STC, p. 98. 
but Griinbaum believes this is purely conventional. 1 His a prioristic 
use of expansion and of the Lorentz transformations is criticized by 
Couderc. 2 Another problem arises from the use of the Doppler shift 
to ascertain the length of time since creation. Is it too short to fit 
other age observations? 3 Bonnar and Me Vittie both question his use 
of a distance-measuring technique quite inapplicable to astronomy at 
present. 4 Bonnar also argues that kinematic relativity does not ex-
plain the movement in the orbit of Mercury, as does general relativity. 
McVittie argues elsewhere that so far kinematic relativity has an in-
adequate theory of gravity. 5 Shapere believes Milne's model handles 
only part of the data which general relativity has synthesized. 6 And 
lastly, Haldane argues that Milne's view implies a universe which., say 
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1.5 x 109 years ago, would make life as we know it impossible. Perhaps, 
he says, evolutionary ideas in biology would need revision to handle the 
implication that certain types of life can only arise at certain stages in 
the history of the universe. 7 
1. A. Griinbaum, PRAS., p. 532. 
2. P. Couderc, EU., p. 215. 
3. But see E.A. Milne, MCG, p. 97. 
4. W.B. Bonnor, FYR~ p-:--22 and G.C. McVittie, "The Cosmological Pro-
blem," Science-News 2l(Aug., 1951), 75. 
5. G.C. McVittie, "The Age of the Universe in the Cosmology of General 
Relativity," Astron. Journ. 58(1953), 132. 
6. Dudley Shapere, MIMC, pp. 376-385. 
7. See his letter in Natur~, 139(1937), 1003-1004. 
(5) A final cluster of problems rests in Milne's metaphysic and epis-
temology. Born accuses Milne of introducing an artificial model. 1 
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Bondi argues that the differences with general relativity possibly reside 
in the order in which a cosmological principle, relativity, and a discus-
sion of gravity arise in each. 2 Where Milne criticized Einstein for 
failing to see that the coordinates can be ascertained only by introducing 
observers first~ Dingle claims relativity is not the principle of the co!!!:_-
plete symmetry of observers~ but rather of arbitrary choice of co-
ordinates for any single observer without consideration of the experience 
of any other. 3 Ayer criticizes Milne for failing to see that the applicabi-
lity of a deductive mathematical system to the universe does not thereby 
show the rationality o! the universe as claimed, he says~ by Milne. 4 Even 
the fact that Milne's system may fit later experiment is of no value in 
5 
settling the point~ he believes. 
A collateral question involves Milne's a priorism, not unlike that 
of Eddington., The least irenic critic is Dingle who has written several 
1. Max Born~ ETP, pp. 41~ 43. 
2. H. Bondi~ RC, p. 109. 
3. H, Dingle,. Review of Whitrow,. SEU, The Observatory, 79(1959), 
191-192. 
4. A.J. Ayer~ The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (London: 
Macmillan and Co., (1940)1958), p. 203. 
5, Ibid., pp. 204-206. Sir Harold Jeffreys makes a similar point in 
his letter, Nature, 139(1937), 1004-1005. 
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articles on the issue. 1 Brown argues that Milne's method is like that 
of Descartes., and just as illusory. 2 Munitz points O'J.t that the intrusion 
of experimental data into what he believes is the supposedly intuitive 
scheme of kinematic relativity is not always realized by Milne. 3 John-
son gives a rather mo sympathetic, but similar., critique., making the 
point that Milne does not always show how the transition of deductive to 
empirical occurs. 4 This outline will provide reference for our later 
discussion., in detail, of the place of rationalism in cosmological develop-
ment., but we must now move on to present a quite new type of model. 
4. Steady-State Models of the Universe. 
i. The Models of Bondi, Gold., and Hoyle. 
In 1948 Bondi and G:>ld., and independently Hoyle, presented papers 
involving a non-evolutionary type of cosmology in contradistinction to the 
various schemes outlined in the previous three sections. However, the 
approach of the first two is rather different than that of Hoyle, so that the 
variant methodological foundations of the two systems is really of as much 
interest to us as is their unusual conclusion. Let us then turn first to 
the early papers of Bondi and Gold so that the contrast with Hoyle may be 
1. H. Dingle, MA, and his reply to letters, pp. lOll-1012. Also his presi-
dential address., M.N.R.A.S., 113(1953)., 393-407. 
2. G. Burniston Brown., HPTN, pp. 619-634. 
3. M.K. Munitz., STC, pp. 95-102. But see criticism in Bonnar's review 
of Munitz., STC., The Observatory, 77(1957), 247-248. 
4. M. Johnson, TKN, pp. ll5-119. 
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that mu-::!h clearer when we present his thesis in a moment. 1 
The starting point of their model is an attempt to derive a cosmo-
logy in which the location in space and time does not restrict the re-
peatability of experiment. They believe that physical science is actually 
defined by this criterion of uniformity but that~ rather oddly~ since they 
pretend to be thoroughly scientific# evolutionary cosmologies violate it. 
The violation lies in the fact that any observation we make of the universe 
must~ if it is assumed to change~ reveal both accidental conditions and 
necessary laws. But there are no grounds~ other than esthetic judgment# 
for determining just what is contingent to our epoch and what is inherent 
for all time~ and yet we must make such decisions if we are to extrapo-
2 
late into the past and future! 
Now the cosmological principle as applied by evolutionary theorists 
well illustrates this problem. Mach's principle demands that physical 
laws and constants be the prod:1ct of the structure of our universe~ and 
this requires the laws of physics for distant nebulae to be like ours. But 
we see such nebulae as they appeared long ago, and if their structure~ 
light-emission characteristics, and so on was determined by the nature 
of the universe~ it must have been the universe as it was long ago. How-
ever# the cosmological prineiple says only that the universe must appear 
1. H. Bondi, RC, and H. Bondi and T. G:>ld, STEU. 
2. H. Bondi and T. Gold, STEU~ pp. 252-253-.--
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statistically the same for all galaxies at a given time1 and thus that the 
laws and/ or constants which depend on this appearance may be true only 
for a given time. On what grounds then can we assume that we know the 
laws obeyed by these distant galaxies if they are controlled by a universe 
of a different structure to that we now see? Is it not really gratuitous to 
decide to let the laws at that time be the same as those we know, or if 
we allow these to change., to presume we know which constants in these 
laws remain truly stable? 
Bondi and G:::>ld desire to escape such arbitrariness, however agree-
able the varied assumptions have seemed to be to their advocates, by 
postulating a cosmological principle consonant with Mach's principle. 
This new 1perfect cosmological principle' 1 assumes a universe unchang-
ing and homogeneous on the large scale; in other words there is no fun-
2 
damental change in structure with time. 
[Only J in such a universe ... is [there] any basis for the 
assumption that the laws of physics are constant; and with-
out such an assumption our knowledge, derived virtually at 
one instant in time, must be quite inadequate for an interpre-
tation of the universe and the dependence of its laws on its 
stru.cture, and hence inadequate for any extrapolation into 
the future or the past. 3 
Being good logicians they make no claim for the truth of their principle, 
but argue only that the alternative is to leave one's choice of the varia-
1. Called this in distinction from the usual 1cosmological principle'. 
2. H. Bondi and T. Gold, STEU., p. 254. 
3. Loc. cit. 
bility of physical laws or constants so broad that cosmology can no 
longer claim to be a science. 1 On the other hand., their position allows 
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them to assume that modern laboratory work has permanent validity and 
therefore certain cosmological consequences. These consequences we 
2 
outline in Appendix H. 
Apart from the many unusual aspects of their theory., one stands 
out for special mention here where we consider a model lying between 
the discussion of Milne's work and that of Hoyle. This is the point men-
tioned in items 5 and 12 of Note One of the appendix; the rejection of the 
field equations of general relativity and the utilization of aspects of kine-
ma.tic theory. Bondi and Gold have had much to say about the models we 
have discussed earlier., with which we will deal in Chapter Five., but the 
interesting point here is their application of kinematic argume~1.ts to a 
stationary model (unlike Milne) and their disagreement with Hoyle's at-
tempt to adapt the field equations of general relativity to a continuous 
creation idea. Let us therefore turn to Hoyle's model to see the differ-
ence of approach and return thereafter to the arguments of both as to 
the pro's and con's of the two perspectives. 
Hoyle 3 tells us that his theory is based on two philosophical ideas -
1. H. Bondi and T. Gold., S'tEU. p. 255. See also H. Bondi., RC., p. 106. 
2. See Note One. 
3. Fred Hoyle., NMEU., p. 3 72. 
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the attractiveness of keeping the proper density of matter a constant and 
the esthetic objection to a creation of the universe at some point in the 
remote past. "For it is against the spirit of scientific enquiry to regard 
observable effects as arising from 'causes unk.TJ.own to science'~ and 
this in principle is what creation-in-the-past implies." 1 On these bases 
he then erects a cosmic model~ based upon a general relativistic analysis~ 
and consonant with the initial premises. The discussion is outlined in 
Appendix H~ Note Two. 
Now Bondi and Gold criticize Hoyle's view because it involves non-
uniformities in the de Sitter model. 2 Mass concentrations already pre-
sent deflect the pencil of geodesics which corresponds to new particles 
before their creation. These create multiplicities in the C -field which1 
long after o. will be of very high order. But Hoyle says the C-field de-
fleets the particles and thus will diminish relative velocities~ thereby 
increasing uniformity. The effect is greatest on the diffuse gas of low 
density formed by newly-created particles 1 rather than on stars, so that 
by the time collisions occur the kinetic temperature will be very low. 
This has various implications. The C-field is only partly deter-
mined by the existing motion of matter and is largely determined by 
Hoyle's event 0 in the infinite past. It seems thereby to fail to satisfy 
Ma•:::h's principle well. Thus, Bondi and Gold, while they like the idea of 
1. Fred Hoyle~ NMEU, p. 372. 
2. H. Bondi and T-:Gold, STEU, p. 269. 
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a field theory formulation of continuous creation~ hope later to present 
a field theory free of Hoyle's problems as they see them. It will involve 
an interaction between a particle and the bulk of the universe, thus satis-
fying Mach's principle. We will mention this work later. 
Hoyle replies in an elaborate, though short, paper published the 
following year. 1 The mathematical difficulties Bondi and Gold mention 
he attempts to correct by removing the approximation whereby he 
'smeared' galaxies into a uniform backgrou...n.d. The more esthetic points 
in their criticism he also discusses. One of these involves the invariance 
assumptions they use as against his non-invariant process. Hoyle prefers 
the latter since it appears to give a unique steady-state model and because 
the universe appears to be markedly non-invariant in structure. In any 
case the non-invariance applies only to the creation properties, but once 
matter is created the invariance of Einstein's general theory is necessary 
to describe the states occurring in local condensations. 
Another point involves Bondi's and Gold's rejection of the postulate 
of relativity that the same basic equations can describe the varied obser-
vations of observers in any environment for the presumption it applies 
2 
only in similar environments. Instead, they postulate Mach's principle 
but, while there is no way yet to determine which obtains, this principle, 
1. F. Hoyle, "On the Cosm~logical Problem," M.N .R.A.S., 109(1949 ), 
365-371. 
2. H. Bondi and T. Gold, STEU, p. 252. 
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unlike Hoyle 's~ does not build upon traditonal theories of relativity. 
Hoyle prefers to start with these, since only in this way do we see 
where important problems arise. 
Finally, he believes Bondi and Gold do not strictly apply their 
a priori perfect cosmological principle, since they do not satisfy it 
within galaxies or galaxy clusters. Hoyle prefers to develop it later 
from axioms of the field form, thus ensuring the scientific idea that 
observable quantities should be tied in with the symbols of our equations -
and these are usually of the field form. Also, Bondi's and Gold's use of 
the Ma,:!h principle is weakened by the necessity of giving empty space 
some physical properties, since no region of space can remain perma-
nently empty. 
With these early debates we may leave these models for the pre-
sent. Others have presented a wide variety of criticisms, and the advo-
cates themselves have developed many detailed points involved. But the 
essence of these falls more suitably in the context of Chapter Five and 
will be left until then. 1 Thus we will conclude this most complex chapter 
with one final model showing continuous creation in a quite different man-
ner. 
ii. Kapp 1s Model for the Origin and Disappearance of Matter. 
As early as 1940, in his Science Versus Materialism~ Kapp first 
1. With the exception of an interesting new variant presented by 
Lyttleton and Bo:r1di. See Note Three, Appendix H. 
suggested a continuous creation idea which was later developed into 
several papers and books. We will here present the ideas given in two 
1 
of these papers. Further discussion of his books will be reserved for 
2 
our methodological studies in Chapter Five. 
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The scheme is based upon a rejection of the idea of a single crea-
tion because such an idea makes two moments of time unique - the moment 
creation began and the moment it ended. The idea also seems to assume 
the un:verse must have a single cause and that there is nothing odd in pre-
saming that the principle of the conservation of energy applies at all times 
except between the two moments above. Kapp rejects the alternative of 
ma.tter with infinite age because he believes that limiting conditions, not 
in fact achieved.~ should obtain, such as the fact that half the m2..tter in 
space is still interstellar, potential energy is still fin5.te in quantity, the 
volume density of space is still finite, entropy maxima have not been 
reach~d, and a limiting radius of curvature of expanding space has not 
been attained. 
Kapp prefers to minimize his hypotheses and to stress the fact that 
varied physical phenomena give differing ages for their initiationJ and 
this hardly points to a single creation. As an alternative to the above 
1. Reginald Kapp, DU, and his "Theories About the Origin and D::.s-
appearance of Matter," The Observatory, 73 (1953 ). 113-116. 
2. Reginald Kapp, TUC, and his Facts and Faith (Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1955 ). 
ideas~ Kapp believes matter is continuously created~ but because this 
would in an infinite time give the universe infinite density. which it has 
not~ he believes also that it must disappear. The creation is random 
and uncaused and its disappearance is simiarly random~ so that it is 
purely chance how long a particle lasts. Thus no region in space is 
more privileged in creation than another and no particle is preferred as 
to the time of its disappearance. 
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The model req'J.ires that most matter~ purely on statistical grounds~ 
arise in interstellar space. The matter then is attracted into neighbor-
ing stars. These stars lose mass in proportion to their size because most 
disappearance must occur where there is most matter. Thus stars and 
galaxies are continually gaining and losing matter. If the gain is greater 
than the loss~ the region involved is one of expansion while the region 
contracts if the reverse occurs. Kapp suggests that there must be an up-
per limit at which loss becomes greater than gain and that this limit is 
reached rather quickly so that galaxies will then remain there or slowly 
dwindle. He believes that observation shows few small nebulae but most 
galaxies of a roughly equal size~ possibly given by this critical maximum. 
Kapp is quite critical of Hoyle •s (and implicitly Bondi's and Gold's) 
alternative continuous creation hypothesis. He believes that Hoyle's 
mod·~l should give a continuous gradation of galaxies from very sma.ll to 
very great~ and this doesn't agree with observation. Also it should in-
volve some galaxies of infinite mass which, even though they have receded 
beyond observability~ should provide an infinite gravitational field at a 
finite distance from us. Finally, this geometric distribution violates 
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the perfect cosmological principle that all points in space-time are alike 
on a large scale. Hoyle has replied to these criticisms, but like so much 
else, and as we have repeatedly remarked, that is a matter for our next 
chapter to which we now turn at long last. 
V. A CRITIQUE OF COSMOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTS FROM THE 
POINT OF VIEW OF POPPER. 
1. The Hypothetico-Deductive Method in Cosmology. 
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i. Esse!!tialism, gonventionalism, or Hypothesis and Corroboration? 
In this chapter we intend to bring Popper's scheme for choice 
among comp•~ting theories to bear upon the cosmological models out-
lined previously. Specifically, we will see if these constructs are de-
fended, in part or in entirety, on Popperian bases by their exponents. 
Th·= first stage in this analysis is to ascertain from the methodologies 
noted in Chapters Three and Four, just how theoreticians in the cosmo-
logical field approach the question of model-building. 
Certain problems deserve special note in this co:::1text. We must 
try to distinguish the reasons given for accepting a specific technique 
after it has supposedly shown that it is fruitful scientifically from ~ 
priori reasons for giving it preference before experimental scrutiny. 
We must ask how cosmologists conceive of their respective schemes as 
handling the relation of inductive and deductive processes in scientific 
discovery. We must seek to expose the relation they see between their 
models and the world they describe. And we must see if they distinguish 
description from explanation in cosmological science. These together 
should provide us with some insight into the relationship of methodology 
to metaphysical conceptions and how far predilections of a non-scientific 
sort are determinative of the techniques and concepts a given cosmo-
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logist is willing to permit in discussing the universe, its history and its 
structure. 
We have gone to considerable pains to distill out of a long history 
of theorizing in the astronomical field on its broadest scale the implicit 
and explicit attitudes controlling decision on method and the conclusion. 
We have also been quite technical at times, not on~.y because O'.lr future 
discussion of the importanee of decision amo.:1g models and the methods 
of validation will necessitate rather elaborate and detailed analysis, but 
because the mine1tae of technique in deriving and enunciating the impli-
cations of models illustrate the logic of scientific discovery as distinet, 
to the degree that it is distinct, from the methodology of metaphysical 
theorizing. Thus let us move to a concentration of the long record in 
these regards, turning first to Popper's question as to whether a theory 
should be, in the eyes of the specialist, essentialistic, formalistic, or 
speculative of the nature of reality when it deals with the universe in its 
entirety, keeping in mind the problematic areas noted in the last para-
graph. 
Essentialism, we saw, was defined by Popper as the view which 
conceives it possible to establish the truth of a theory beyond reasonable 
doubt and which considers the aim of science to be such ultimate explan-
ation. 1 He regards it as being of no help to scientific work, and indeed 
1. See p. 6S: 
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a possible hindrance to asking new questions, for it assumes that there 
are essences (i.e. realities behind appearance) and the belief in these 
Pop;>er considers of little use in scientific practice, because we can 
.'lever know if and when we have come upon them. Indeed, the belief may 
even prove a stultifying influence since we may too readUy assume that 
our current theory is true of reality and thus the last word. Our study 
of the develop:nent of cosmological theory has~ I think, revealed anum-
ber of adherents to these, what Popper would call, incautious beliefs. Do 
they exhibit, however, the failings and deserve the measure of op;>ro-
brium which he delegates to them? 
Probably the first important point in our analysis must be to dis-
tinguish an essentialistic cosmological theory from certain essentialistic 
axioms basic to these constructs, for one may well be an essentialist 
with respect to the latter and not to the former. Relatively few cosmo-
logists have taken their stand on essentialism in the former stronger 
sense. Probably Copernicus 1, Galileo 2, and Kepler 3 fall generally in 
this class. So does much of the post-Newtonian argument from design 4 
5 
and the ideas of Euler, Faraday, and Maxwell. In the latter and weaker 
class falls a much larger number of theoreticians. The rationalists, 
1. See p. 41-3'7. 
2. See p. 9-¥-1. 
3. See p. 41-¥-2. 
4. See pp. 1/8-11'1. 
5. See pp. 121-122. 
exemplified by Leibniz's presump·:ion of the principle of continuity and 
the law of sufficient reason~ provide one case in point. 1 More's argu-
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me :It for the work of spirit in explaining motion 2 and Clarke •s arguments 
in defence of Newton are other early examples. 3 There are many other 
examples in Appendix B. Kant's belief that the general thesis of the New-
tonian world, at least insofar as it is phenomenal., was a necessary pro-
duct of our minds 4 ; aspects of the thought of Hertz., Kirchoff., and 
Pearson 5; Lorentz's retention of classical ideas of space and time 6 
the commitment to a real ether 7 ; the use of extensive ad hoc argu-
ment so as to preserve mechanical theories of gravity 8; and Einstein's 
belief in the rationality and intelligibility of nature 9 are further ill us-
trations. And when we move to the specific models of modern cosmology 
we find fundamental., in an essentialistic sense, such ideas as the cosmo-
10 
logical and perfect cosmological principles ., Eddington's view that 
physics is., in its important facets, the necessary product of mind which 
11 
must think in certain ways , and Milne's belief in the inherent ration-
ality of nature allowing us to deduce its laws. 
12 
1. See pp. /1,:-119-/;;;-:--
2. See p. 11'11. 
3. See pp. J/1. -117. 
4. See pp. 135"-/37. 
5. See pp. 1<¥-1 -111-~. 
6. See p . .,_sg. 
7. Seep. 1.21!--125". 
8. See pp. 11 ff-11 '1. 
9. See pp. /SS"-IS"'. 
10. See pp . ..zoz-zo3_, Z-1'-3-2.1/-~ #-tU-~'/1. 
11. See pp. 211-212J 211. -.Z/7. 
12. See p. 23l.. 
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All of these abo-,re examples presume that essential truth has been 
already discovered about O'..l.r world. But Popper defines an essential-
ist also as one who conceives theory as potentially capable of reachin.O' 
such truth. Likely Newton falls into this category. 1 Surely Ej_nstein 's 
essentialistic pursuit of a unified field theory is also of this type2 as is 
Eddington's and Milne's argument that their (differing) methodologies 
3 
seem to be the only correct one. 
In sum~ we may conclude that very few cosmologists have been so 
rash as to c::msider their models as final in all essentials but many have~ 
while taking their models as tentative, either treated some of their basic 
theses as true of reality or considered the goal of their theorizing to be 
attainable and ultimate, even if delimited, truth about nature. The pro-
blem these crystallize is that of ascertaining whether any, or all .. of 
these assumptions fails to aid scientific work and perhaps even hinders 
it, and whether alternative assumptions perhaps do hatter. 
The first alternative Popper presents is that of formalism or con-
ventionalism. This he defines as the thesis that theories are merely in-
struments for connecting one symbolic representation of reality to 
another .. mere aids to prediction and calculation. Of this attitude he is 
most critical. Science., he says .. advanees by testing its theories and not 
just by establishing theories of different ranges of applicability, by criti-
1. See p. ~s~. 
2. See pp. 157-IS!?. 
3. See pp. 236, 24-t-.z~::z. 
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cal attitude and not by a complacency in past successes at synthesis~ 
and more by skill at clever empirical corroboration or falsification than 
by skill at applying mathematical rules. 1 
Our survey has revealed that, whatever Popper may believe is best 
for scienee~ the instrumentalistic thesis has had a number of advocates 
in cosmology. 2 Tycho Brahe, 3 Newton~ 4 Kelvin, Poynting~ and Hertz 
5 in their mathematization of gravitational action across space, Berkeley 
. h" . ~ . . 6 d p . , 7 1n lS ep:s~em1c v1ews an orneare in his conventionalism are ex-
amples in the period before modern cosmology. With the advent of com-
plex relativistic models there appears a strong instrumentalistic tendency 
of much wider scope. It begins with Einstein's special relativity 8 and 
continues apace with his work on the cosmic constant, 9 with Robertson's 
studies, 10 with the untestable aspects of Godel's, Omer's, and Heckmann's 
11 
models, with the purely descriptive side of Dirac's theory and that of 
12 Jordan, It shows up too in the utilization of highly theoretical relativi-
1. See pp. ~o~ 66-67. 
2. Popper is, of course aware of this. We have simply systematically 
revealed who they are among the major figures. 
3. See p. "'· 
4. See pp. '1-S 3- '1-S"~. 
5. See pp. /.Z/-/23. 
6. See pp. /~~-"3';t-. 
7. See pp. 1¥-z. -/¥-3. 
8. Seep. /so. 
9. See pp. 17oJ/8'/. 
10. See p. 18¥-. 
ll. See pp. 17~-/"'· 
12. See pp . .z.z 3 J zz' -.zz7. 
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1 
ties in Eddington and in Jordan, and many critics find it in the (to them) 
artificial I time scale in Milne or the revised field equations of Hoyle. 2 
There are at least several problems here. One, which we will 
leave until later study, is whether such models or attitudes do less for 
science than Popper's own theory. The other is the assumed metaph.y-
sical neutrality implicit here in comparison to the positive ontological 
ideas of essentialism. We shall discuss these in a moment, but first sev-
eral brief comments on Popper's own view of scientific theory. 
In Chapter Two we noted in detail Popper's criterion which suggests 
that science best advances by making conjectures and subjecting them to 
critical test. A theory should be a serious attempt to discover the nature 
of reality, unlike essentialism in that it never claims to have arrived at 
truth and unlike formalism in that it claims to assert something about the 
3 
world - even if it is only what reality caiL""l.Ot be like. There is little 
doubt that the majority of the ideas we have presented in our outline fall 
within Popper's class. But there are still differences needing explora-
tion, for some presume the conjectures to be incbcedJ and Popper does 
not. and some consider testing to be verification rather than falsification, 
as in Popper. Later. in Chapter Six, we will scrutinize carefully the na-
ture of validation but we have left several other assessments open and to 
1. See pp. :zo~-Z/Z,ZZ9-.z.-s(). 
2. See pp. 238,z.t~-s-. 
3. See pp. 67-6'i/. 
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these we now turn. 
The first of these is the relationship of cosmological models to 
the world in essentialism and its competitors as categorized by Popper. 
We refer here not to the epistemological, analogical, and logical prob-
lems attendant to this relationship which will occupy us often in our 
later analysis but to the general metaphysical p:;..~edilections of each of 
the three groups which are partially determinative of their attitude to-
ward the methods and goals of science. Our interest lies solely in 
deciding whether Popper is correct in his evaluation of these presuppo-
sitions. 
Discussing essentialism, 1 Popper seems to find in it opposition 
to two fundamentals in his own metaphysical position. One is that there 
is no single, essential, ultimate reality attained or to be attained. The 
second is that to p:esume there is such a reality is of no help in science 
and may even hinder its progress. Now in our comments above we noted 
that essentialism has several faces. The stronger of these conceives its 
cosmological theories to be final and there can be little doubt that such 
must fall under Popper's judgment that they could stultify science. But 
have they? The lesson of history is surely that such theories have done 
more to stifle debate about science than to limit its operational advance, 
at least where science was free to advance independent of strict political 
1. See pp. 6s--o8, 
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or religious control. Where freedom to differ with a construct has been 
available, the judgment of finality has usually died with the inventor. It 
has been apologetes for particular arguments from a theory to deity and 
synthesizers 1 who saw in a theory a correspondence with other meta-
physical or political schemes, rather, who have suffered by petrifying 
2 
their philosophies in tying their defence in part or entirely to a given 
cosmological scheme. Given a relatively free environment, or even a 
closed society, social forces of many sorts, along with new discoveries, 
have always eventuated in new theory. 
Also important is Popper's second alternative that perhaps such 
esentialistic theories just do nothing to aid seientific advance. In a logi-
cal sense this is very largely true. If a cosmic scheme is believed in all 
essentials to correspond with reality there is little incentive in this for 
novel conception. But history reveals that the combination of attempting 
to fit in details which do not fit and the great variety of drives causing 
other thi.nkers to differ has provided this incentive in a shorter or longer 
period. The attitude of finality thus acts more as a goad than a positive 
force for change, and Popper is likely correct in asking that scientific 
methodology should augment these negative fo:;:--ces, which will exist any-
way, with continual pressures for improvements which are built in. The 
LThis may be one person or effectively an entire society. 
2. And even in rigidifying their ability to adapt to novel circumstanees. 
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whole process of technical advance should thereby be accelerated. 
The weaker essentialistic scheme, however, as we saw takes only 
certain aspects of its theory as ultimately true. This can be less serious 
as a deleterious influence on improving theory than the first type of es-
sentialism for its places dogmatism into a more restricted sphere. Some 
examples we mentioned earlier actually utilized such accepted truths as 
the incentive to explore their implications, thereby develop:ng quite novel 
1 
constructs! Popper is seemingly correct, however, in calling upon 
science to continually examine even its most cherished presuppositions 
be it in spec-lfic models in, for example, cosmo~ogy or in more general 
physical systems such as those of Newton or Einstein. 
The difficulty here lies in the fact that what we said of essential-
istic theories above applies as well to these more restricted essential-
istic axioms, but even mo:~e importantly in realizing that such axioms in 
cosmology are sometimes taken as essential to thought or essential to the 
assump·~ion we can be other than agnostic about the long history and large 
scale of the universe. It is hard to avoid the assumption the mind mu.st 
think in terms of space and time for example, quite apart from a Kantian 
or Eddingtonian specification of exactly how or why. It is eq11ally hard to 
see how we can do without the belief that we know, or can know, something 
1. The fact that many models may utilize the same supposedly essential 
axioms may, however, attract attention away from the axioms so that 
they remain unexamined much longer than a single entire model would. 
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about distant events in space and time. One may reasonably expect, how-
ever, that these beliefs be studied continually to see just what they ential. 
New facts or ideas may require change in O'J.r concepts of space and time, 
or may demand a new cosmological principle: at least we should see if 
we need new ideas on the limitations these will always have. 
Finally, Popper mentioned the essentialistic conviction that true 
theory is an attainable goal. Does this always fail to aid science as he 
argues? His claim is doubtful, for we have noted a number of thinkers 
in which such a goal of true knowledge abo:1t reality provided a real stimu-
lus to their labors. Is it not at least possible that we might be stimulated 
to wondering about the possibility of levels of reality, for example, which 
Popper's own view may suggest, and this could lead to imp::.~oved theory? 
Does this attitude ever hinder science, however? The only case that 
readily comes to mind here is the chance that certain types of speculation 
might not be carried on if our metaphysical attitudes disallowed, for ex-
ampl-9, the possibility of non-finite models. non-uniform mod<2ls, a.."l.d such 
as means to the desired end. 
What now about formalism, the first alternative to the essentialis-
tic schemes? It seems obvious that such a methodology can aid sc-i.ence 
by stimulating ma·.:hematical analysis and synthesis. It is just as obvious 
that it can hinder technical advance if it leads to complacency or to for-
getting the need for hard emp~rical work. But Popper seems, in his 
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criticism to overlook the fact that some minds are so constructed that 
they are highly theoretical in bent and of a very logical and esthetic 
spirit while others are much more practical and suspicious of abstrac-
tion. If science integrates both types of worker, as it usually does, these 
fears of Popper's need not eventuate. 
A more basic problem is the metaphysical attitudes of typical 
formalistic conventionalism. Usually it is ontologically agnostic, but it 
may, as we saw, be even anti-metaphysical. However, it is interesting 
to note that people with such attitudes fail to realize the implicit beliefs 
they actually have about reality for they a priori tell us that models 
should not seek to be like reality or that the only permissible scientific 
concepts are those wh;_ch disallow certain typ:cal metaphysical ideas. 
Conventionalism is then itself a part of a metaphysic. Two difficulties 
arise as a consequence of failing to see this. One is a failure to guard 
against some of the essentialistic shortcomings we have noted, for this 
may well freeze a grandiose formalistic scheme into finality just as much 
as any essentialistic theory does. The other is that., in failing to see cer-
tain biases placed upon the kind of model allowed because of implicit 
metaphysical strictures, one may stultify the search for differing models. 
Both are particularly dangerous in cosmology. 
Similar difficulties arise in the hypothetico-deductive scheme Popper 
prefers. He spends relatively little time discussing the value judgments 
one must make in analyzing any test for corroborating a thesis. Such 
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judgments often include metaphysical predilections quite explicitly. He 
1 
tells us that metaphysics has been the source of much scientific theory 
but also that every statement in science (including those in tests presum-
2 
ably) is a theory. Why then is metaphysics not determinative of at least 
some judgments about the results of tests? 
Popper is also quite clearly desirous that metaphysics not limit 
theorizing. 3 But he spends comparatively little time discussing the ori-
gin of theories 4 and seems to ignore the great likelihood that metaphy-
sical biases on theory choice~ even if only as working hypotheses~ may 
well require careful explication. However~ some compensation occurs 
in his falsification test at the other end of theory choice. Most cosmo-
logists consider verifiability, rather than falsifiability~ as the essential 
eleme~~t in corroborating a construct. This tends to produce perhaps un-
due confidence in a model and to give the feeling of having arrived at a 
satisfacto:ry 'truth' about phenomena. The difference, for practical pur-
poses wi.th essentialism here becomes faint. Popper's more suspicious 
attitude tends to have less of this tendency~ save in the negative sense that 
testing tells us what is not true of reality. 
5 
A second problem with the three methodologies lies in their varia-
1. See pp. 22,2 s; 30, 37. 68 
2. Seepp.~~-s6,S'f. 
3. See pp. 31-#- o~. 
4. See pp . .z3J3:5J37JS'3,~S'I-,S,, 
5. See pp. 6'1-69. 
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tions with respect to description and explanation in cosmology. It is not 
It is not 'our point here to critically analyze varied conceptions of the 
role of theory in these regards but rather to poi.nt up apparent relation-
ships between one's method and the stress one places upon description as 
against explanation. Popper's remarks on this subject are rather incom-
plete. Consonant with his ideas above, he remarks that to conjecture that 
a statement expresses a natural law is to conjecture that we express a 
structural property of the world. 1 Of course, he claims, one can never 
be sure that the supposed law is genuine because we cannot search every-
where for counter instances nor search all possible worlds in which 
initial conditions might differ. Thus a posi~ive_criterion of natural neces-
sity is impossible but falsification may, in a negative way, obviate some 
statement as a natural law. This means that potential ultimate explanation 
is possible but not necessary. 
This is the crux of his difference on this point with essentialism 
2 
which claims that there are ultimate explanations. It is also at variance 
with formalism in which explanation is, he feels, merely the use of instru-
ments to con:1ect one symbolic representation of nature with another. 3 
Testing is not the same as trying out different computation rules! But 
while this is inceptive, is it sufficiently refined for the history of cosmo-
LK. Popper, LSD, p. 432ff. 
2. Ibid~, p. 431. 
3. See p. 66. 
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log-y we have outlined? 
For example, do not some essentialistic theories really claim only 
that there are ultimate des_criptions_ ? Copernicus did not explain why 
planets moved as they did but begged the question by calling it 'natural' 
that they should so move. Galileo and Kepler asked only that we mathe-
matically describe a world they believed was mathematical itself. Such 
explanation as they used was largely mystical or at least not amenable 
to scientific study. For Newton~ explanation of gravity was only a goal 
to be sought; the present analysis was merely descriptive. And Pearson 
endeavored to reduce all dynamical theory (explanatory) into kinematic 
theory (descriptive). Popper shoald thus distinguish between the view of 
some essentialistic theoreticians that we can introduce forces, ethers., 
spa~e-time matrices and such as adeq·.1ate scientific explanations for 
events in ;nature and the above views that science describes and perhaps 
only metaphysical addenda explain why things act as they do. 
Again, in regard to formalistic theories Popper's request that we 
seek relative testability among the many possible descriptions of the same 
data is salutary, but is the kind of explanatory status he gives such con-
structs the only explanation they claim? Unless we require scientific 
explanation to be mechanistic in nature such field theories as those of 
Kelvin, Poynting, and Hertz surely claim to explain force. Unless we 
exclude metaphysical ideas as explanatory, does not a formalist such as 
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Berkeley seek explanation in a sufficiently comp:cehensive weltanschauung? 
But e7en the most descriptive of cosmological models relating diverse 
events into a mathematically predictive pattern~ by the very fact it re-
lates at all, imp:!.ies that these events are explainable somehow in terms 
of each other, regardless of how metaphysically agnostic their adherents 
may be. 
And, finally, in Popper's own hypothetico-deductive scheme the 
distinction between description and explanation is not clear. A possible 
natural law may be descriptive of the properties of the world without 
dynamically relating these, while most broad cosmoiogical schemes~ 
each of whlch is a sort of law of laws, seeks to relate these descriptive 
analyses so as to explain them to that degree. While the analysis of this 
distinction will req·J.ire further discussion, Popper's incertitude about the 
term 'explanation' in natural laws is of little help. 
Early in this section we mentioned two other problems; the rela-
tion of induction to deduction and the relative roles of ~riori and 
a posteriori defences in the three theory types. The dj~scussion of these 
is related to the ma.'ly factors governing the postulation of a theory, in 
part at least independent of what such constructs are taken to involve 
as analyzed in the pages immediately pl~eceding, and thus will be discussed 
in the next section. We have seen several general prope:cties which advo-
cates of the three schools conceive of their theories as having in different 
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ways, and we will later become quite specific with others~ but the reasons 
wh;y people choose one way of handling these properties over another 
needs discussion. 
The question of parely operational success or of the way people con-
ceive their theory to be related to p~ysical nature of course plays an im-
portant and necessary role in the decision which of the three positions 
one desires to be aligned with. But we have hinted earlier at many other 
factors involved in this decision also - perhaps even determining the de-
cision ~riori. Popper has said that induction is neither the soarce of, 
nor an adequate defence for, concept formation. He also largely ignores 
the factors in theory choice which are not connected with testability. 
1 
W!.thin his definition of the logic of scientific discovery the former is 
obviated and the latter is excluded. But it will be our intent to show that 
something like induction is often believed by cosmologists to operate in 
decision on their choice of a construct, and that the process of analysis 
and test of a theory is not readily isolated from the world-view of the 
theoretician nor the values of the community to which the theory is pre-
sented. In Chapter Five we will try to improve upon Popper's thesis in 
the light of these, and other, points but here it will be sufficient to dem-
onstrate our case. 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 38. 
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ii. Metaphysics and Bias in Cosmology. 
The last section showed some oversimplification in Popper's ac-
count of the three schools of theory interpretation. This section will 
show some artificiality in his delineation of the process of scientific 
discovery when compared with the history of cosmological development. 
For it is Popper's thesis that the origin of theories is irrele-.rant to the 
logical analysis of scientific knowledge 1 and also that the testing of 
theories is a matter which should be predicated solely on emp-i_rical data, 
and this appears overly simple in a number of ways. 
(1) Popper tells us that the central problem of epistemology is the growth 
of knowledge and that this is best studied by analyzing the growth of sci-
entific knowledge. 2 But if one dismisses theory construction from such 
analysis, is it not then dismissed from epistemology? What of the rational 
elements he says it may contain (even if it also involves irrational 'crea-
tive intuition')? 3 Do we not need to classify and sort sense experiences 
and our knowledge of earlier theories., both those falsified and those still 
accepted, in developing a new theory? 4 Are these rational elements not 
subject matter for a theory of knowledge? 
·-------
1. See pp. :23~ 33J37. 
2. K. Popper, LSD, p. 15. 
3. Ibid., p. 32. 
4. Compare G.S. Kirk, "Popper on Science and the Presocratics," Mind, 
69(1960), 318-330. See Popper's discussion in LSD, p. 31 of the logi-
cal reconstruction of the process whereby testing reveals a theory 
to be a discovery. 
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(2) In develop5.ng a theory one uses judgements as to how to relate and 
arrange the facts about which one theorizes and as to the relationship 
between one's theory and earlier falsified constructs. Now Popper says 
that the logical analysis of science deals only with discovering the vali-
dity of theories (Can they be justified? Does a statement depend logi-
cally upon other statements? Etc.), bat claims that the origin of theories 
1 
is a matter for the psychology of knowledge only. If the analysis plays 
this a posteriori role, why divorce it from a partly similar antecedent 
role? Does he not claim that logical analysis deals with justification and 
logical interrelationships, and isn't this partially the question involved in 
construct-building? It seems artificial to allow scientific analysis to 
deal with theories until they are falsified and yet not deal with the process 
by which a theoretician may extract elements from these, collate them, 
introduce portions of other yet-unfalsified theories, and bring these to-
gether with other simple theoretical statements about empirical data into 
a novel theory. 
(3) Theories do not exist in a vacuum: they tend to be interrelated with 
one's general weltanscha~ung. Testing a theory involves many kinds of 
judgment and these are partially predicated upon this world-view. Experts 
differ on whether a test falsifies or does not, on whether added concepts 
1. K. Popper, LSD, p. 31. Also pp. 55"-s-o. 
271 
are ad hoc or are not, and even on the pre-judging which the particular 
language used or the questions asked may involve. Why then assume 
that empirical data sufficiently judges a theory as does Popper? 
(4) Popper's comments that conviction is epistematically irrelevant to 
1 
the acceptability of a theory, that metaphysical predilection must not 
restrict scientific research, 2 that metaphysics has frequently antici-
pated scientific theory and stimulated its development, 3 and that there 
is thus, by implication. an appropriate area for metaphysics which is not 
meaningless as some would have it. 4 are all salutary but not entirely 
felicitous. For he tells us that false theories may stimulate science 5 
and that every statement about nature is a theory 6 so that, if varied 
theories have equal prior claim to describing reality (even if the more 
7 
conjectural of these are to be made more testable), one would expect 
that muGh that passes for scientific before it can be tested may well be 
metaphysical on this definition (i.e. it does not turn out to be falsifiable). 
Popper's eomments then express abstractions to the degree that one may 
not be able to ascertain at any time entirely what role they play in the cur-
rent state of the art. 
1. See p. 5"6. 
2. Seep. 3'1. 
3. See pp. 2z~.zs-. 
4, See pp. IB~ 3Z-3~. 
5, SeeK. Popper, "Baek to the Pre-Socratics," Proc. of the Arist, Soc, .• 
59(1958-1959)~ 8. 
6. lbi~~--' p. 3. Also pp. St,-5'7. 
7. See p, ''· 
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We will have to examine these points carefully in Chapter Six, but 
we may now turn to cosmology to discover whether there is evidence that 
1 
the problems are very real. To do this let us see the part played by 
political dogma, by religious attitude, by philosophical predilection, by 
the scientific melieu, and by psychological factors in determining the 
development and acceptability of constructions of a cosmological type. 
Political restrictions upon theor-y choice tend to do two things. They 
establish an environment in which speculation in sensitive areas is 
avoided 
2 
and they app·~ar eventually to absorb any theory useful to the 
practical development of science within the state into the area of re-
spectability by whatever philosophical re-orientation is necessary. 3 In 
addition, practical restrictions in the everyday work of science are re-
vealed by restraints and incentives of various types which foster theory 
1. Popper is not, of course, oblivious to such questions. See his OSE. 
But he neither discusses cosmology extensively nor the impossibi-
lity of evading the problems we note below in any analysis of scien-
tific method. 
2. See Appendix 1, Note One. Also see the major new work by Thomas 
Blakeley, Soviet Scholasticis~ (D-.:>rdrecht, Holland: D. Riedel, 1961), 
particularly pp. 4, 36, 129, 135, 138-139; Raymond Seeger's analysis 
of their changed views on relativity in "On Teaching the P.il.ilosophy 
of Physics," Ame~d~ur. P~_s_j.cs, 28(1960), 384-393; and Barring-
ton Mo~re, Jr ... ''Influence of Political Creeds on the Acceptance of 
Theories," in Philipp Frank, The yalij.atio~_!~cien~i_f_!.c T!!~or.!_es 
(Boston: The Beacon Press, (1954)1956 )., pp. 29-36. 
3. See "Logical Empiricism and the Philosophy of the Soviet Union" in 
Pnilipp Frank, Modern Sci~nce~nd ~s P~i_losop~y (Cambridge: 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1950), pp. 198-206. Also M, Iovtchouk's 
Survey in R. Klibansky (ed.) .. Philosophy in the Mid-Century, Vol. 4 
(Florence: UNESCO, 1959), pp. 236-251. 
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and experiment amenable to the purposes of the state. We have discussed. 
in Appendix 1, N•)te One, Naziism and Communism as extreme examples 
of these points. but even in more open societies restrictio::1s operate to a 
lesser degree, generally not by official dictate but by subtle accumulated 
social pressures. 
In the case of speculation of an ideologically sensitive nature the 
state generally operates in more open societies to protect such freedom 
by fostering research where it may be hindered within smaller religious 
and philosophical sub-cultures. This is particularly true in cosmology 
and astronomy where such smaller groups have often neither the mo::1ey 
n:::>r inclination to promote such esoteric pursuits. As to the eventual 
absorption of new theory into the public philosophy. this may safely be 
ignored in cosmology, tho:.1gh certain biological theories have met such 
a process. Whatever role Darwinism may play in various social theories, 
there has not been any similar utilization of cosmological models! It is 
in the practical fostering of scientific areas valuable to the public pur-
pose that cosmology may suffer. Such aid as it has received has been 
largely ancillary to other ends, or has been of a mo:e indirect sort such 
as the provision of tax benefits to foundatio::1s who build telescopes and 
endow chairs. 
This is of course ultimately the product of social attitudes toward 
sciences with little utilitarian value which are not unlike Fourrier's claim 
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that the principle aim of science is public usefulness. 1 (Even the stress 
upon space studies today is largely the product of cold war competition). 
It can eventually influence the attitudes of scientists themselves. In any 
case we may say that various societal restraints., which we may safely 
call political, act so as to inhibit the free study and test of theory., even 
if only in that the scientist may not be stimulated to examine widely-
accepted presuppositions in his field and may rather be stimulated to 
unconscious ad hoc adjustments of theory to societal mores in testing 
those theories he does use. 2 
The role of religious attitudes in theory choice is also of great 
importance. We have noted many instances in passing in our earlier 
study, 3 but let us now synthesize the implications involved here. McCrea 
touches upon one critical problem when he remarks, "Physics as ordin-
arily form·::~lated gives us laws that certain things must obey if those 
things exist. In cosmology it seems as though we expect the laws to tell 
1. See Cornelius Lanczos., ~E, p. 58; Harcourt Brown (ed.), Sc~nce_ an~ 
the Creative Spirit (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1958), pp. 26ff., 
158ff.; the overstated but useful volume by G.R.G. Mure, Retreat From 
Truth (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 19.58); and B. Moore, Jr.-in P. Frank-
(ed-:); VST, pp. 31, 35, on societal pressures. On utilitarian ideas for 
science see Ren~ Dubos., The Dreams of Reason (New York: Columbia 
Univ. Press, 1951), pp. 132': 157. And on the restrictions education may 
place upon new ideas in science see Henry Eyring's chapter "Scienti-
fic Creativity" in Harold Anderson (ed.), Creatj.vity and Its Cultivation 
(New York: Harper Bros., 1959) and Paul Heist eta!_. "Personality and 
Scholarship," Scie_!lce, 13.3(1961), 362-367. 
2. Compare pp. 270-27/, 
3. See pp. 'II- 'IZ, 9~, /OZ, 113 -1/'f, 138; /5"6, /I'Z, zoz, 23~, z~6, z~a--z~?, ~~J-~~8/ 
41-7?, 41-B/. 
275 
us that certain things must exist that obey the laws." 1 While he is 
discussing here certain methodological distinctions between cosmolo-
gical theory and physics., if one interprets 'laws' so as to include reli-
gioas restrictions of a general sort, this succinctly points up an ~priori 
judgment such belief places upon theory. 
Religious commitments act in cosmology in two ways. One is a 
general pressure to conformity, where the environment of theorizing and 
experiment exists in a religio:1s culture of some sort. The other is in 
the personal predilections of the theorizer himself, whereby his choice 
of theory and his interpretation of experimental conclusions are colored 
by his value judgments. And what is said about religio:1 applies equally 
well to anti-religious or dogmatically atheistic beliefs. Much has been 
written about the former case ranging from historical studies in the his-
tory of ideas., through studies of the differences between the way science 
is handled in differing religions, to reports on the stresses within parti-
cular sects or within the centers of learning they support. It is probably 
fairly safe to say that cultures such as the Soviet place as many res-
trictions as any large religioas environment has succeeded in doing in 
the past and that the degree of restriction may increase with decrease 
[ -W .H. McC~ea., "Cosmology: a Reassessment," The Times Science 
Review., 37(1960), 5. 
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in the size of the religious community involved. In any case, the prob-
lems raised by such restrictions are not unlike those discussed under 
political restraints and may be passed by here. 
More particular are the difficulties raised by our second case. The 
choice among prior models, the development of one 1s own construct, the 
interpretatio~ of the meaning of conclusions deduced from a cosmology, 
and the evaluation of test data have all been conditioned quite frequently, 
in part or in toto, by religious attitudes on the part of individuals quite 
1 
apart from any external pressure to conformity. Collier has remarked 
on the degree to which this is just as true of anti-religio:1s bias. He says 
of it, '~othing exists but material objects, energy, and human desires; 
which last may properly belong under energy. Thus there can exist no 
spiritual reality prior to and not dependent on the material universe." 2 
Lanczos has noted somewhat the same thing in the rejection by scientists, 
3 
because of an assumed mysticism, of Einstein's unified field theory. 
The two major aspects of the problem may be illustrated by the 
diverse theses of Kuhn and Jordan. Kuhn claims, ''Man does not exist 
for long witho:.tt inventing a cosmology, because a cosmology can pro-
vide him ·with a world view which permeates and gives meaning to his 
1. See Appendix 1, Note Two. 
2. K.G. Collier, ORB, p. 141. 
3. Cornelius Lanczos, AE, pp. 56-57. 
every action, practical and spiritual." 1 And Jordan remarks: 
It is doubtless very justifiable ... that our scientific 
research on the future and past of the universe need not 
be influenced by human desires and hopes or by theolo-
gical theories of creation, It is also characteristic that 
the state of development of our science suddenly makes 
such warnings necessary again. 2 
The former implies, it seems, the impossibility of dichotomizing one's 
thought so as to hold to a physical model, within the context of a larger 
weltanschauung, which at least tentatively does not appear to be in 
harmony with it. The latter. if Kuhn is correct. then asks for an im-
possible deal - but it is a necessary caution for all that. It is how to 
show clearly when such factors do impinge, and in what ways, that we 
must analyze later.3 Here, however, let us merely summarize how they 
affect Popper's thesis in the light of our comments earlier. 
(1) Among many other factors, religious belief is one of the sources of 
the limitation whereby we theorize within rather restricted areas, con-
sciously or unconsciously rejecting alternatives or not even thinking of 
them.+ If epistemology involves conceptualizing experience this surely 
1. Quoted in James Haden, CHS, pp. 79-80. 
2. Pascual JOrdan, Physics of the Twentieth Century, trans. E. Oshry 
(New York: Philosophical Library, 1944), p. 184. 
3. See pp. 3 vs--4t-oo. 
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4. It has been said, by Frank, of Einstein that his religious views weren't 
determined by his particular scientific theories but by his general 
judgment about the role of science and fact in human life. Compare 
Einstein's, "Science, Philosophy and Religion" reprinted in Philip 
Wiener (ed.), Readings on the Philosophy of Science, (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953 ). pp. 601-607. A careful reading of 
this will show that Frank has overstated his case - possibly because 
of his own predilections. On our point see Vergil Dykstra, "Philoso-
phers and Presuppositions," !Y!!.!!£, 69(1960), 63-68, esp. p. 64. 
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acts so as to limit such activity. 
(2) In the process of forming constructs, religious predilections affect 
one •s judgment of what needs improving in past theories and what data 
is most important to synthesize in a new theory. The gestalt here is 
in no essential way different from that involved in the process of cor-
roboration which judges the improvement a theory needs and what em-
pirical facts corroborate or falsify. or how much. 
(3) Religious belief plays an important role in testing a theory. We may 
mislead ourselves or others by the way we talk about our tests, and the 
very questions we ask. We may also disagree on what is special plead-
ing or ad hoc correction. These are intimately related to our commit-
! 
ment to specific religious attitudes. Of course, the result of new ob-
servation might also demand some revision in specific details of prior 
religious interpretation of natural phenomena. 
What now of metaphysics in science, at least as regards our pro-
blem? This is rather more broad than religious influence since diverse 
metaphysical theses are held by those of the same religious persuasion. 
Waismann has noted one difficulty here. 
[New]ways of thinking evolved in science, when they have 
become firmly established, tend to harden into metaphysics 
1. A very thorough account of this is found in Isaac Levi, "Must a 
Scientist Make Value Judgments?". Jour. of Phil., 57 (1960). 345-356 
and in Frederic Will, "The Justification of Theories," Phil. Rev., 
64(1955 ). 370-388. 
so that they are regarded as necessary, as a sort of ines-
capable groove within which thought is bound to run. 1 
Rust raises another, though it is quite covert in his remarks. 
(Men start with absolute presuppositions) and the reason 
sets out to demonstrate that it meets the theoretical and 
practical issues raised by human existence. In the pro-
cess it will arrive deductively at certain presuppositions 
which are implied in the initial faith, but it will finish 
where it began except that it will make its subject fully 
aware of the meaning and implication of this faith prin-
. 1 2 c1p e. 
And finally, Whiteley cautions us to remember that 
the idea of a presuppositionless scientific investigation, 
which proceeds simply by collecting, sifting and classi-
fying the given facts, is mythical. Our initial approach 
to a scientific problem is determ1ned by our metaphysi-
cal presuppositions, that is, by our views as to the sort 
of explanation which is discoverable .•.• Since meta-
physical beliefs determine the kind of hypotheses that 
scientists put forward, a lop-sided or blinkered or 
downright erroneous metaphysic can hamper scientific 
progress. 3 
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Let us ask, then, whether Popper aids us in escaping the tendency 
to freeze our cosmology into final truth, just what occurs when we dis-
cover the empirical implications of a belief in the nature of reality, and 
1. F. Waismann in R.J. Blin-Stoyle et al, Turning Points in Physics 
(New York: Harper and Bros., 1959), p. 98. Philipp Frank, AE, 
p. 30 makes the same point. 
2. Paraphrasing R.C. Collingwood. See Eric Rust, "The Apologetic 
Task in Modern Science," Review and Expositor, 56(1959), 178-200. 
3. C.H. Whiteley, "Metaphysics and Science," Phil. Quart., 9(1959 ), 
248-249. 
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what effect metaphysical presuppositions have on the application of Pop-
per's methodology. Those elements of the problem which metaphysical 
persuasion has in common with religious attitude we may conveniently 
pass by, stressing rather the distinctiveness of metaphysical judgment 
here. 
In our earlier studies we have noted a number of examples of ex-
treme essentialism - the attempt to take physical theories of varied scope 
and turn them into final truths about reality. We have also examined the 
historical and logical failures in such endeavours. With respect to such 
concepts, Popper's remarks are very helpful in pointing up the need for 
continual testing of physical models and in stressing the need to be truly 
empirical in seeing how inconclusive a bearing past and future observa-
tion have on the theories used to predict them. This emphasis on the 
absence of crucial experiment in science, save in the negative sense of 
disproof, is most salutary. 1 We may even broaden this and state that 
the successes of various scientific constructs, or even the fruitfulness of 
certain scientific attitudes, gives no logical reason for scientistic con-
1. The idea of crucial experiment is crystallized in Francis Bacon. See 
Herbert Hochberg, "The Empirical Philosophy of Roger and Francis 
Bacon," Phil. of Sci., 20(1953 ), 313-326 and Curt Ducasse, ''Francis 
Bacon's Philosophy of Science" in R.M. Blake et al, TSM, pp. 50-74. 
The idea is criticized in Philipp Frank, PhiloSO'j)hy of'Science 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice Hall, Inc., 1957 ), pp. 31-32, 193-199, 
in Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, trans. 
P. Wiener (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1954) xi, 189-190, and 
in S.E. Toulmin, "Crucial Experiments: Priestly and Lavoisier" in 
Philip Wiener and Aaron Noland (eds.), RST, pp. 481-496. 
1 
elusions or for the conclusion that certain metaphysical ideas are 
2 thereby proven. 
But Popper's method of analysis is only partially successful with 
certain other difficulties. Bridgman, for example claims that we bring 
to our concepts and methods certain pervasive blindnesses and illusions 
which we record in our use of words quite unawares. Words are often 
treated as conceptually terminal where really one may inquire much 
further and introduce new concepts. 3 Or we may falsely interpret data 
and even, unintentionally, ignore what may be pertinent. 4 Or again we 
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may interpret our models and the data of observation in a variety of ways, 
rightly or wrongly, both metaphysically in the traditional sense or purely 
functionally. 5 There may be varied levels of discourse, 6 or one's 
metaphysic may be so unspecific that, though it fits physical data, it may 
be quite insufficient to confront other realms of human activity, interest, 
1. Compare Einstein's opposition to positivism. See Philipp Frank, ELT, 
pp. 282-284 and G. Bergmann, Review of Schilpp, AE. Phil. Rev.,60 
(1951), 272. See also J .H. Woodger, Physics, Psychology and Medicine 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1956 ). pp. 10, 12, 20-21. 
2. Compare Richard Tolman, RTC, p. 488. and Frederick Copleston, SJ, 
Contemporary Philosophy (London: Burns and Oates, (1956)1960), 
pp. 26-44. 
3. See C.D. Collins, Review of Bridgman, Way Things Are. Mind, 69 
(1960). 422-423. 
4. Compare Max Planck, The New Science, trans. J. Murphy and 
W.H. Johnston (New York: Meridian Books), 314-319. 
5. See the discussion on Nature and Supernature in The Christian Gra-
duate, 7(1954), 182-189. 
6. Compare D.C. Spanner, "The Methods and Limitations of Science," 
'The Christian Graduate, 6(1953 ), 12-20. 
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1 
and experience in a satisfying way. Each one of these illustrations is, 
in a sense, a 'freezing' of a model of the physical world into a metaphy-
sic of an implicit or explicit sort. 
The resolution of Bridgman's problem, to the degree that it is 
resolved, lies more in corrections from the side of logicians and from 
the hypothecating of new ppysical schemes than it does from a Popperian 
corroboration-examination of a given theory. The question of false in-
terpretation or unintentional ignoring of data arises from either per-
sonallimitations or from the restricted outlook of the scientific melieu 
of a period. The former is subject to correction by continued testing of 
models proffered, particularly by a variety of persons, but the latter re-
quires more a change in philosophical outlook than simply more test 
data. Finally, it is quite possible to obtain more and more suitable phy-
sica! models, as far as Popper's criteria are concerned, and yet effectively 
isolate these from any attempt at a more embracing metaphysics. This 
tends to debilitate science by placing its technological aspects out of pro-
portion to the many other purposes one should have in desiring to know 
about nature. Or, on the other hand, we may tend to relax the diligent 
testing of our scientific theories if they appear to harmonize with our 
world view, again restricting scientific advance. A continued use of 
1. See J .V. Langmead Casserley, The Christian in Philosophy (New 
York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, n.d.), p. 198. 
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Popper's program, but broadened so as to embrace the predictable por-
tions of the factors we are discussing in this section~ can aid in escaping 
either of these limitations~ but irrational aspects in all scientific work 
make it difficult to perform the task rigorously. This is hardly the fault 
of a person like Popper who argues for the worth of a given methodology, 
but it is a limitation nonetheless in its widespread acceptance and use. 
Let us turn now to the reciprocal relationship existing between a 
metaphysic and its empirical implications, in respect to Popper's ideas. 
We have noted earlier num~rous examples of cosmologists whose attitudes 
toward their model and toward empirical data was related to their meta-
physical ideas. As they observe nature and as they test their theories 
what effect does this effort have upon their more general beliefs as they 
progress and what effect do the beliefs in turn have upon their scientific 
work? Now Popper cautions scientists to be ever vigilant and to avoid 
the ad hoc and the dogmatic attitude in their work of conjecture and test~ 
and we may first inquire whether such a spirit affects their metaphysical 
concepts. With few exceptions it appears that it does, as we shall note 
specifically later in the chapter. 
Cosmologists appear to be conscious of the need to examine contin-
1 
ually the implications of their weltanschauung. They see that such 
1. See a fine~ brief survey in Sir Wm. Dampier, A History of Science 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press~ 1949), pp. 455-501. 
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a priori schemes may place limits upon scientific ideas and methods 
and with varied, but always incomplete, success they attempt to avoid 
this. 1 They become more aware of the need to avoid the naturalistic 
fallacy of confusing what is with what the believe ought to be the case. 2 
They may even explore systematically where a hypothetical negation of 
some traditionally accepted principle leads after the fashion of what 
Bachelard calls the 'philosophy of No.' They may ask themselves how 
much evidence is necessary to negate a metaphysical belief. They may 
see science as suggestive of new ways of viewing ultimate reality. All 
these are important because, as we have noted in the past few pages, one's 
scientific judgment is influenced in return by our decisions here. 
This other side of the continual oscillation of influences, as it re-
lates to Popper's conception of the spirit of scientific inquiry, reveals 
several limitations in the latter. For instance, one's metaphysic may lead 
one to conceivinJof elements in a cosmological scheme as proffering cer-
tain 'miraculous' aspects. 3 While some competing model may well treat 
these as natural, one may be led to prefer one's own construct, partly at 
1. Compare R. Hooykaas, "Science and Religion in the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance," The Christian Graduate, 7(1954), 84 on early failures 
this regard. Also Paul Kocher, SREE, p. 175 for a striking example. 
2. See John Kemeny, A Philosopher Looks at Science (Princeton: D. Van 
Nostrand Co., 1959 ), pp. 230-243. Also Philipp Frank (ed.), VST, p. 9 
and P.G. Fothergill, Evolution and Christians (London: Longmans, 
Green and Co., 1961), p. 17. 
3. See Adolf Griinbaum 's letter in the Scientific American, 189(June, 
1953 ), 6-8. 
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least, just because of this, thereby tending to limit inquiry. In neither 
model may either idea be readily, or even conceivably, directly falsifi-
able, and in the perhaps -very-lengthy period of indirect testing such ae--
philosophical ideas may strongly color the interpretation of the construct. 
Again, just what the 'physical' elements of elaborate contemporary phy-
sics are may be decided on metaphysical grounds. Hence the kind of 
test considered valid for falsification may differ so that just what is 
'observed', what is 'ad hoc', and what is 'dogma' may be rather diffi-
cult to ascertain. Finally, we note that the differing spirit of metaphy-
sical and scientific inquiry impinges upon our problem. 1 For if we 
maintain that science is objective, impersonal, unconcerned with man's 
interests, and requiring doubt while metaphysics is the product of ulti-
mate anxieties, human tensions, and the desire for a more embracing 
knowledge, we introduce the need, perhaps, for varied levels of discourse 
or at least for a distinction between the 'how' and 'why' of the quest for 
knowledge. Varied axiological judgments will then be made depending on 
the theoretician's predilections as to subjective -objective distinctions, 
personal-impersonal differences, as to what one assumes the totality of 
expereience teaches as against what is still open to question in terms of 
1. Compare Harcourt Brown in Harcourt Brown (ed.), SCS, p. 126; 
Stephan Korner, Conceptual Thinking (New York: Dover Pubns., 1959), 
pp. 264-288; and Richard Feynman, ''The Relation of Science and 
Religion," in Edward Hutchings, Jr. (ed.), Frontiers of Science (New 
York: Basic Books, 1958), pp. 307-317. 
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physical data alone. This tremendously difficult area of disagreement 
leaves the problem of demarcating metaphysics from science, particularly 
1 in cosmology, rather more open than Popper suggests. 
All of the above have to do intimately with one's attitude as to how 
satisfactorily one's prior beliefs meet the issues of experience in the 
realm pertinent to physical data. What, however, about our third point, 
as to the role of Popper's criteria in the face of the sanctioning of cer-
tain types of explanation in cosmology and the determination of the devel-
2 
opment of cosmological theories by prior metaphysical beliefs? We can, 
it should appear, consider this sufficiently outlined in varied places earlier 
in this chapter and we need pursue it here no longer. We shall return to 
the problem in the next chapter, but we will here suggest further sources 
for study of the question. 3 
Let us now turn to the role of the scientific me lieu in theory choice. 
We may be quite brief, merely summarizing the pertinent facets of the 
material outlined in the appendix, 4 and once again we are far from un-
1. See pp, 13, 1~ 11-o -t~-t.J 1.1.~ 71. Compare G.S. Kirk, PSP, p. 321. 
2. ''I think the metaphysician has a full right to •.. say to the scientist: 
I precede you in that I anticipate what later will be a scientific theory, 
and I precede you in that I provide you with a frame of reference which 
will make it possible for you to see what you are doing .... My realm 
is the realm of possibilities, preceding your actualities," Philip Merlan, 
Jour. of Phil., 56(1959) 617-618. Compare E.A. Milne, ONG, p. 132. 
''Kinematic relativity is the ultimate statement of metaphysical refine-
ment, in which every gross influence, whether of ether, space or tube 
of force, is purged away, and mere existence and motion remain." 
3. See Appendix I, Note Three. 
4. See Appendix I, Note Four. 
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appreciative of Popper's many safeguards here. We question only the 
problem of applying them in practice as easily as he apparently assumes. 
(1) Substantive concepts and theories which are widely accepted tend to 
act as a source of resistance to new ideas in cosmology. 1 
(2) The preference for a methodology in cosmology which sticks to sense 
data, the preference for established schemes of analysis and accepted 
models, and the debate over the extent of the role which mathematics 
2 
should play in schematizing all restrict cosmological theorizing. 
(3) The religious attitudes of scientists (today it is prevailingly agnostic 
or even naturalistic) plays an important role within science in placing 
some suspicion on certain deviant ideas and on their proponents. See our 
earlier discussion and later examples in this chapter. 
1. Specific examples are Copernicus and Galileo, Galileo's treatment of 
Kepler's ellipses whereby he still continued to seek a circular orbital 
view in the face of this new insight, the tendency to ignore continuous 
creation ideas over long periods of science~ the rationalists' opposi-
tion to Newton, the attempts to preserve the ether concept~ opposition 
to Robb's and Ritz's relativistic schemes, and the earlier preference 
for closed and finite models in cosmology. 
2. Examples in the present scene will become apparent in the rest of this 
chapter. Past examples are afforded by Baconian preference for the 
'fact gatherer' and the rigid schematizing of method by Mill, Herbert 
Dingle both overstresses the role of experiment in cosmology and under-
estimates the role of mathematics (see his PA~ pp. 406-407 and his MA). 
There is a present predilection to dogmatize about special relativity 
in opposition to ideas like Milne's or Bondi's or Gold's. The long pre-
ference for the Newtonian model is another example. The place of 
mathematics first becomes a problem in Galileo and Kepler and again 
in Newton. 
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(4) Social factors such as professional standing affect cosmological 
work. The established authorities tend, however innocently, to influence 
the attitudes of those seeking recognition. In the first half of our century 
this may partially explain why so much cosmological theory has tended to 
rise in Europe and so little here. Research money and professional chairs 
have gone to other tasks in this country until recently. Another factor is 
specialization wherein the insider suspects the outsider. Observational 
astronomers tend to suspect the sweep of theory and the theoretical worker 
sees the former as rather too much of a technologist. Again, professional 
societies and their journals may review unusual papers incompetently or 
place too much stress on the authority of referees. While there are many 
safeguards here, one wonders what reception kinematic relativity or uni-
fied field theories might have received had they been pre'sented by un-
knowns. The rivalry of various schools of opinion places some restraint 
too by determining which journals will and will not publish varied philoso-
phical analyses of cosmological schemes. 
(5) The pressure to publish quickly and often, or to popularize unduly, so 
as to advance one's reputation and rank or to serve the insatiable appetite 
of the press and presses may serve to influence deleteriously the time 
taken for experimental checks or thought. Dingle accuses Hoyle of this. 1 
The recent radioastronomical debate between Ryle and Hoyle (see later) 
1. Herbert Dingle, PA, p. 407. 
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is a fair example. The misleading implications of much of Eddington's 
popularizations affords another illustration. 
(6) With the geometrical rate of increase in experimental work and pub-
lication in areas pertinent to cosmology several effects are occurring. 
It is becoming increasingly more difficult to cover the literature even in 
one's own language, and this is accentuated with respect to foreign pub-
lications. 1 One consequence~ among the obvious ones, may be a tendency 
for students to enter other fields (or aspects of cosmology itself) where 
it is easier to reach new frontiers, neglecting subjects of great complexity 
and with a vast literature. Another effect is the increasing difficulty of a 
single person developing useful and more embracing concepts. 2 Perhaps 
cooperative research is required in all facets of cosmological work - and 
there is evidence this is increasing. 
(7) We remarked earlier in this section on society's tendency to support 
the- utilitarian aspects of science more than its esoteric branches. Cos-
mology, a field in which the value system is closer to that of pure science 
than many - humility, industry, rigor, disinterested curiosity, devotion, 
scepticism - might well suffer if universities and private foundations do 
not foster its growth, apart from any technological import it might have. 
Thus while the true orthodoxy of science in theory choice might 
1. For a recent study of parochialism in this regard in geoscience, see 
GeoTimes, (September~ 1961), 19. 
2. Or of being able to critically evaluate contributions to a science other 
than his own. See Milne's criticism of Jeans in this regard, in his Sir 
James Jeans (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press~ 1952), p. 154. 
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well include only agreement with attempts to falsify, the ability to explain 
or correlate more than competitors, the ability to predict the novel and 
unsuspected, and the employing of fewer or simpler basic concepts (what-
ever precision these may still require in definition), there is an orthodoxy 
which has an effect not nearly so salutary. 
1 
In our last chapter we will 
see if both can be related to Popper's scheme more definitely than he has 
done himself, but, in the light of our earlier remarks in this section and 
the last, we can now see that the less s.uitable orthodoxy can seriously 
affect either the initial presentation of theory, the methodology we prefer, 
the manner by which we test (the care we take, its scope, and its interpre-
tation), and that even the more satisfying schema of pure science, con-
sidered valuable to its own ends, requires further definition, 
As a last point in this section, let us turn to some psychological 
factors in scientific discovery not covered, save perhaps partially or im-
plicitly, in the earlier biases discussed. These may equally prove to be 
2 
Baconian idols with those noted already. We have repeatedly noted ex-
amples of the role of psychological factors in theory choice in our history 
of cosmology, indeed this subject is one of the finest examples of their 
1. Even though it provides a hurdle for new ideas which, playing its 
finest role, reduces the novel schemes scientists must ponder and 
explore to those appearing most promising. 
2. For an outline of certain pertinent literature see Appendix I, Note 
Five. 
. t 1 2 1mpor , and we have remarked on Popper's attitude to the question. 
Now Popper expressly omits these personal controls from the logic of 
scientific discovery but, as noted earlier in this chapter, this implies 
that there is no logic of theory discovery, in Hanson's sense, 3 and that 
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the choice of methodologies (including Popper's) is independent of such 
factors, and that tests for corroboration of theories need not consider 
such factors. While our attempts to enlarge Popper's thesis so as to 
handle these limitations must await our analysis in the final chapter, it 
will suffice to show here that they play a crucial role in cosmology at 
any rate. At least this will reveal that theoreticians in the field have 
not succeeded in avoiding placing them in a critical position in the forma-
tion and defence of their constructs. 
Bacon once said that every student of nature should take it as a 
rule that one should suspect whatever the mind dwells upon with peculiar 
satisfaction. May we not conclude this section, then, by demanding that 
any stUdy of scientific discovery include a serious analysis of the many 
manifestations of this point? While much of this belongs in a psycholo-
gica1 or sociological study, there are elements in political, religious, 
1. See pp. 'l!o-~z., ~8,/t>~ //1?-//.,, /.Z?, /3-?-/¥-o, /~tr.~ /s-a-/.s~ /Sft-/S7, /~s--/66., 
/7/, /11"/, /fl"tr, ZO~ Z.3S-Z36, Z~7-..ZSO., 1'fi-3-41-S3., 1'--S'~ ft.~O. 
2. See pp. /6, z '3_, 33., ¥3_, ~6, s-o, Sll;, s-6, fr/,~ ll"~. 
3. Compare his ''The Logic of Discovery," Jr. of Phil., 55(1958}, 
1073-1089 and Donald Schon's comments, Jour. of Phil., 56(1959}, 
500-503. 
metaphysical, environmental, and personal influences that may well be 
placed in Popper's scheme if it is sufficiently amplified. In regard to 
the last of these, for example, may we not ask whether esthetic judg-
ments in science (as with art) involve objective factors amenable to 
logical analysis, whether there are predictable elements in creativity 
and imagination both in postulating theories and in testing them, and 
whether personal attitudes may even affect the method of discovery and 
the emphasis one places upon such schemes in distinction to 'luck' and 
the simple accumulation of new observation? But let us move on. 
2. The Philosophical Import of Decision Among Cosmological Models. 
i. Is a Choice of Cosmological Construct Important? 
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In the light of our previous work it would appear that the answer 
to this must be yes, even though some astronomers and many other phy-
sicists consider attempts at comprehensive theories here as at best 
premature and at worst mere exercises in mathematics or imagination. 
\Vhile there are elements of truth in these criticisms, they do not tell 
the entire story. In its most general sense, cosmology is one of the most 
stimulating and challenging areas of human concern for it both stretches 
our scientific abilities to the limit and it presents us with the greatest 
demand to empirical knowledge conceivable. Ingenuity of comprehension, 
integration, and experiment are given a sphere of operation not elsewhere 
available, and our methodological concepts and varied predilections are 
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put to their most severe testing. 
More specifically, our varied views of the very nature of scientific 
models become much clearer and our conceptions of the ontological sig-
1 
nificance of these models is often made quite explicit. Again, the mode 
of construction of these is clarified. With regard to any biases operative, 
there is an opportunity to make these explicit,. for the totality of available 
I 
sense data must seriously affect our general world-view in all other areas. 
Many problems of great philosophical import and of long standing are 
brought to the fore, for one can hardly avoid analysis of concepts such as 
the nature of time, the question of infinity and of creation, and the applica-
bility of uniformitarian presuppositions. 
Popper presents a methodology of discovery. One may ascertain 
whether it suggests which construct to prefer, whether cosmologists apply 
it with any consistency and to what degree. whether there are inherent 
difficulties when it is applied to what must be models with only one case 
(the universe). and whether his lack of concern with the problem of mean-
ing seriously affects the utilization of his method in analysis of creation, 
unobservables. or trends such as that toward a 'heat death'. Let us then 
turn to an examination of these questions, so critical both to the models 
and to the method in which they are applied. 
1. A fine new study in this area is L.W. Friedrich (ed.). The Nature of 
Physical Knowledge (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1961). 
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ii. The Principle of Uniformity. 
In cosmology, this question so critical to scientific endeavor, is 
particularized in three areas: the apparent motion and distribution of 
distant galaxies, the cosmological principles, and the so-called Mach 
Principle. We will look at each of these in turn, and once again the 
rather technical discussion and bibliography will be placed in appen-
dices. 1 The first area, as that additional material should show, clearly 
reveals that most theoreticians consider the recession of galaxies to be 
quite consonant with some sort of uniformitarian presumption. They have 
accepted this particular motion because of a red-shift in the spectral lines 
of distant galaxies, interpreted as due to a Doppler effect caused by ra-
dial motion away from us. And they have accepted uniformity as provi-
ding at least a close similarity in the appearance of space at a given time 
from place to place, excluding only models whose content has no movement 
or random motion on the large scale, but permitting a great variety of 
theses as to how this appearance arises and how it is related to time. 
The work on red-shift provides a fine example of the diligent search 
for elusive observational data in science. It also reveals the vicissitudes 
of attempts to relate such data in a mathematical law. We have seen, 
1. On the motion and distribution of distant galaxies, see Appendix J. 
For earlier references in this dissertation, see pp. IZ7-13.Z, 1-¥-?-/s-o, 
/{,,, /73,17S"j llt3-/Y9-, /118", /?0, /?~-/?~, 2DZ, .Zo¥,Zo(,, .Z/3,22(/l; .2'70~ 
23'3-235", 238-23,, -¥41-8"- ~S:J, <¥7~ -.t,t-7?, ¢g"/-~8'Z, ~TS-~11'~. 
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first, that there appears to be a relationship whereby the velocity of re-
cession increases linearly with distance, at least until the recession 
velocity is around 2 Oo/o that of light. The constant in this relation is 
known only within broad limits, but its reciprocal (if taken as the 'age' 
of a model) seems to allow all the generally-accepted ages for objects 
in the universe. Thus it falsifies of itself practically no cosmological 
model, although the belief that it did, when the accepted value differed 
from the present range, was conducive to the rise of steady-state models. 
The law at greater distances exhibits some apparent acceleration which, 
along with indications of increased density in galactic counts at large dis-
tances, may falsify certain models. However, the data is highly tentative 
and other means must be found if we are to feel secure in these falsifi-
cations. 
A few deviant theoreticians, however, provide us with the most 
interesting examples of problems for a Popperian analysis. The first of 
these is that provided by those who deny that any or all of the red -shift 
is a Doppler effect~ But we have seen that such suggestions are often not 
as coherent with other aspects of physics and astronomy as is the usual 
concept. In itself, this kind of evaluation can, however, stultify scientific 
advance, but on the other hand we must be sure the novel idea is a serious 
challenge. Popper's idea that a construct must be testable has been used 
generally {however unknowingly) to provide the needed criterion, for 
critics have pointed out that they fail to see how these deviant shift ideas J 
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not already placed on a shaky basis by astronomical observations of 
different types, can be corroborated under suitable terrestrial con-
ditions. There is no present scientific meaning to that which cannot 
be observed in a known environment, even potentially. 1 However, other 
relativistic explanations of the red-shifts are potentially testable and 
will be analyzed later. 
Another is presented by the view that we study only expansion in 
a massive supercluster and not of the universe at large. We have criti-
cized this~ in the appendix~ as meaningless scientifically if it a priori 
assumes we will never be able to determine which we are in fact doing. 
To the degree that the limits of such a supercluster are placed in regions 
where observation is now~ and may remain, subject to ambiguity we may 
say that Popper would place the theory on a low level of scientific value. 
A final example is provided by supercluster size, rotational motion~ and 
presumed age. To the extent that steady-state~ or other~ cosmologists 
argue that this data cannot be fitted to some preconceived cosmological 
principle~ and to the degree that there is evidence for the validity of such 
superclustering, the principle is falsified in some element. If still main-
tained nonetheless~ argument used to explain away the evidence must be 
considered ad hoc and the scientific utility of the principle is greatly 
lowered. 
In conclusion we may say that presumed clustering of different types 
1. This applies also to the idea that the shift is only partially Doppler. 
If we cannot test the relative roles the idea is meaningless. 
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and changes in galaxy density with distance are both, at least for the pre-
sent~ subject to a number of potential tests. These must be carried out, 
and to the extent they can be and corroborate the presumptions~ those 
theories which do not permit the clustering or density change will be 
falsified Popperian constructs. These tests along with better red-shift 
data at great distances, provide then possible modes of falsification for 
theories not allowing the data found, but, since no current cosmological 
theories really require clustering of any precise type, it will be changes 
in density or red-shift which will corroborate models predicting the data 
found, and not the cluster tests! 
Turning now to the cosmological principles, we find a quite different 
problem to the above. Our discussion heretofore has dealt with procedures 
for ascertaining uniformity in certain variables in nature important to the 
construction or choice of cosmological models, but now we meet the ques-
tion of choice among uniformitarian concepts foundational to the models 
and isolatable from the empirical observation of nature. There are several 
varieties of cosmological principles sufficiently important to treat for our 
purposes: the 'narrow' principle of most evolutionary models, the 'perfect' 
1 
principle in steady-state models, and Milne's principle. 
The first of these originates in Einstein's development of general 
1. Earlier pertinent discussion of these, and allied topics, may be found 
on pp . .Zfi-Z9, ~"1-,.~fl~ 5"8-SY, 9~, -,f/; NJZ-/03, /OS';, /10, //~_,/Z8'-IZ~ 137-/~1'; /~7, 
/5"1, ;,s-6 -/S~ ~~~~ 171, "'9--/f'S", /??, 203, .ZC6 -.zo 7, .Z/~-,;u~ .ZZ.I, ZZ.S';, 233-2.'3¢, 
Z+'"3-2¥4, 2+'::1, 2'1-;fr~ zs-o, I'~/, .¢65'", ¥7?, ~8'~- ~"· 
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relativity wherein laws of physics are presumably made independent of 
the choice of spatial coordinate system; the latter the feature descrip-
tive of his cosmological principle. Originally this relativity theory was 
applied, as we saw, to a static model conceived of as having all points 
equivalent. i.e. with the same mean curvature. The cosmic constant was 
presumed to provide this stability. but with the discovery that it seemed 
to have failed in this regard, the general theory was adapted so as to pro-
vide only for a uniformity in the description of the universe for a given 
time. Implicit in this is the contingency of certain laws. or at least the 
values of the constants in them, to a particular epoch but there is also 
implied the maintenance of certain laws however complex and variable 
the 'constants' therein, descriptive of the relationship of the model at 
one epoch to another. 
While the choice of which laws are 'contingent' and which 'necess-
ary' has been criticized as arbitrary by Bondi et al one maY., it seems, 
provide more precision in the analysis. Obviously. prior to observation. 
a choice of varied general laws prescriptive of the nature of any model 
may be made, but these are restricted usually to items like the change in 
the factor B with time. the controls on the curvature, and obedience to 
a conservation of energy principle. Any, or all, of these is potentially 
falsifiable and is seldom taken, except as in Eddington, as logically nec-
essary (and not even he is able to sustain the idea consistently). Of 
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course the degree of falsifiability varies greatly, as we shall see later; 
but falsification arises by discovery that implied descriptive principles 
at any time do not fit the facts of observation, however difficult and de-
batable this discovery may be. Thus the models function in a hypothetico-
deductive manner, and no cosmological laws need be taken a priori as 
inviolable in the face of contrary experience. 
One may not assume, scientifically, any change in a law or 'con-
stant' therein in a potentially untestable manner. Thus if the distant 
regions of space, representative of the long past. differ in any way from 
those near us we must offer a potentially testable explanation and not beg 
ultimate agnosticism. This we cannot do in a circular manner either, 
assuming (say) the role of smaller radius or mcreased density in the 
universe which instead we desire to corroborate, for this obviates test-
ing. 
We may say then that Einstein's cosmological principle is not a 
part of any of this. It is not synthesized from experience (as he clearly 
saw), it does not appear to be necessary to thought (he called it a 'free 
invention'), nor does it seem to be axiomatic. The total model, which-
ever it may be, is axiomatic in that it is the postulation of a composite 
of presumably consistent statements whose implications are to be tested, 
but in the model the cosmological principle serves only to control any 
a priori license in applying and not applying these statements. Thus we 
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cannot falsify the principle but rather the postulated laws which it pre-
sumes apply in space-time. Popper's remarks on 'uniformity' then 
clearly agree with the way the Einsteinian cosmological principle is used 
in building world-models. 
The perfect cosmological principle is a broader concept; basic to 
the ideas of Bondi and Gold and arising within the specific field equations 
of Hoyle. The principle assumes the description of the universe on the 
large scale remains constant through space and time. Utilizing it, along 
with certain observational data, Bondi and Gold develop an entire cosmo-
logy while Hoyle develops certain partial facets therefrom in his model. 
But, since both schools interpret the consequences of applying the principle 
as being testable, it cannot then be conceived to be self -evident. Does 
this leave only the alternatives of its being a synthesis from experience 
or an axiom in their models (or parts of them)? The two groups seem to 
treat it as both, but thereby they raise certain problems. 
In the former case it is supposedly extrapolated from the universe 
as so far observed, although it may require revision to fit the new details 
of galaxy clustering and it may even be inapplicable if distant observations 
prove to reveal factors not consonant with it. But does not this place it on 
a par with the narrower principle just discussed, for both simply argue 
for the applicability of laws, unchanging in the case of the steady-state 
theoreticians and changing in a testable manner in the case of the cosmo-
logists espousing evolutionary models, to observations not yet made? 
And in the latter case can it be an axiom: has it deducible con-
sequences? Now it is obvious that the models which the steady-state 
schools present do have testable, or at least potentially corroborable, 
consequences. But the perfect cosmological principle is not one of the 
statements involved in the complex making up these models, for they 
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can be constructed without it. It serves rather as a regulative principle 
in deciding what physical laws and theories they will permit in their 
models from the beginning or at some later point. Indeed its advocates 
use it to define what laws and theories may be given the appellation 
'scientific'. These choices are logically arbitrary (however preferable 
they may seem, a priori, from past results or in comparison to present 
alternatives) and their value will have to be proven out against competing 
ideas, equally arbitrary on logical grounds. Thus we may test their 
steady-state models, but some other construct, 'unscientific' by their 
definition, may prove preferable! At that point we may look back and 
decide which regulative principles were not justified in suggesting the 
restriction of science to certain specified classes of descriptive relation 
(laws and theories). 
Turning to Milne's cosmological principle, defined as the 'necessity 
for observers, on any of the uniformly-moving fundamental particles in 
Euclidean space, to describe the motion of the whole in statistically the 
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same way~' we meet another example of the same role for such principles. 
In Einstein the principle used was the product of judgments of the intelli-
gibility and rationality of nature, of esthetics, and of economy and turned 
out to define what was scientific law and theory. In Bondi and Gold, de-
sires to preserve the pre-requisites of science as they saw them -
requirements such as simplicity and the statistical constancy of observed 
relationships - eventuated in another differing proscription of the scien-
tific area. Here, in Milne, it is the psychological consequences of desires 
to find exact and simple sources for scientific laws, the desire to avoid 
presuming any physical laws, and the belief in the necessity of a specific 
type of creation which results, as he saw clearly, in a definition of homo-
geneity and consequent delimitation of its consequences. Thus, once more 
a cosmological principle simply acts so as to regulate what is scientific 
and what is not. 
The interesting point is that other workers have usually been clearer 
about what these three camps were doing than their founders. These wor-
kers see the principles acting merely as dictionaries defining the scienti-
fic, and thus permissible, constructs therein, and subject to revision if 
the models themselves fail to find corroboration after severe examination. 
They see the principles then, not as falsifiable, but as proving useful or 
not. And it is likely that most see this utility, or lack of it, arising with 
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. 1 
about equal effort at testing in each case, although each camp sees its 
own models as most testable in some manner. But the founders appear 
to have essentialistic tendencies, arguing as they do for the a priori 
preference of their definitions on psychological, religious or anti -religious, 
and other axiological grounds as if they had discovered an ultimate truth 
of nature. And, quite inconsistently along with this (for it makes the truth 
of the principle supposedly contingent on observation), they argue that so 
far experience corroborates their principle. But they fail to see that this 
evidence from test conclusions which they claim to produce is for the 
models within their scientific schemes and places no truth-value upon 
the cosmological principles themselves; this because the principles serve 
as a meta-language to the language at the level of theory and do not enter 
into their truth -values. 2 
Finally, let us note the role of Mach's principle earlier, 3 however 
it is of interest here in that greatly varied constructs have not only been 
considered to be consonant with it but have been developed so as to give it 
a fundamental place. The principle may be stated briefly as the view 
that one may define a frame of reference relative to the distant stars 
1. It is interesting to note that in Einstein's case, this might be discovered 
by falsifying the general theory of relativity itself long before many 
models based upon it could be otherwise falsified. 
2. See Appendix K, Note One. 
3. See pp. 12/,~ /37-/~o,~ /6S"-/~6, ~~g-; /11~ 2oo,. zo~ Z/¥-.- Z~3-Z~fl; Zf&~. zf&8', ¢~.7, 
-~~~ "?-~70; # ,..~ -~?/. 
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rather than with respect to a hypothetical absolute space. This has gen-
erally been interpreted as requiring that inertia, and the laws and con-
stants of physics, be the product of the structure of the universe. 
We shall give attention here to its precise role in model building 
and to its place in the scheme of testing these constructs, as seen by con-
temporary workers, making no attempt to provide a critique of the com-
plexities of the principle itself. 1 If we look carefully at the work dis-
cussed in the appendix, several important conclusions stand out in these 
regards. 
(1) The Machian principle is universally taken as a fact of experience if 
only in the weak sense that inertia is describable by an invariable direction 
for motion in space. 
(2) Bridgman has shown that to introduce distant matter into the descrip-
tion above is convenient for geometrical reference but need not play any 
physical role, although a physical relation is not obviated. It is doubtful 
whether this is true in general relativity, however, where the reference 
matrix is itself shaped by material content. 
(3) Cosmological models of a very diverse sort can be made amenable to 
the principle. However, except in the a prioristic versions of Milne and 
Bondi-Gold where only a geometrical version is really necessary (at least 
as they have described their model originally) .. the physical version is 
held to obtain. 
1. For brief notes on contemporary discussion of the principle see 
Appendix K, Note Two. 
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(4) The physical version is seen as essential to certain models; in others 
it is seen only as consistent with the model. But this physical relati,onship 
is taken as a most favorable factor in a construct's acceptability by ad-
herents. 
(5) The Machian problem is like that of explaining planetary motion ar-
ound the sun. In both cases we can describe a state of affairs and then 
seek an explanation. In Mach's view we simply deal with a much larger 
region of observation and potential observation. Unless we assume in-
stantaneous action at a distanceJ anything we can seeJ now or laterJ may 
in theory influence us (~ gravitationally or electromagnetically) and 
such influence would be that due to the objects we see at the time in their 
history now apparent to us. It is scientifically meaningless to talk of un-
observable regions (not just 'unobserved') in this regard until, and if~ it 
is found that influences can pass between objects at greater than the 
velocity of light. 1 
Now, just as there are varied explanations for the planetary motions, 
1. On Einstein and inertia see A. Einstein, OMLY, pp. 104-106 and J.L. 
Synge, "How Stands the Theory of Gravitation Today?~" Adv. of Sci., 
14(1957), 207-214. On how gravity travels see report, Sci. Amer., 
200(April, 1959), 68; S. Tolansky, "Gravitation; Cosmos and Atomic 
Particles, 11 Discovery, 18(1957), 522-523; W.B. Bonnor, "Gravita-
tional Waves, 11 Sci. News, 49(August, 1958), 7 -16; L.I. Schiff, 
"Neutrino Theory and Gravitation, 11 Science, 127(1958), 1063; H. Bondi, 
"Plane Gravitational Waves in General Relativity, 11 Nature, 179(1957), 
1072-1073. 
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so there may be varied theses offered to explain the unusual motion of 
(say} a Foucault pendulum relative to distant bodies. General relativity 
is one such attempt. But while it was devised so as to incorporate the 
principle of equivalence, it ended up with solutions to the field equations 
in empty space. This raises the question of whether physical meaning 
can be given to such solutions, as Dicke suggests, and in conjunction 
raises the question of whether physical space-time requires the prior 
1 
notion of matter or the reverse. Thus, while it is widely conceded that 
general relativity is consonant with Mach's principle, it is still not clear 
whether a physical Machian idea is logically prior to general relativity, 
as with Sciama, or posterior as it is in Wheeler and Mould. 
But we see also that other models may be based upon a Machian 
premise, as in Moon and Spencer or Bondi and Gold, or may incorporate 
2 it as in Milne. Hence it can hardly be used to give prior favor to any 
specific model among these. Also a physical verion is predictive of a 
number of observed cosmic facts; but this does not show that it predicts 
these facts uniquely, and even if it did, since it fits different models, it 
can hardly place weight for corroboration. 
(6) Should any evidence be forthcoming for a change in the universal gra-
vitational constant with time, this will lend increased weight not only to 
1. Richard A. Mould, AGR, 485-486. Compare D.W. Sciama, OOI, p .. 34 
2. E.A. Milne, ONG, pp. 120-124. 
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models predicint or permitting it but to the physical version of the Mach 
. . 1 1 pr1nc1p e. 
Thus Mach's principle~ particularly in its physical form, turns out 
to play an important role in constructing cosmic models. It is also perti-
nent to the question of corroborability in general relativity. But this 
version of uniformitarianism would seem to require much further devel-
opment in the subtleties of its implications and of its specific role in 
differing models, 2 and much further empirical study, before we can 
give it any very great risk value in testing. Its present import lies in 
the more philosophical issues of the physical properties of space (see 
Griinbaum and Hoyle), which we must ignore here~ and in logico-esthetic 
decisions about models, to be analyzed later. 
iii. The Problem of Spatial Infinio/. 
1 We have noted certain historical facets of this question earlier. 
2 
Obviously this is an area deeply involved in philosophy and even meta-
mathematical rules of enumeration which would be very lengthy and com-
plex to discuss. We shall simply note here the role the problem plays in 
cosmological concept formation and in the acceptability of these models 
in the light of Popper's analysis. 
Einstein first, in the contemporary scene, saw certain problems 
1. See pp. I.ZI/-12'1/ /63-/6~, /67, /lf'3/ zoz/za~.2o~-2a7, z13/zz~-zzs-/2.'3o/ 
<1'--¥- 'ff--¥-5"~J .t.t-7'1/ ~8'2-¥-8'3. 
2. Compare M.K. Munitz~ KDMC, pp. 328-338. 
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with spatial infinity. Assuming his general theory, he noted the difficulty 
inherent in an infinite static model if one permits his cosmological prin-
ciple as delimiting the nature of physical laws in space. This principle 
obviates ad hoc escape from Oblers' and Seeliger's paradoxes therein; 
consequently the alternative is a spatial infinity but a finitely extended 
material content. But then one is left with Euclidean space far beyond 
this matter and the consonant Galilean frames therein appear to violate 
the assumed general relativity theory. Hence, he suggested a closed and 
finite static space around this matter. Later work, mathematical and 
observational in nature, suggests this be revised so as to expand. 
Now such a topology can have its curvature measured, in theory 
anyway, internally so there is no need to imagine a second-order space 
without, in which one measures the 'radius' of the model. Zeno's pro-
blem with finite space may then be avoided, in science anyway. One can 
1 
instead talk of space being formed as cosmic time proceeds! There was, 
however, a predisposition on Einstein's part to take the curvature as 
closing space, repeated in Lemaftre, de Sitter, Eddington, and Jordan. 2 
But there seems to be little ground, other than a purely esthetic one_. for 
rejecting certain models because of the difficulty of conceiving an imag-
1. Space may expand with velocity greater than that of light as this is not 
a dynamical motion in space but an inflation of space itself. 
2. Note Pascual Jordan, Science and the Course of History (New Haven: 
Yale Univ. Press, 1955), p. 84. 
inary radius in them, and surely none for rejecting zero curvature, at 
least insofar as their general relativistic models are concerned. 1 
Later Milne assumes an unbounded Euclidean space but develops 
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an 'observable' space for any fundamental particle, delimited by the re-
gion where other particles appear to recede from it with the velocity of 
light. Space for an observer is meaningful scientifically only within this 
volume. Yet he defines another time-scale in which the universe will 
appear static. Milne believes that this settles the question of the curva-
ture of space, left open in general relativistic models, since a curvature 
is defined for each scale. 2 Dirac presumed, on the other hand, a finite 
but flat space! The argument rests on assuming that the discussion which 
he presents relative to the large dimensionless numbers is valid, for were 
space curved its radius would be related to these changing numbers and 
yet it could not consistently be so. 
Finally, the steady-state theoreticians have assumed an unending 
space. Bondi and Gold postulate it essentially so as to permit the repe-
tition of experiment without end and to avoid anomalies they find in evolu-
tionary models. Such a space has matter distributed isotropically and 
homogeneously, both because this is a rough fit to observation (at least 
at the time of their early work} and since it is the simplest assumption. 3 
1. Except that one may possibly accept a closed model on some epistemic 
criterion, as in Eddington. See his RCG. 
2. See E.A. Milne, ONG. 
3. Of course most evolutionary models postulate this also. 
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But in order to provide for change and a direction to time, to agree 
with red-shift data and to avoid a heat death, this matter, on the large 
scale, is assumed to expand in space (with velocity proportional to dis-
tance so as to preserve homogeneity along with continuous replacement 
of the moving matter). The appropriate metric is that of de Sitter. For 
any galaxy, there is a horizon, beyond which we cannot see, defined as the 
distance beyond which no events are observable to us at any time. Dis-
tant galaxies, under expansion, should be continuarlly passing over this 
horizon but be replaced by new matter. 1 
Hoyle instead begins with a relativistic model which turns out to be 
formally like the de Sitter model but with density ::J: o. In it, matter which 
appears moves off along a geodesic from the point of appearance and 
eventually disappears over the visibility threshold centered in the point 
of appearance. But the time-axis being open infinitely into the past, the 
curvature of space in any sizeable region may be taken as zero, and hence 
1. On the horizon in steady-state models see F. Hoyle, NMEU, pp. 378-379; 
T. Gold, letter, Nature, 175 (1955 ), 382; F. Hoyle, letter, Nature, 175 
(1955 ), 808; W. Rindler, ''Visual Horizons in World Models," M.N.R.A.S., 
116(1956), 662-677; G.J. Whitrow, note, The Observatory, 73(1953), 205 
and 74(1954), 37, 173-174, 253-254; H. Bondi and T. Gold, note, The 
Observatory, 74(1954), 36; F. Hoyle, The Observatory, 74(1954), 253 
and his NU, pp. lOlff; and Parani, The Observatory, 74(1954), 172. 
Hoyle defines our horizon as containing those points which are in our 
present and which will, at any future time, become visible to us, i.e. 
the region whose R= 1/Hubble's constant). --
3ll 
the entirety as unlimited. 
We have noted, under the discussion of the red-shift and the dis-
tribution of distant galaxies, and shall remark on again under the general 
survey of model-testing .. the possibility that there is some slight weight 
presently in favor of the finite models above. But it must be noted that 
choice of finite or infinite models has been predicated, rightly or wrongly, 
largely on other grounds. The finite Einsteinian model rests essentially 
upon attempts to avoid, without refuge to some hierarchy, the paradoxes 
of Oblers ana Seeliger and to absorb Mach's principle. In Milne it is the 
product of certain ideas of creation and epistemology. In Dirac it is done 
to avoid inconsistencies with numerical ideas held on other grounds. In 
Bondi and Gold the infinite model rests on Mach's principle and the con-
sonant operational criteria of the perfect cosmological principle. And in 
Hoyle it follows from a set of relativistic field equations with a term con-
trolling the continual appearance of matter. 
Thus it is grounded in no overt way upon the usual philosophical dis-
cussions, as far as the figures noted above are concerned or in any of 
dozens of their analysts. 1 And often the grounds used may be unsatisfac-
tory any longer. Olbers' and Seeliger's paradox simply requires a reces-
1. However, a major example of philosophical predilection here is Soviet 
cosmology. See Maxim Mikulak, SPCT. pp. 44-46. They presume an 
infinite model. 
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sion, or much less preferably a hierarchy, of galaxy centers to find re-
solution even in infinite models. Mach's principle is hardly critically 
related to either a finite or infinite model. Milne's kinematic ideas for 
a finite model can be related to other schemes carrying few of his ere-
ational or epistemic assumptions. Dirac's numbers may well be con-
sis tent with versions of the steady-state model. And Hoyle •s field 
equations are not the only ones predicting an infinite model and the app-
earance of matter. 
While distant observation has not settled by any means, but only 
given some preliminary relevant suggestions, whether and how space is 
curved on the large scale~ and although original reasons for advancing 
one model or another are no longer too compelling, the presumed finitude 
or endless character of the universe is still used for or against certain 
models. Indirectly, it may be because other connected ideas in the model 
are accepted or rejected and consistency compels us to carry through the 
implications. Directly, the grounds are of an analogical nature. 
Cosmologists no longer worry what lies 'outside' closed models 
for space 1 or outside the steady-state visibility horizon, beyond which 
things are assumed to be the same as within the range of potential visi-
bility but where we cannot ever give empirical proof. 2 Rather, they 
1. Except for those with projective relativistic schemes in five dimen-
sions. 
2. Except for those who suggest very large scale inhomogeneity in 
space, but we have seen this is hardly scientifically meaningful 
unless the visibility horizon can reveal it. 
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evaluate spatial extent on esthetic grounds when it is done directly. 
Hoyle provides a fine example when he argues that physics will likely 
proceed to endless levels of subtlety, and that the steady-state model 
alone permits it to. This is because, he claims, pulsting models could 
not accomodate laws of infinite complexity and exploding models, while 
allowing an infinite universe in some cases, allow only a finite portion 
of these laws to be discovered (since there is only one generation of 
galaxies and life). His model, on the other hand, permitting an endless 
generation of galaxies, allows learning to be passed from old to younger 
galaxy so as to provide unlimited intellectual possibilities! 1 
We may conclude that the concept of finite or infinite space then 
is usually not taken as a metaphysical or religious question, it is often 
the product of ideas no longer widely held, it is not yet a well-tested dis-
tinction, and it is connected often to prior methodological assumptions 
as to the best criteria of what science is or can be. Thus Popper's cri-
teria for rejecting constructs after severe testing has not yet proven out 
here and decision is made rather on bases Popper would call 'psycholo-
gical' and 'schematic'. 
iv. The Problem of Time and of Creation. 
Our problems here are again of great philosophical import, but we 
can hardly deal with other than the aspects stressed by scientific cosmo-
1. F. Hoyle, WTB, pp. 18 3 -184. 
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logists. Nonetheless, a variety of facets of these controversial areas 
have played a part in both the choice of models and the discussion of their 
corroborability, and these we must analyze. Specifically, we will assess 
the utility in testing of cosmic time and its alternatives; the problem of 
whether there is convincing evidence for a first moment for the entire 
universe, for only portions of it, or for none of it; and briefly, the con-
sonant logical question of creation to see just how helpful they are to 
cosmology from the perspective of a Popperian scheme. We may build 
1 
upon our earlier mention of pertinent matter, working through each 
class of models successively. 
The question of a beginning point to space-time first arises in mod-
ern cosmology in those relativistic models wherein there is a zero value 
for the radius and thus a beginning of expansion time. These constructs 
have appeared to gain some credence from the presence of conditions in 
the universe requiring a finite past, ~ conditions of less than maximum 
entropy, the presence of radioactive elements, and some agreement among 
maximum ages obtained for astronomical and terrestrial objects in a 
variety of ways. Mathematically, they have depended upon the presumed 
2 
presence of a cosmic time in the field equations of their models. And 
1. See pp. Ji'J 32-3S", //'~ //Y-/1?, 173 -17s; /77-/fl'.z_, /It?-/?~_, /?s; /?1"-/??, .z~:~-207, 
21,, z2-st--z2.~ zzs--2:1o, Z33-Z.34', -1'93--1'4-tr_, ¢7Z--fl1fz., ~B<~~-~Cs: 
2. See G.J. Whitrow, NPT, pp. 223-267; H. Bondi, RC, pp. ll6-ll7; and 
his Cosmology, pp. 70-72, 101-122. 
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physically they have related such a cosmic time to the Doppler red-shift 
and thus to Hubble's law. 
In this section we will not attempt to decide upon the actual falsifi-
cation of any specific models mentioned insofar as actual empirical data 
is concerned, but rather on their corroborability. One of the first con-
ditions here is to ensure that the model can exceed in duration the age 
of processes or objects within the observed universe. 1 While the 'age' 
from the reciprocal of the Hubble constant has increased rapidly in the 
last dozen years, it seems that the ages for stars and galaxies has risen 
even faster. Now there are very few feasible grounds upon which to 
question ages up to that of our solar system (~ 5xl0 9 years), and many 
theoretical reasons, connected with galactic evolution, to considerably 
increase this for the ages of our galaxy and then others supposedly more 
mature. It seems to the writer, after some laborious analysis of the ques-
tion, that approximately 20xl09 years is a fair and conservative age for 
the oldest galaxies which we observe, assuming the physics used. Con-
sequently, the minimal value we gave the Hubble constant earlier is just 
adequate to encompass such a figure. 
But we have chosen the maximum value for the reciprocal of the 
Hubble constant and an apparently conservative value for the maximum 
age of galaxies in the light of our current knowledge of both. In addition, 
1. For an outline of recent work here, see Appendix L, Note One. 
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we have noted that there is some slight evidence in favor of a present 
value for the recession-distance constant which is less than that obtain-
ing long ago. It seems quite likely then that if an expanding model of the 
relativistic type is to be acceptable, some way must be found to so alter 
the expansion conditions~ in the period much before the time we see in 
our most distant observations~ that a greater age is permitted. This has 
been frequently suggested~ 1 the classic cases being the models which 
begin in an unstable Einsteinian static form, or variants as in Lema1tre. 
Here we meet a two-fold difficulty. Is not such an escape ad hoc 
and presumptuous ? And is such an idea testable or meaningful, includ-
ing the extrapolated problem of an actual beginning to current expansion? 
To aid us in examining these points~ let us summarize the tenor of the 
arguments presented pro and con among theoreticians on behalf of these 
issues. 
(1) "The world known to us cannot have been in existence for more than a 
certain length of time according to the laws known to us~ but (they] do not 
say more than that in any respect." 2 
1. See G.C. McVittie~ FTC, p. 152 and AUC~ p. 134; F .A. Paneth, HOU1 
pp. 196-197; W.B. Bonnor~ "The Instability of the Einstein Universe~" 
M.N.R.A.S.1 115(1955)1 310-322; Paul Epstein~ ''Attempts to Reconcile 
the Long and Short Time Scales in Cosmology, 11 Proc. Astron. Soc. 
Pacific, 47(1935)~ 203; H. Dingle, ''The Age of the Universe and Its 
Bearing on Astronomical Problems~" Proc. Astron. Soc. Pacific~ 
45(1933)1 159-170; and Donald Andrews~ "The Challenge of the New 
Cosmology~ 11 Christian Scholar~ 41(1958)1 347-360. 
2. F .A. Paneth, HOU1 p. 196 and R.O. Kapp, DU. 
